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CHA.PrER I 
THE PERSONAL CHARACTER OF THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF WILLIAM JAM.bS 
It has been said of contemporary existentialists that 
they philosophize from the viewpoint of one deeply involved 
in the action of life rather than from the viewpoint of a 
spectator. Yhile historians do not usually number William 
James among the existentialists, there are striking similar-
ities between his approach to philosophical questions and 
the decidedly personal philosophy for which certain existen-
tialists, notably Kierkegaard and Marcel, are so well known. 
From their point of view, genuine philosophy can be done 
only by one who is intimately involved with the problems with 
which he concerns himself. These problems must be problems 
which arise out of the philosopher's own personal existence--
problems which are of vital interest to him precisely because 
he is a human being. In general, existentialists have little 
use for the cold abstractions of logic. They are primarily 
interested in the problems of concrete human existence with 
all of its emotional and dramatic overtones. 
Although William James was not an· existentialist, his 
philosophy, like the philosophy of men like Kierkegaard and 
Marcel, was never a matter of abstract logical speculation; 
1 
2 
tor him it was always a living endeavor--a vocation. He 
knew well the belief of such philosophers as the rationalists 
an~ positivists of his day that philosophy, as well as all 
knowledge worthy of the name, must somehow be coldly objec-
tive. And he knew well that such a demand was unrealistic. 
For man is not pure intellect--he is flesh and blood, "a 
bundle.of desires,"1 who lives inasmuch as they are grati-
fied and dies to the extent that they are refused. According 
to James, it is this whole man, not just his intellect, that 
philosophizes. Certainly this was true in James's own case. 
Some might say that for James abstract rational objectivity 
was impossible because of his volatile, active, and emotional 
nature. Be that as it may, James did not philosophize from 
the viewpoint of one looking at the issues from the outside, 
nor did he think it wise that anyone should. He did not 
philosophize as one removed from the fray. Rather he philos-
ophized from the middle of the battlefield, so to speak; and 
what he gave us was not an abstract analysis of reality, but 
a blow by blow account of life as concretely lived, a vivid 
description of the world as he experienced it. For James, 
the fullnes~ of reality could never be held within the con-
fines of any ~bstract genera~izations or constructions. 
For existential thinkers, the purpose of philosophy has 
always been to furnish a way of life rather than to develop 
1Villiam James, notes on man, cited by Ralph Barton 
Perry, The Thought and Character of William James (2 vols.; 
Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1935), I, 301. 
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an abstract doctrinal system. Certainly, the problems about 
which James philosophized were more than mere objects of 
speculative curiosity for him; they were questions, the 
answers.to which, he believed, ought determine the whole 
course of one's existence. They were issues which he con-
sidered vital to himself and to all men. 
The questions with which James concerned himself were 
common subjects of philosophical discussion in his day. They 
were problems which his father, Henry James, Sr., debated 
with his friends, friends such as Ralph Waldo Emerson, who 
frequently visited the James household, and Thomas Carlyle, 
with whom Henry James, Sr., carried on a lively correspondence. 
Through his father and his father's friends, as well as 
through his own extensive reading, William James was intro-
duced to philosophical questions: Is reality basically one 
or many? Is the course of the world determined by blind 
physio-chemical forces or is the world guided by some higher 
power possessing intelligence? How can the presence of evil 
in the world be reconciled with the reality of an all-good 
God traditiona~ly held to be infinite and omnipotent? What 
is the real significance of human existence and what is its 
relationship to reality as a whole? To what extent, if any, 
is man free and responsible for his own life and for what 
becomes of the world? These concerns as well as many other 
questions, especially questions dealing with science and 
religion, were matters.which William James discussed at 
length with his friends and contemporaries--with men like 
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Charles Peirce, Chauncey Wright, John Fiske, and Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes, Jr. These men along with James and a few others 
fo~ed a small group known as "The Metaphysical Club" which 
met regularly in Cambridge in the early 18?0's for the express 
purpose of philosophical discussion. 
Although the questions discussed by James with his 
friends and associates concerned problems which occupied 
many of the philosophic minds of the nineteenth century, for 
James they held a special fascination. They involved issues 
which were vitally important to him personally. He saw that 
the answers to these questions could influence his own way 
of life. More than that, the answers to these questions held 
the key to that most vital of all issues--the very value of 
life itself. Many and varied were the problems about which 
William James philosophized; and yet underlying all of them, 
even those which seemed the most metaphysical, was one burning 
issue--"Is life worth living?" And for James this was more 
than a merely academic question. 
No doubt, there are men who have never asked themselves 
this question, because, ~ facto, life for them is generally 
pleasant; their days are relatively free of tragedy and pain; 
they are not reflective and perhaps are not often touched by, 
or vividly aware of, the pain of others. Ask them whether 
life is worth living or not, and they are likely to reply, 
"Of course it is," because they have never had any great 
reason to suspect that it might not be. There are still 
other men, perhaps like Henry James, Sr., for whom life, 
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with whatever pains and sorrows and tragedies it may embody, 
is worth living in virtue of some ultimate outcome of it, 
such as promised happiness in heaven or the oneness with God 
that the faith of Henry James, Sr., promised him. But for 
all those for whom the question does not pose a problem--
either because they do not have a faith which guarantees 
them a happy ending, no matter what, or because even though 
they anticipate or at least hope for some repose or joy when 
life is over, they need something ~ to make them want to 
live !!:2:!• The hope of heavenly bliss may make dying somewhat 
easier, but it does not in every case provide a compelling 
motive for living. It is not always enough to keep the fire 
of life burning from day to day. 
The youthful William James did not share his father's 
Swedenborgian faith in the eventual ·mergence of man's selfhood 
in the selfhood of God. Even if he had had no intellectual 
difficulties with his father's theology, his own longing for 
self-identity and self-realization would have made any theory 
which even suggested the loss of the individual creature's 
identity in that of the Creator repugnant to him. As far as 
any individual personal survival after death is concerned, 
William James in his youth did not seem to have any convic-
tions in that regard, although in later life he confessed a 
growing need for such a belief. But even if he had believed 
in some sort of eternal reward or life after death, it is not 
likely that this belief in some future happiness would in 
itself have been enough to give him any zest for living, for 
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the intervening time would still be devoid of meaning. 
For James, living to the full meant using all of his 
po~ers; it meant being productive and creative; it meant 
alleviating as much of the pain and evil in the world as 
possible; it meant contributing in some way to the beauty 
and goodness of the universe. For James, to live with zest 
and gusto was to live the moral life to the full, ·i.e., to 
live a life of responsible human action by which one resists 
evil and seeks good, not merely one's own private good but 
the good of one's neighbors, the community, and the world as 
a whole. James felt that in order for life to be worth 
living, reality must somehow be commensurate with and.con-
genial to man's most intimate and cherished powers. His 
desires, motives, and abilities must have some real relevance 
to the universe as a whole. Man longs to make some lasting, 
significant, and uniquely personal contribution to the world's 
goodness and beauty; and he wants to know that, even if he 
himself should not survive, the ideals which he admired, 
loved, and helped to actualize by his efforts will in some 
way last forever. Thus the only life worth living for James 
was the moral life authenticated and sanctioned by an eternal 
moral order. The only life ~orth living was an active moral 
life in a universe in which one's striving, however feeble, 
could never completely come to naught. 
To meet the challenges of the world with spirit and 
determination, to fight for the good and to overcome evil, 
meant living to the full. But as early as 1861, poor health 
? 
began to weaken the vigor of James's own activities. He be-
came afflicted with eye trouble, digestive problems, back 
pains, and numerous attacks of neurasthenia, all of which 
hampered his physical activities as well as his intellectual 
pursuits for many years. A certain mental depression fre-
quently accompanied the physical ailments. It is not possi-
ble to say whether the physical ailments caused the mental 
depression or the mental condition caused the physical dif-
ficulties; but in all probability, no matter what the basic 
causes of either, it seems safe to say that they augmented 
each other. Certainly James's sense of inactivity and unpro-
ductiveness as well as the difficulty he experienced in mak-
ing decisions must have contributed to a feeling of futility 
which could make a.n:y man wonder whether life was worth living 
or not. That he thought of suicide is admitted in his diary 
as well as mentioned in his correspondence with his friend, 
Tom Ward; apparently it was not always clearly evident to the 
young William James _that life !!.!! worth living. 
To what extent his disillusionment with life was brought 
about by his own ill health and the sufferings of his brother 
Henry and his sister Alice (which he witnessed with great 
anguish on his part) is difficult to say. But it is apparent 
that James's early philosophical reflections had much to do 
with his disenchantment with living. There was in fact a 
kind of reciprocal relation between his ill health and his 
philosophizing; for while it is true that his early reflec-
tions upon life contributed to his mental depression, it is 
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also true that his illnesses in turn spurred James on to 
still deeper philosophical thought. His illnesses not only 
provided the leisure necessary for speculation by putting a 
damper upon his more active life; but Ralph Barton Perry sug-
gests that James's melancholia and·neurasthenia to a great 
extent required a philosophical cure inasmuch as they were 
due at least in part to his lack of a philosophy by which to 
live. In Perry's view, James's survival depended upon his 
finding answers to the basic questions of life, particularly 
to the question of. man's real relationship to the universe as 
a whole. 2 
James's early philosophical outlook and, one might add, 
his permanent philosophical outlook were greatly colored by 
his concern with the particulars of experience. He was 
strongly attracted by the philosophy of empiricism; and such 
an attraction was·quite natural, given his scientific back-
ground. Certainly his training in biology, as well as in the 
other sciences with their emphasis upon observation and exper-
iment, contributed much to his conviction that the sole reli-
able source of knowledge is the experience of particulars. 
Of course, Jame·s was influenced also by his reading of the 
early British empiricists, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Mill, 
as well as by his association with "The Metaphysical Club," 
particularly with such devotees of exact science as Chauncey 
2 Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William 
James, Briefer Version, Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper 
and Row, Publishers, Incorporated, 1964), pp. 120-22. 
Wright and Charles Peirce. But the influence of .these men 
might not have been so strong had James not encountered them 
already predisposed by his own scientific background to lo.ok 
fa~orably upon experience as the fount of all k:nowle~e. 
The empirical philosophy with which the young William 
James was familiar, however, seemed to be tending more and 
more toward sensationalism, materialism, and determinism; 
9 
and although his religious heritage and moralistic tendencies 
prevented James from ever accepting such theories whole-
heartedly, he nevertheless was vulnerable to their influence 
and at times momentarily fell under their sway. In 1867 he 
wrote to his father from Berlin: 11I feel myself • • • more and 
more drifting towards the sensationalism closed in by scepti-
cism •••• "3 To Tom Ward he wrote from Cambridge in 1869: 
I'm swamped in an empirical philosophy--! feel that 
we are nature through and through, that we are wholly 
conditioned, that not a· wiggle of our will happens 
save as the result of physical laws, and yet not-
withstanding1 we are en ra~ort with reason. How 
to conceive it? Who knows·. 
These lines reveal the dilemma faced by William James 
and other young thinkers of his time. On the one hand, the 
industrialization which scientific discovery and human inven-
tion made possible after the Civil War seemed to testify to 
the fact that the individual person had a free and actively 
creative role to play in the progress of society. On the 
· 3The Letters of William James, ed. by Henry James, Jr. (2 vols.; Boston: Atlantic :Monthly Press, 1920), I, 97. 
4Ferry, The Thought and Character of William James, I, 
472. 
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other hand, there were philosophers and scientists who seemed 
to be robbing man of his unique place in nature by interpret-
ing both man and nature mechanistically--thus reducing man to 
a mere cog in a machine and making freedom nothing but an 
illusion. The horns of the dilemma faced by James were spir-
itualism (theism) and freedom on the one hand and materialism 
and determinism on the other. 
All the evidence in favor of man's free creative role 
in the universe notwithstanding, James was pulled by his 
scientific tendencies and empiricist outlook toward the view 
that all that happens in the universe is rigidly determined 
by blind forces of nature and that the course of human life 
and the course of the world as a whole can be reduced to a 
process of mechanical evolution. Such a materialistic inter-
pretation of life, however, meant the complete frustration of 
James's moral aspirations; for according to the theory of 
mechanical evolution, whatever good and beautiful things have 
thus far evolved, whether the work of man or not, must one 
day be destroyed. As the result of the continual redistribu-
tion of matter and energy, evolution must inevitably be fol-
lowed by dissolution. As A. J. Balfour put it, 
The energies of our system will decay. • • • 'Imper-
ishable monuments' and 'immortal deeds,' death itself, 
and love stronger than death, will be as if they had 
not been. Nor will anything that is, be better or 
worse for all that the labor, genius, devotion, and 
suffering of man have striven through countless ages 
to effect.5 
from The 
New or : 
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Viewing the future or the world from a materialistic 
point of view could only lead to despair, for materialism 
meant that all man's cherished aspirations and all or his 
ex.Pansive emotions such as admiration and love, hope, forti-
tude, and joy had no real objects-~for in reality, all the 
ideas loved, desired, hoped for, and fought for would one day 
be reduced to nothing. As James himself said, 
That is the sting of it, that in the vast drift-
ings of the cosmic weather, though many a jewelled 
shore appears, and many an enchanted cloud-bank floats 
away, long lingering ere it be dissolved--even as 
our world now lingers, for our joy--yet when these 
transient products are gone, nothing, absolutely 
nothin~, remains, to represent those particular 
qualities, those elements of preciousness which they 
may have enshrined. Dead and gone are they, gone 
utterly from the very sphere and room of being. 
Without an echo; without a memory; without an influ-
ence on aught that may come after, to make it care 
for similar ideals. This utter final wreck and 
tragedy is of the essence or scientific materialism 
as at present understood. The lower and not the 
higher forces are the eternal forces, or the last 
surviving forces within the gnly cycle of evolution 
which we can definitely see. 
Thus materialism's final word was that all striving is in vain. 
Insofar as it made the lower and blind forces in the world 
control the world's destiny and insofar as it posited the 
eventual annih~lation of all human values, the materialism of 
James's time rendered man's role in the universe meaningless 
and insignificant. Such a philosophy which legitimized only 
the emotions of fear and despair left man with little for 
which to care and nothing for which to live. It certainly 
The World Publishing Company, 1963), p. ?6, quoting A. J. 
Balfour, The Foundations of Belief, p. 30. 
6Ibid. 
-
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rendered impossible what James himself considered the only 
life worth living--a moral life warranted by an "eternal 
moral order." "This need of an eternal moral order," James 
wrote, "is one of the deepest needs of our breast."? Man 
needs to feel that his active striving is never totally fruit-
less. He needs to feel that the ideals of goodness and beauty 
for which he lives and works will survive even if he should 
perish, that these ideals will not decay along with the 
material universe. 
Despite materialism's bleak outlook,· however, James 
found its stress upon the developmental aspects of reality 
congenial to his way of thinking and in harmony with his 
experience. Thus he found it difficult to reject materialism 
completely. But although he could not at the time reject it 
entirely, his attitude toward it was largely negative, as 
the following lines from a memorandum sent to Oliver Yendell 
Holmes, Jr., in the winter of either 1866 or 1867 reveal. 
But as a man's happiness depends on his feeling, I 
think materialism inconsistent with a high degree 
thereof, and in ~hl.s sense [I] maintained that a 
materialist should not be an optimist, using the 
latter word to signify one whose philosophy authenti-
cates, by guaranteeing the objective significance of, 
his most pleasurable feelings.8 
Although James at this period in his life seemed intel-
lectually compelled to examine deterministic naturalism, the 
kind of world he really needed and wanted was a world in 
?Ibid., P• ?7. 
8Gay Wilson Allen, William James (New York: The Viking 
Press, 196?), pp. 125-26. 
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which mind, rather than the blind forces of nature, was in 
control--a spiritual or theistic world, in other words--a 
world in which some higher spiritual power, which one might 
call God if he wished, guaranteed an _ideal order that would 
be permanently preserved. James needed a world in which his 
cherished ideals would be looked after and cared for even if 
he failed to bring them to fruition. A letter to Tom Yard in 
1868 expressed the religious desire which James felt that he 
shared with most men. "W'e long for sympathy, for a purely 
~ersonal communication, first with the soul of the world, and 
then with the soul of our fellows. And happy are they who 
think, or know, that they have got them!"9 
James's father was one of those who thought he enjoyed 
such-communication--but youthful William James was not. He 
was continually tossed about on the waves of doubt; he wanted 
to believe, but intellectual difficulties made him uncertain. 
Thus unable to find meaning for his -existence in religious 
belief, young William James tenaciously clurig to the moral life. 
He saw the moral life as the only response to the universe 
which could make life at all worth living in a materialistic 
scheme of things. For even if there were no God to guarantee 
an eternal moral order in which his ideals would be preserved, 
even if someday all of his efforts would count as nothing, 
still he could find some satisfaction in life by helping his 
contemporaries to suffer less and enjoy more, and perhaps he 
9The Letters of William James, I, 131. 
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could even contribute in some way to the well-being of whatever 
generations were still to come. 
James's experience, from one point of view at least, 
seemed to lend support to the view that a man by his actions 
could contribute something to the good in the world and help 
ease the suffering therein. For his experience revealed beyond 
any doubt that men did indeed suffer and enjoy, and· that indi-
viduals by their actions could alleviate some of that suffer-
ing and add to that enjoyment. Even though his philosophical 
outlook at that time might prevent him from believing in a 
God who cared for him and for his ideals, James felt that he 
could still find reason for living and some value in his own 
existence by helping others. James wrote to Tom Ward: 
All I can tell you is the thought that with me outlasts 
all others, and onto which, like a rock, I find myself 
washed up when the waves of doubt are weltering over 
all the rest of the world; and that is the thought of 
my having a will, and of my belonging to a brotherhood 
of men possessed of a capacity for pleasure and pain of 
different kinds. For even at one's lowest ebb of be-
lief, the fact remains empirically certain (and by our 
will we can, if not absolutelt refrain from looking 
beyond that empirical fact, a least practically and 
on the whole accept it and let it suffice us)--that 
men suffer and enjoy. And if we have to give up all 
hope of seeing into the purposes of God, or to give 
up theoretically the idea of final causes, and of God 
anyhow as vain and leading to nothing for us, we can, 
by our will, make the enjoyment of our brothers stand 
us in the stead of a final cause; and through a know-
ledge of the fact that that enjoyment on the whole 
depends on what individuals accomplish, lead a life so 
active, and so sustained by a clean conscience as not 
to fret much.10 
But even this moral life preserver in a sea of doubt had a 
lOibid., p. 130. 
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way of slipping from James's grasp--!or empiricism as he was 
familiar with it seemed to ~mply determinism. At least the 
empiricism of Bain and Mill, who were much discussed by James 
and.the other members of "The Metaphysical Club," was decidedly 
deterministic. Determinism, however, took all the zest out of 
the moral life. What merit or value could human actions have 
(however salutary they might be) if they could not _have been 
otherwise? What could James personally and creatively contrib-
ute to the world for better or worse if he were but a cog in 
the vast machine of the universe--if all he did were rigidly 
determined? Determinism not only took.the satisfaction out of 
the moral life, it rendered the moral life non-moral--for moral 
action is moral action only to the extent that it is free and 
responsible. And so the young William James floated back and 
forth between lights and shadows, grasping at rays of hope 
only to find them vanish again and again in the dark fog of 
nihilism. 
It is not difficult to see how William James's philoso-
phical turmoil, combined with physical and mental ills, could 
have led him to the brink of despair. For if all the world's 
' 
affairs are rigidly governed by blind physio-chemical forces, 
then all physical ailments as well as all mental difficulties 
must be rigidly rletermined or the result of chance; and all 
efforts to overcome them must be useless. Indeed, there were 
times when James felt that nature and life had simply 'unfit-
ted' him for all the activities to which he aspired. The 
result was apathy and a kind of paralysis of the will. But 
16 
James's despair was never final. He could never unreservedly 
resign himself to the life of inactivity and waste to which 
his illness and philosophic determinism seemed to relegate 
him· He could never unreservedly accept materialism and its 
deterministic implications. He could never wholeheartedly 
accept a philosophy which took all the joy out of living by 
rendering human action ineffective and meaningless. James's 
inward rebellion against determinism and the inexorability of 
evil, suggested by the unrelenting character of his own illness, 
found articulate expression in some notes written during the 
summer of 1869. Although he did not seem to espouse a doctrine 
of freedom definitively until almost a year later, these notes 
indicate that he was inclined to believe that man does have 
some freedom of choice. He suggested, for example, that to 
accept the universe or to protest against it are two voluntary 
alternatives. 
So that in a given case of evil the mind seesaws between 
the effort to improve it away, and resignation. The 
second not being resorted to till the first has failed, 
it would seem either that the second were an insin-
cere pis aller, or the first a superfluous vanity. 
The solution can only lie in taking neither absolutely, 
but in making the resignation only provisional (that is, 
voluntary, conditional), and the attempt to improve 
to have its worth in the action rather than the result. 
Thus resignation affords grounds and leisure to advance 
to new philanthropic action. Resignation should not 
say, "it is good," "a mild yoke, 11 and so forth, but 
"I'm willing to stand it for the present. 1111 . 
Apparent in this passage is James's conviction that what is 
important is the fight, even if the battle be lost--that it is 
11Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, I, 301. 
l? 
a man's moral fibre that counts even if his effor.ts come to 
naught. One also sees James's refusal to close his eyes to 
evil, to consider evil in some way good, or to consider it as 
irremediable. For James, evil was a part of his experience; 
his own life would not allow him to blink it away. He could 
not go along with the idealism of Francis H. Bradley. For 
Bradley evil was not fully real; it was only an appearance--
·simply one aspect of the Absolute which in itself was perfect 
12 in every respect. Nor could James go along with those who 
absolved man from all responsibility toward evil, either by 
denying man's freedom or by placing the responsibility ulti-
mately upon God as Yilliam's father was wont to do. For Henry 
James, Sr., man really does nothing; God does all; all men 
are merely manifestations of God who has alienated himself 
from himself for the purpose of an eventual free and loving 
reunion. According to Henry, Sr., all the vicissitudes of the 
12
".bVil and good are not illusions, but they are most · 
certainly appearances. They are one-sided aspects, each over-
ruled and transmuted in the Whole •••• As with truth and 
error, so with good and bad, the opposition is not absolute. 
For, to some extent and in some manner, perfection is every-
where realized. And yet, upon the other hand, the distinction 
of degrees is no less vital. The interval which exists between, 
and which separates, the lower and the higher, is measured by · 
the idea of perfect Reality. The lower is that which, to be 
made complete, would have to undergo a more total transforma-
tion of its nature. And viewed from the ground of what is 
higher--of what they fail to reach or even oppose--the lower 
truth and lower goodness become sheer error and evil. The 
Absolute is ·perfect in all its detail, -it is equally true and 
good throughout. But, upon the other side, each distinction of 
better and more true, every degree and each comparative stage 
?f reality is essential." (F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Real-~ty [London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Lim.; New York: Macmillan ~pany, 1899], p. 401.) · 
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spiritual life, its ups and downs, its triumphs and its falls, 
are all God's work and man is deserving of neither praise nor 
blame. God, He said, will eventually bring good out of all--
the ultimate good being the final reunion of God with Himself 
in the eventual mergence of all individual human selves with 
the divine Selfhood. 
William was not at all in sympathy with his father's view 
of evil. He was sympathetic, however, with the views of his 
father's friend and opponent, Thomas Carlyle. Carlyle was 
militant in his attitude toward evil; he recognized it as 
real and set the moral will against it. Henry, Sr., however, 
saw the struggle between good and evil as somehow transcended 
in the movement of the Divine Spirit toward ultimate reunion 
with itself. For Carlyle, on the other hand, the conflict 
between good and evil was absolutely valid in itself, and so 
it was for William James also. For William James, good and evil 
were both real in experience and could not be identified or 
subsumed into one. Furthermore, righteousness demanded that 
man love the good and hate the evil. And to hate evil meant 
not merely to brood over it, to grieve over it; it meant ac-
tively to combat it--to attack and effectually overcome it 
within the world of action. 
According to William James, man must fight evil as best 
he can and contribute as much good to the world as possible. 
This was the moral life to which he aspired, the life for which 
he longed with all of his heart; but his empiricist philosophy 
with its apparent deterministic implications and his own 
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pbYsical weaknesses had seemed to put thumbs down on it. How-
ever, by the end of 1869, James was beginning to overcome the 
psychological inhibitions which prevented him from actively 
espousing the moral life although his physical difficulties 
still tended to paralyze him. 'Whatever else he could not do, 
he could still make decisions that affected life and appreciate 
lite as he saw others live it. "I may not study, make, or 
enjoy--but I can will. I can find some real life in the mere 
respect for other forms of life as they pass, even if I can 
never embrace them as a whole or incorporate them with myself."l3 
on February 1, 18?0, William James decided to give the moral 
lite a try for its own sake. 
Today, I about touched bottom, and perceive plainly 
that I must face the choice with open eyes: shall I 
frankly throw the moral business overboard, as one 
unsuited to my innate aptitudes, or shall I follow 
it, and it alone, making everything else merely stuff 
for iti I will give the latter alternative a fair 
trial. 4 
The problem of intellectual unification still remained, 
however. How could the possibility of moral action be recon-
ciled with the determinism which empiricism seemed to entail? 
It was the French philosopher, Charles Renouvier, who finally 
helped James to recognize that determinism is not a necessary 
implication of empiric.ism at all. Renouvier believed that the 
only philosophical doctrine that could be the logical enemy of 
l3'William James, "Diary," quoted in Allen, William James, 
p. 163. 
14Villiam James, "Diary," The Writings of William James 
ed. by John J. McDermott (New York: Random House, Inc., 196?), p. ?. 
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is the pantheistic doctrine of substance-~the doctrine rreedom 
that men and all other phenomena are but manifestations of the 
one absolute substance from which all phenomenal appearances 
tloW necessarily. But there is nothing in empiricist philosophy 
as such that logically demands determinism. In fact, from the 
point of view of Renouvier and finally from that of James him-
self, empirically one can not prove that either determinism or 
freedom characterizes human activity. 
But in that case, how does one settle the issue? What 
does one do---suspend judgment? To suspend judgment implies 
that a judgment is equally possible; it implies a choice; it 
implies freedom. Doubting is itself an option--a state of 
voluntary inhibition and suspense. According to Renouvier, 
the possibility of doubting our freedom, of doubting anything, 
implies the possibility of affirming it; but that means that 
one has a choice. ·Since determinism and freedom are alike 
indemonstrable, whichever one a person accepts, he accepts, 
not because his intellect is coerced by any incontrovertible 
evidence -but simply because he chooses to accept i t--he accepts 
it on faith--he freely believes in it. And so Renouvier wrote--
•Let our liberty pronounce on its own real existence."15 The 
impact of Renouvier's reflections on William James was decid-
edly salutary. In one of James's notebooks, we find the fol-
lowing entry, dated April 30, 1870: 
l5William James, "Bain and Renouvier," Collected Essays 
!fd Reviews (London and New York: Longmans, Green and Co., ~2g), p. 34, quoting Charles Renouvier, Essais de Critique 
generale. 
I think that yesterday was a crisis in my life. I 
finished the first part of Renouvier's second "Essais" 
and see no reason why his definition of Free Will--
"the sustaining of a thought because I choose to when 
I might have other thoughts"--need be the definition 
of an illusion. At any rate, I will assume for the 
present--until next year--that it is no illusion. My 
first act of free will shall be to believe in free 
will. For the remainder of the year, I will abstain 
from the mere speculation and contemplative Gri.iblei 
in which my nature takes most delight, and voluntarily 
cultivate the feeling of moral freedom, by reading 
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books favorable to it, as well as by acting •••• Hith-
erto, when I have felt like taking a free initiative, 
like daring to act originally, without carefully wait-
ing for contemplation of the external world to deter-
mine all for me, suicide seemed the most manly form 
to put my daring into; now, I will go a step further 
with my will, not only act with it, but believe as 
well; believe in my individual reality and creative 
power. My belief, to be sure, can't be optimistic--
but I will posit life (the real, the good) in the 
self-governing resistance of the ego to the world. 
Life shall (be built in] doing and suffering and 
creating.16 
James's acceptance of the fact that the will is free, 
that the mind can act without being determined in its activity 
by physical or psychic coercion, and his determination to cul-
tivate the belief in his own freedom by voluntarily exercising 
it was clearly a turning point in his life. His posture at 
this time was the beginning of his physical and mental recovery. 
His decision freely to accept freedom and to affirm actively 
as well as theoretically that lif e--the good lif e--the life 
worth living--consists in resisting evil, struggling for the 
good, in '-'doing and suffering and creating," had more _than a 
therapeutic value, however. Together with the empiricist 
insight, which James never lost, this concrete espousal of the 
16 James, "Diary," The Writings of William James, pp. ?-8. 
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moral life as the life worth living functioned as a fundamental 
principle by which he not only directed his entire life but 
navigated his philosophical vessel as well. (He was not pre-
pared to distinguish between how he lived his life and how he 
operated philosophically, for in him the two in fact formed a 
single unity.) James lived the moral life first of all, and 
finding it eminently livable, adopted moralism not only as a 
philosophical position but as a kind of standard to which any 
philosophical view had to measure up if it was to win his sup-
port. No theory which would render the moral life impossible 
could hope for a favorable reception. This does not mean that 
James would dispute some one else's right to believe it, if 
he chose to do so; it simply means that James himself would be 
unable to espouse it, because it ran counter to the evidence 
in his experience. 
From his acquaintance with the thought of Renouvier, not 
only did James come to realize that he had the right to believe 
in his own freedom, but he also began to see that he might have 
the right to believe other things which while not logically 
or philosophically demonstrable were nevertheless necessary 
for effective moral action. Renouvier confirmed in James's 
mind something which James himself had much earlier felt but 
which his rigorous scientific training had no doubt prevented 
him·from espousing--namely the fact that heart and head work 
together in determining convictions. As Renouvier pointed 
out, when a judgment is necessary for action and when exper-
ience and reason can not determine one's judgment, then it is 
p a . . . 
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the will's place to do so and faith must come into play. In 
this doctrine of Renouvier, James found the confirmation of 
hiS own insight--an insight Which was to play a central role 
in the development of his entire philosophy and from which he 
was to develop the pragmatic method for which he became famous. 
In enumerating the factors which may have influenced a 
given man's philosophy, it is not uncommon-to include his fam-
ily background, the social and cultural milieu in which he 
lived, and his formal education, including the earlier phil-
osophers with whose works he was familiar as well as those 
contemporary thinkers with whom he may have had direct or 
indirect contact. Certainly in the case of William James, all 
of these can be said to have helped to shape his thought in 
one way or another. But it is obvious that the one overwhelm-
ing influence, which functioned not only as the primary source 
of his own doctrines but also as the test of the opinions 
offered to him by other thinkers, past and present, was his own 
lived experience in which all of these elements found a place. 
The grea~est single factor which shaped James's philosophy and 
which in a sense determined the effects which all other influ-
ences were to have on it was James's own life and his living 
of it. 
Ralph Barton Perry speaks of Renouvier as "the greatest 
individual influence upon the development of James's thought";l? 
and James, himself, acknowledges his great indebtedness to 
17Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, I, 655. 
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R~nouvier in the dedication of Some Problems of Philosophy. 
Nevertheless, Renouvier's contribution to James was not that 
o! revealing to him facts otherwise unknown; rather his ac-
quaintance with Renouvier's writings helped James to realize 
fUllY the truth of what he had already suspected. The influ-
ence of Renouvier, of course, must not be discounted; but it 
must be said that it was James's own life which contributed 
the most to, and provided the ultimate warrant for, the phil-
osophy which James was to develop--a philosophy, which unlike 
the rationalistic and positivistic schools of thought enjoy-
ing popularity in his day, provided a legitimate and necessary 
place for faith in the lives of men. 
The purpose of this thesis will be to examine in depth 
the position of William James in regard to faith. Considera-
tion will be given to what faith in general is, its legitimate 
place in human life, indeed its necessity for both thought and 
human action. Special attention will be paid to religious 
faith in particular, especially to James's justification of 
religious belief as a necessity not only for the :t'ulfillment 
of man but also for the :t'ulfillment of the universe as a whole. 
Much has been done on the question of faith since the death 
of William James. In this thesis, however, no attempt will 
be made to evaluate James in terms of the work of later writers 
or to reconcile his position with current trends on the sub-
ject. Since the purpose of this thesis is primarily exposition., 
the reader will find a minimum of critical assessment. 
There is a sense in which James's philosophy is presently 
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being rediscovered, and when a man's thought is thus being 
reexamined, the first task to be accomplished is that of expo-
sition and unification. 
CHAPTER II 
THE OPEN WORLD OF RADICAL EMPIRICISM 
In reflecting upon life as he lived it, Yilliam James 
shared reverence for experienced fact with the empiricists and 
respect for reason and logic with the rationalists; but he 
refused to allow sense and reason exclusive access to reality 
or an exclusive franchise on truth. The ~orld, as James ex-
perienced it, was a world in which faith was not only an 
empirical datum, in the sense that men did in fact believe 
when conclusive evidence was lacking, but also a necessary 
factor in the world's development, as well as the key without 
which many of its doors would never be unlocked and many of 
its secrets never discovered. 
Having found faith to be a practical necessity for his own 
life, James was forced by his understanding of experience to 
take account of faith in his philosophy. The quality of his 
experience demanded the recognition of faith as an indispens-
able factor in the evolution of reality as well as a necessary 
avenue to truth. Our purpose in this chapter will be to exam-
ine some of the more salient features of James's philosophy in 
order to discover what there was about experience, as James 
interpreted it, that made him assign to faith such a signifi-
cant role. 
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William James's metaphysics can be appropriately described 
as s: biographical metaphysics. Indeed the influence of his 
life upon his thought was so great that his metaphysics became 
almost a mirror of his lived experience. As an examination 
of his philosophy reveals, his life and his metaphysics to a 
great extent paralleled each other, the latter involving the 
conceptualization of the felt experiences of the former. 
That his life and his metaphysics went hand in hand was as it 
should be from James's own point of view, for in his opinion 
the only raw materia~ out of which a man can legitimately 
build a metaphysics is his own experience. Describing.a 
man• s philosophy as. the way in which he feels the "whole push" 
of the universe and experiences "the whole drift of life,"1 
James suggested that philosophy is little more than the biog-
raphies of philosophers. 
Although one might be tempted to expect that basic simi-
larities in men's lives would result in philosophies that would 
be the same in broadest outlines, such is not the case. There 
are two reasons for this: first, no two men share precisely 
the same experiences, however similar their lives may be; and 
secondly, most men conceive the world after the analogy of 
some one particular experienced feature of it which especially 
interests them or with which they feel most comfortable. Thus, 
among professional philosophers, we have materialists on the 
one hand and spiritualists on the other; pluralists and monists; 
p 1William James, A Pluralistic Universe (Gloucester, Mass.: 
eter Smith, 1967), pp. 20-21. 
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iricists and rationalists; indeterminists and determinists; e•P -
and so forth. A man's philosophy, whether it be the profes-
sional philosopher's view of reality or the ordinary man's 
sense of the meaning of life, mirrors his experience in some 
way. However, it very often reflects only one preferred part 
ot that experience--one or more aspects of it standing out 
clearly in the foreground, others being blurred or even lost 
entirely in the background. 
For James, himself, however, all of life was fascinating. 
He did not, as so many other thinkers did, single out one 
special facet of the experienced world and make it the model 
tor his philosophical picture. All of the details of exper-
ience were interesting, valuable, and worthy of note from 
Jam.es's point of view; and in his metaphysics, he tried to 
take every one of ~hem into· account in some way. 
James, himself, described his own philosophy as a radical 
empiricism2--an empiricism because experience and only experi-
2James described radical empiricism in terms of a postu-
late, a statement of fact, and a generalized conclusion. The 
postulate was that the only things about which philosophers 
can lawfully argue are things that can be described in terms 
of experience. James was careful to point out that this did 
not mean that other things can not exist, ·but that it did mean 
that other things are not the proper subjects for philosophical 
debate. The statement of fact affirmed that the relations 
among things, relations which are conjunctive as well as dis-junctive, are experienced just as directly as the things them-
selves are. ·And the generalized conclusion was that the uni-
verse as directly experienced has a concatenated continuous 
structure of its own inasmuch as the connective relations · 
among the things experienced are themselves matters of direct 
a1pprehension, and that, therefore, it is unnecessary to postu-ate any sort of trans-empirical support to hold the various 
parts of the world together--they hold together by themselves. 
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ence provided the raw material for it, radical because not 
onlY did he r~frain from introducing elements that could ~ 
be described in empirical terms but furthermore he refused to 
exclude anything that ~ directly experienced.3 His fondness 
tor particular facts and details and the very movement of life 
itself made the abstract and static systems of the rationalis-
tic philosophers seem like empty shadows in comparison with 
the concrete flux of life; and thus James would allow nothing 
of his experience to be lost sight of in his metaphysics.4 As 
we shall discover in the following paragr~phs, James's meta-
3The primacy of experience in James's philosophy has 
prompted several contemporary writers to try to place James 
within the tradition of phenomenology. Although James himself 
did not describe his own work in phenomenological terms, phil-
osophers such as Aron Gurwitsch, John Wild, and Johannes Lin-
schoten have found significant parallels between the thought 
of William James and that of contemporary phenomenology. Ac-
cording to James M. Edie, "Some of these can be traced to the 
direct influence of James on Husserl, but for the most part 
they transcend such direct historical interaction and rather 
show a common spirit and temper, developing independently but 
convergently toward the same goal-~namely, the establishment 
of the bases for a method of radical empiricism in philosophy." 
(James M. l!;die, "Necessary Truth and Perception: William James_ 
on the Structure of Experience," in New Essals in Phenomenol-
,2Sl, ed. by·James M. mie [Chicago: Quadrang e Books, 1969], 
p. 233.) 
4James consid.ered himself an opponent of rationalism. But 
his opposition to it did not imply that he had no use for rea-
son and logic. On the contrary, as we already indicated, he 
had a healthy respect for both of them and often pointed out 
that conceptual knowledge and logical rules have an important 
function in life insofar as they help a man to get around among 
the parts of his experience. However, James felt that concepts 
?an never exhaust reality or adequately represent it, for there 
is a dynamism about reality that the static unchanging concepts 
of the mind can never capture. There is something about the 
flux of experience that seems to escape forever the grip of 
logic. Reality and life are wider than.logic; they spill over 
the limits of all of our conceptual schemes. And the concepts 
that we do find useful, James said, are useful only insofar as 
they lead us back to the world of experience again. 
ptiysics, perhaps more than that of any other man, can be said 
to mirror his life and fittingly be called a biographical meta-
p}lysics. 
According to James's biographers, from earliest childhood, 
hiS experience was Of variety, novelty, movement, and activity 
of many kinds. As a child he lived in almost ceaseless envir-
onmental change. Because of his .father's inability to decide, 
with any degree of resoluteness, on the.best mode of educating 
his children, William James studied in schools in England, 
rrance, Switzerland, Germany, and more than one city in the 
united States. From his birth in 1842 until he received his 
degree in medicine from Harvard in 1869, he made .four trips to 
Europe and one to Brazil and studied a variety of subjects in-
cluding languages, classical and modern literature, art, science, 
psychology, medicine, and philosophy.. And even after his pro-
fessional life began, he lived his life against a continually 
fluctuating background provided by Europe and the United States. 
His purposes in traveling included improving his health, 
studying, delivering lectures, supporting peace movements, pro-
moting mental health, and observing the progress of physical 
research. James' a activities were as varied as his surroundings. 
Wherever James was, he was extremely sensitive to the rich-
ness of his environment, to the wealth of detail which made each 
Place unlike any ot~er, and to the novelty of each new situa-
tion. No matter how many times he visited a place, he could 
always see something in it that he had not seen before; he 
always had something new to report to his family and friends 
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as bis letters to them reveal. But as his letters also show, 
~ often the impression made upon him by a country or a city 
ve~~ 
vas due not so much to the physical surroundings as to the 
personal characteristics of its inhabitants. Although nature 
in its varying costumes always intrigued James, it was people 
with their unique points of view, their faiths (religious and 
otherwise), their virtues, their foibles, and their general 
unpredictableness that captivated him most of all. They, 
after all, made the world what it was--good or bad, better or 
worse. And James was one of them--acutely aware that by what-
ever he did he added something to the goodness or badness of 
the situation and that his ability to act fruitfully at all 
demanded faith on his part--faith in himself, in other men, and 
in God. 
The world, as James lived in it, then, was a multi-faceted 
world--dynamic and always changing, lacking any rigidly deter-
mined order, permeated with the novel and the unexpected, bear-
ing the impress of personality (human and divine), and of course 
moralistic. ·It is not surprising that the world presumed in 
his philosophy should be the same. Indeed, like the world of 
his lived experience, the world given to us in James's meta-
physics is pluralistic, evolving (although not according to 
any rigidly determined plan), tychistic, personal, and moral. 
And just as the well-being and productiveness of James himself 
required the exercise of faith on his part, so too the progress, 
development, and perfection of this pluralistic and open-
ended universe as a whole demand faith on the part of men. 
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JSJJleS did not make a place for faith in his philosophy simply 
because he personally felt the need for it in his own life. 
On the contrary, he did so because the very char~cter of the 
universe demanded it. A closer examination of his metaphysics 
will make this clear. 
The universe for James was obviously pluralistic. It was, 
in some sense, a collection of many things some of which at 
least were only externally related to each other. The diversity 
of James's own experience made it impossible for him to agree 
with the rationalistic philosophers whose passion for simplic-
ity, unity, and economy of thought led them to underplay the 
multiplicity in reality and to try to explain the universe in 
terms of as few principles as possible--ideally in terms of 
one principle if that could be accomplished. James's experi-
-
ence revealed to him a world more lik~ the world of the eigh-
teenth century British empiricists, a world of multiple data, 
a changing world of particular facts. On the other hand, James 
did not agree with those empiricists who saw reality merely as 
the sum of entirely separate phenomena or representations; he 
disagreed with Hume, for example, who claimed that all percep-
tions are loose, separate and disconnected. The various as-
pects of James's experience flowed one into the other and while 
many items of it were indeed separated from others by inter-
vening items, nevertheless, his experience as a whole had a 
directly perceived continuity as well as unity. 
According to James, Hume and empiricists like him failed 
to see most of the conjunctive relations among things--the 
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connective relations by which one thing can be said to be with 
another thing, near another thing, like another, caused by 
another, intended by another, or belonging to another. Such 
connections James found to be directly apprehended in experi-
ence. Thinkers like Hume, however, readily recognized the 
relations or disjunction among phenomena but rarely saw the 
connections and continuity among them. In James•s experience~ 
on the other hand, the conjunctive relations were grasped as 
clearly as the disjunctions and were therefore just as fully realt 
While James could not accept the totally fragmented world 
ot ordinary empiricism, he likewise found untenable the kind 
ot unity which the rationalists presumed to be sustaining all 
reality. The modern rationalists, disturbed by the splintered 
universe that they believed resulted from the empiricism of 
men like Hume, tried to remedy the situation by positing some 
kind of trans-empirical agents of unification such as substances 
or souls. The most complete unification was achieved by phil-
osophers such as Hegel, Royce, and Bradley, who posited an 
Absolute and who, each in his own way, made the multiple phe-
nomena of experience to be parts of this Absolute, manifesta-
tions of it, or·objects of its thought. However their views 
may have differed, Hegel, Royce, and Bradley posited the Absolute 
as the only authentic reality, in relation to which the phenomena 
of ·finite human experience were but transitory or even illusory 
appearances. Yb.ere Hume's 
their rationalistic 
essential characteristic of reality 
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diversity mere semblances of the real. James, however, could 
not reconcile either ordinary empiricism or rationalism ·with 
his own experience, for James's experience revealed neither 
absolute unity nor absolute diversity. No item in James's 
experience ever exactly duplicated another; thus there was 
always lacking the unity of exact similarity. Furthermore, 
while some items may have been with each other or ~ each 
other in terms of space and time and thus spatially and tempor-
ally connected, other items were separated from each other by 
space and time and were thus disjunctively related. Moreover, 
while James experienced some things as causally related, he 
experienced many other things which did not appear to influence 
each other actively at all. Multiplicity and diversity were 
thus obvious features of James's experience; but the multiplic-
ity and diversity notwiths~anding, each part of James's lived 
experience was continuous with the part which preceded it and 
with the part which followed it. Thus his experience as a 
whole revealed that reality had some kind of unity, no~, how-
ever, the kind of unity posited by absolute monism in which 
all the parts somehow interpenetrated and were in some way one 
with the whole and with each other. Rather, as the world 
appeared to James, it had a 'strung-along' type of unity. 
While its parts were distinct from each other, they were never-
theless joined together, figuratively speaking, by their edges. 
The parts of James's world were not only next to each other, 
they ran into each-· other without interruption. They were con-
tinuous. Of course, each and every part of the world was not 
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experienced by James as continuous with each and every other 
part, but every item in his experience was next to, or con-
tinuous with, ~ other items. And these in turn were con-
tinuous with still others so that in one way or another, every 
thing in the world of James's experience was linked, directly 
or indirectly, with every other thing. Because of this empir-
ically evident unity, James believed that the world held to-
gether by itself and did not require any trans-empirical Abso-
lute to keep it from falling apart. 
James rejected the monistic theory of the Absolute not 
only because it was unnecessary and not corroborated by ;his 
experience but also because the data provided by his experience 
actually supported pluralism not monism. The evidence found 
within James's own life ran counter to monism's denial of 
plurality and diversity, its denial of change, novelty and 
development, and its denial of evil. To William James it was 
empirically evident that reality was multiple and diverse and 
constantly changing, that it was a mixture of good and evil 
{the proportions of which did not remain the same), and that 
development was continually occurring. While the rationalists 
held that everything flowed so necessarily from the Absolute 
that, if one could see things from its point of view, every 
future event could be accurately predicted, James saw the 
world as tychistic, as involving spontaneity and novelty. 
Chance events in the sense of the unpredictable and the unex-
pected were common occurrences in his own life; no moment of 
his experience ever seemed to duplicate another. Thus, unlike 
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the finished and completed world of the rationalists, James's 
~orld appeared to grow continually by the successive additions 
o! novel experiences--experiences that grew out of but never 
repeated the old. And the future of his world, like the future 
of James himself, could not be precisely foreseen. 
James's rejection of· rationalistic monism-and his adop-
tion of pluralism were, as we have noted, based upon the evi-
dence of his experience; but one can hardly doubt that his 
acceptance of the one and rejection of the other also received 
a certain sanction from the moralistic posture of his life. 
for the moral life could have no place.in a monistic universe. 
Moral commitment, i.e., free commitment, would be impossible 
in a fatalistic world in which all that happened was necessary; 
more than that, human activity would be somehow less than real 
in a scheme in which the only fully real thing was thought to 
be eternal and unchanging; and whether real or not, human 
activity would be, to some degree, like beating the air if the 
world were essentially finished and complete and if man's 
actions could not significantly change or improve it in any 
way. Furthermore, if all were necessary, experienced evil, 
illusory or otherwise, could not be alleviated. In a word, 
a monistic world simply held no challenge for the powers of a 
man for whom a life of creative, productive, moral action was 
a cherished dream. 
The world, for James, was thus a plurality--not in the 
sense.that it had no unity at all, but in the sense that many 
of its parts were only externally related to one another. 
,. 
f. 
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some things, of course, may have been internally related, i.e. 
related because of what they were, related by their very exis-
tence. For example, William James and his friend, Tom Ward, 
could be said to be internally related because they were both 
men. "When two terms are similar, their very natures enter 
into the relation. Being ~ they are, no matter where or 
when, the likeness never can be denied."5 However, many 
things in the world of James's experience were related not 
because of what they were but only because of where they hap-
pened to be or when they happened to be. For example, two 
diverse events happening at the same time but in different 
places may have been related only by the fact of simultaneity. 
A hat and a pencil lying on a table may have been related only 
insofar as they happened to be together in the same place. 
Other relations, the where and t.he when, for example, 
seem adventitious. The sheet of paper may be 'off' 
or 'on' the table, for example; and in either case the 
relation involves only the outside of its terms. Hav-. 
ing an outside, both of them, they contribute by it to 
the relation. It is external: the term's inner nature 
is irrelevant to it.o 
Thus, for James, the world was not a universe nor a multiverse 
purely and simply. The world was ~ just insofar as he 
experienced it as concatenated and continuous; it was not one 
just to the extent that disconnections and disjunctions were 
directly felt. The pluralism which James saw in the universe 
meant that everything had an external environment of some kind 
5william James, ~ssays in Radical .h:mpiricism (Gloucester, 
Mass.: Peter Smith, 1967), pp. 109-IO. 
6rbid., p. 110. 
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and no reality could be said to encompass all others as the 
rationalistic Absolute was thought to do. 
However, to describe the world as a plurality is, from 
one point of view at least, to characterize it negatively. 
It is to describe it as devoid of complete and absolute unity. 
One may well ask, then, "How did James positively characterize. 
the world? What was reality for James?" He himself said that 
reality is experience--lived experience. For James, reality 
and experience were co-extensive terms. 
For the purposes of this thesis, we must determine what 
there was about reality, as James encountered it, which forced 
him not only to include faith in his de facto description of 
it but also to posit faith as a decisive factor in its dis-
covery and evolution. To do this, we must consider in depth 
the 'nature' of experience·in James's metaphysics and give 
special attention to those relations among the various parts 
of experience which are involved in the phenomena of knowledge 
and action. 
b.:xperience, from James's point of view, is not merely the 
condition of su~jectivity or awareness, as it has so often 
been defined by others, although certainly awareness cannot 
be excluded from it. Nor is experience exclusively the things 
of which we are aware. One might be tempted to say that exper-
ience, for James, is made up of thoughts and things, or of 
things and thoughts, depending upon where one chooses to place 
the priority. And there is a sense in which one would be 
correct. But the statement would need much clarification 
.. 
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before it could be said to represent James's position with 
any degree of accuracy, for the meanings which James gave to 
•thought' and 'thing' are not immediately evident. James did 
not see thought and thing as two fundamentally different kinds 
of reality, differing as body and soul, matter and spirit, dif-
fer in traditional metaphysics. From his point of view, things 
are as they are experienced--things are their appearances. 
James had no experience of any special stuff out of which 
thoughts are made. He experienced no 'thought-stuff' which 
differed fundamentally from the stuff out· of which things are 
made. Thus he asserted that there is no empirically discover-
able •matter• found in one and not in the other. Thought and 
thing, James said, are but two different names given in retro-
spect to one and the same moment in experience when it is con-
sidered in relation to different contexts. 
Explicating this point further, James called a given 
moment in experience, considered as immediately present, pure 
experience. He defined pure experience as the "instant field 
of the present"?--as plain unqualified actuality or existence 
which is only virtually thought or thing, subject or object. 
or what 'stuff' is this pure experience made? James said that 
-
there is no general •stuff' or which it is made. 
There are as many stuffs as there are 'natures' in the 
things experienced. If you ask what any one bit of 
pure experience is made of, the answer is always the 
same: "It is made of that, of just what appears, of 
space, of intensity, ~latness, brownness, heaviness, 
? ~., P• 23. 
or what not." ••• Experience is only a collective 
name for all these sensible natures, and saye for 
time and space (and, if you like, for 'being') 
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there app~ars no universal element of which all things 
are made.~ 
In this description of pure experience, the term 'thought' 
is conspicuously absent. Yb.ere in James' s account o·f experi-
ence does thought appear? And what difference did James see 
between the thought of heat and the thing, heat, for example? 
James held that in the immediate experience of heat there is 
only the datum--the phenomenon--simply heat. There is in this 
immediate datum no distinction between heat and the thought 
of heat. But in a second, retrosp.ecti-ve experience, the simple 
•that• of the first experience can be seen to figure in dif-
ferent contexts. As considered in relation to a man's other 
thoughts, as continuous with them, as coming at a certain 
point in his mental history, the heat figures as a thought, 
feeling or sensation. (James sometimes used the term 'thought' 
broadly to signify any mental state.) But the same datum 
considered as related to other physical objects--to the flame 
from which it comes, to the hearth on which the fire is, to 
the logs burning, to one's body being warmed--figures as a 
thing, as an object. Thus thought and thing, the feeling of 
heat and the. heat felt, are, from James's point of view, just 
two designations of one and the same indivisible fact properly 
called the datum, the phenomenon, or the experience. And in 
the datum per se there is no dualism of subject and object, 
8~., PP· 26-27. 
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of consciousness and the content of consciousness. The sub-
jectivity and objectivity of the experience are functional 
attributes only, which, James said, are realized only when 
the experience is '"taken,' i.e., talked-of, twice, considered 
along with its two differing contexts respectively, by a new 
retrospective experience, of which that whole past complica-
tion now forms the fresh content."9 
From the point of view of James, then, reality is exper-
ience. Experience is but a collective name for all the 
sensible natures appearing in time and space--a collective 
name for all phenomena. But because of the various ways in 
which phenomena are related in experience, they become classed 
as thoughts and things, as mental states and objects of mental 
states. Of all the.experienced relations in which phenomena 
exist, the most intimate of all relations is the one in virtue 
of which a datum of experience becomes classified as a mental 
state, the relationship in virtue of which it is considered 
part of the mental life of one individual person. No relation-
ship is more intimate than this relationship between two 
experiences, two states of mind, the second of which is imme-
diately conscious of continuing the first. Some thoughts are 
isolated from each other as my thoughts are isolated from 
yours. But other thoughts consciously continue each other, 
. . . 
as my present thought continues my past. And when thoughts 
are thus aware of continuing and belonging with other thoughts, 
9Ibid.' p. 23. 
~nve a stream of consciousness called a self. we UP-
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"The organi-
zation of the Self as a system of memories, purposes, strivings, 
fulfilments or disappointments, is incidental to this most 
intimate of all relations, the terms of which seem in many 
cases actually to compenetrate and suffuse each other's 
10 being." 
»npirically, a self involves a series of experiences 
consciously continuing each other, a stream of conscious thought. 
The nucleus of this self at any given moment, James said, is 
experienced as the bodily existence warmly felt to be present 
at the time and the sense of intimate activity accompanying it. 
Attempting to explain the sense of continuing self-identity 
which each person has, James pointed out that a present exper-
ience in the stream of thought can rememb.er those which pre-
ceded 'it and can know the ~bjects which those experiences knew. 
When a present experience looks back on past objects of thought, 
it findsthat some have about them the same warmth and intimacy 
which pervades the present experience. On the other h~nd, 
others (experiences thought of as having occurred to other 
people, for example) lack this warm and intimate character. 
Any remembered object of thought, any remembered past exper-
ience, which brings to consciousness the same warmth and inti-
macy which accompanies the present experience is appropriated 
. . 
by the present experience as 'mine'--as·!!· James said that 
I 
we assimilate all such appropriated experiences to each other 
lUibid., p. 45. 
\ 
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and to the "warm and intimate self we now feel within us as 
"e think"ll and we separate them as a group from all those 
experiences which do not have this warmth and intimacy--in 
other words, we separate .the ~from the not-me.12 
The world described for us by James, then, is a plural-
istic world in which reality is experience--experience involv-
ing multiple phenomena related in diverse ways. And in virtue· 
of certain of these relations we are able to distinguish in 
experience between thoughts and things, more precisely between 
11william James, The Principles of Psychology (2 vols.; 
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1890), I, 333. 
12Empiricists, less radical than James, found it more dif-
ficult to explain man's consciousness of personal identity, 
because they had overlooked the experienced transition by which 
one thought flows into and is consciously continued by another 
when they both belong to the same self. For James, this 
"co-conscious" transition was one of those relations among 
the parts of experience which he directly apprehended. "With-
in each of our personal histories, subject, object, interest 
and purpose are continuous or may be continuous. Personal 
histories are processes of change in time, and the change 
itself is one of the thin s im.mediatel e erienced. 11 (William 
am.es, .;.;,ssays in a ica Zmpir cism, p. • ume overlooked 
this experience of change and transition and described the 
mind in terms of such loose and separate representations, that 
the rationalists felt compelled to look around for some supra-
sensible agent to unite the otherwise discontinuous items of 
experience. Traditional scholastic metaphysics had already 
employed a substantial soul as the undivided subject 0£ 
diverse thoughts· and feelings; but the rationalistic monists 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries solved the problem 
by positing an Absolute of some kind as the repository of all 
the disjointed experiences of men. According to James, if one 
is a radical empiricist, no trans-empirical agency--neither 
the substantial soul of traditional metaphysics nor the Abso-
lute 0£ the monists--is necessary to hold one's experiences 
together. They hold together by themselves. My thoughts flow 
into one another and the continuous transition is something 
felt by me. Although James's explanation of the consciousness 
of personal identity may not be totally satisfying, it repre-
sents a noteworthy attempt to describe the 'I' or the 'me' 
entirely in empirical terms. 
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streams of consciousness and objects of consciousness. Thus 
ve find that among its realities, James's world includes 
personal selves. One may well ask, however, whether there is 
a:JJY room in his uni verse for personal selves other t.han human 
beings--whether human consciousness need be considered the 
highest kind of consciousness. 
As a matter of fact, James saw nothing in experience to 
militate against the view that there are other consciousnesses 
in existence--consciousnesses which are superhuman. Further-
more, James held that there are certain types of experience 
(which an empiricist who is radical enough cannot overlook) 
that point to the reality of such superhuman consciousness. 
The experiences of life following upon death--of new heights 
of power and happiness following upon despair, for example--
of joy based upon giving up one's own will and letting some-
thing higher work for him--all such experiences show us a 
world in which all is well, in spite of sorrow, pain, tragedy, 
and death. They point in the direction of a world wider in 
scope than the one we ordinarily see, a spiritual world of 
which our visible world is just a part and "from which it 
draws its chief significance."13 They point to the existence 
of some form of superhuman life with which we may, unknown to 
ourselves, be co-conscious· and which we may call 'God.' if we 
wish. James assented to the reality of such a God on the 
grounds that he produces real effects in the world--in the 
._.:.-'· 
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sense that prayer, communion with him, and obedience to what 
we consider his demands seem to produce real salutary effects 
upon our personal centers of energy. We shall learn more 
about the God in whom James felt inclined to believe in a 
later chapter. For now, let it suffice to say that James's 
God cannot be identified with the Absolute of the rationalists. 14 
Thus far, personal beings have been described primarily 
in terms of consciousness and, therefore, in terms of their 
runctions as knowers. But men, the personal consciousnesses 
with which we are most familiar, are not merely knowing beings; 
they are desiring and acting beings as well. And all of these 
terms--knowing (sensing, feeling, thinking, reflecting), 
desiring, and acting--refer to possible relations which per-
sonal beings can have to other parts of experience, i.e. to 
the things in the world and to other persons. To some extent, 
all of these relations have both interested and yet baffled 
philosophers for centuries. That relation with which phil-
osophers have been most frequently preoccupied has been the 
cognitive relation. 
14According to James, a God conceived after the fashion 
of rationalistic monism, a God conceived to be absolute, infin-
ite, eternal, unchanging, all-embracing and without a history, 
is totally foreign to our experience and is thus totally for-
eign to us--a monstrosity, he suggested. There can be no com-
mon ground for communication with such a God--no basis for 
sympathy, trust, love or cooperation. The only way to avoid 
the foreignness, strangeness, and paradoxical character of the 
monistic world of the Absolute, James said, is to be frankly 
pluralistic and to assume that the superhuman consciousness, 
however vast it may be, has itself an external environment and 
is therefore finite. In James's opinion, theism in these terms 
is a very strong probability that follows from experience 
taken in the widest sense. 
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Por centuries, philosophers· have struggled with the prob-
iem of how to bridge the supposed gap between knower and object 
known. Subject and object being treated as discontinuous 
entities, the presence of the object to the subject has always 
been a very mysterious thing. How is it possible that one 
reality can be in two places at one time--in outer space and 
in one's mind? A great portion of the history of philosophy 
is the story of the various theories which have been invented 
to try to solve this paradox. Representative theories posited 
an image or mental representation of some sort to act as a 
kind of intermediary between knower and object. William James, 
however, felt that representative theories violated the indi-
vidual' a sense of life, for a person knows no intervening men-
tal image between himself and the thing perceived but seems to 
see the·object immediately as it physically exists. At least 
James himself experienced no such intervening image and he 
took the evidence from his experience as primary. Other theor-
ies, which James labeled common-sense theories, left the sup-
posed separation between knower and object known untouched and 
assumed that the mind is able to clear it by a kind of self-
transcending leap. Transcendentalist theories, characteristic 
of certain rationalists, declared that the gap is impossible 
to bridge by finite knowers and that the only possible explana-
tion of knowing is in terms of an Absolute, for whom knower 
and thing known are both objects. 
James, however, took experience as he found it, with all 
of its felt conjunctions and transitions, and saw that it was 
4? 
not necessary to resort to an.y artificial inventions in order 
to close the gap between knower and object known. James found 
that it was possible to describe cognition intelligibly en-
tirely in terms of his experience without calling upon any 
trans-empirical powers to make it possible. The cognitive 
relation can be described adequately, he said, in terms of the 
felt conjunctions in one's experience without intrQducing any 
artificial intermediaries between his thoughts and things. 
James gave us just such a description in "A World of Pure 
Experience" in which he explained what knower and object are 
empirically known as. 
Either the knower and the known are: 
(1) the self-same piece of experience taken twice 
over in different contexts; or they are 
(2) two pieces of actual experience belonging to 
the same subject, with definite tracts of conjunctive 
transitional experience between them; or 
(3) the known is.a possible experience either of 
that subject or another, to which the said conjunctive 
transitions would lead, if sufficiently prolonged.15 
In the first instance, we have knowledge of perception--know-
ledge in which the mind has direct acquaintance with a present 
object. The second and third cases are both instances of 
conceptual knowledge in which the mind has 'knowledge about' 
an object that is not present. We alluded to perceptual 
knowledge above when we discussed the difference between the 
thought of heat and the thing, heat.16 As we said, thought 
and thing, subject and object, knower and object known, are 
l5James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 53. 
16Above, PP• 39-40. 
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but two designations of one and the same indivisible fact or 
item of experience. In perceptual knowledge, as experienced, 
there is no duality of subject and object to be overcome; 
there is no gap between knower and thing known. In perceptual 
or intuitive knowledge, the mental content and the object are 
identical; we experience no intermediaries between thought and 
thing at the moment in which an object, such as thi~ piece of 
paper, is intuited by us. "The paper is in the mind and the 
mind is around the paper, because paper and mind are only two 
names that are given later to the one experience, when, taken 
in a larger world of which it forms a part, its connections 
are traced in different directions."17 The separation of a 
given piece of immediate experience into consciousness and the 
content of consciousness results from adding to it different 
sets of experiences in connection with which it performs dif-
ferent functions. The pure experience of heat, referred to 
earlier, is the point of intersection of two processes which 
connect it with different groups of associates. One process 
is a man's personal biography. The datum, the pure experience, 
the phenomenon, is the· last term of a series .of "sensations, 
emotions, decisions, movements, classifications, expectations, 
etc., ending in the present, and the first term of a series of 
similar 'inner' operations extending into the future, 
The other process is one in which the datum~ r~at, i~ 
• • • 
17william James, "1.l!he Kn~,-· -eS of Things Together," ~ 
,!!:_5:_!;!r:i.gs ·of William Ja111P~ -r~· 156-57 • 
lbJ,, ...... ~ -.;)ays in Radical Empiricism, p. 13. 
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terminus ad quem of a lot of previous physical operations--
-felling trees, cutting logs, carrying wood, laying the wood, 
lighting the f ire--and the terminus a quo of certain future 
operations such as illuminating the room, warming the room and 
all that is in it, smoldering, smoking, dying out, etc. The 
datum, the pure experience, 'heat,• is the intersection of 
these two processes. And a second retrospective experience 
can consider the datum as figuring in both lines of activity. 
Considered as part of the process known as one's personal 
history, the experience functions as knower; considered as 
part of the train of physical operations, the experience func-
tions as known. Thus James avoids the problem of bridging the 
gap between knower and known in perceptual knowledge by recog-
nizing that knower and known are in fact identified in the 
immediate experience, i.e. at the moment of intuition. 
In explaining conceptual knowledg-e, James did not Dridge 
the gap between knower and known by 1d~ntifying them as he.did 
in the case of intuitive knowledge. In conceptual kn~wledge 
knower and known are distinct; nevertheless, knowing in this 
case does not involve any sort of trans-empirical leap. · On 
the contrary, knower and known are distinct portions of exper-
ience, and the knowing itself is the experienced transition 
from an earlier piece of experience to a later piece which the 
first piece ·intends. Conceptual knowle·dge is knowledge about 
an object that is not immediately present, and it consists in 
the pointing of one's thought to that object. It is the know-
ing of absent experiences and consists in passing smoothly 
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· towards them through the intermediate experiences which inter-
vene between the present thought or concept, conside~ed as 
}Cn.ower, and the absent experience, considered as object. In 
bis essay, "The Tigers of India," James said that conceptual 
}Cn.owledge of an object such as the tigers in India amounts 
to mentally pointing to them from wherever we are, assuming 
that we are not in their immediate presence. What _did he 
mean by 'pointing'? Or rather what is this 'pointing' known 
as by us? How is this pointing experienced? 
The pointing of our thought to the tigers is known 
simply and solely as.a procession of mental associates 
and motor consequences that follow on the thought, 
and that would lead harmoniously, if followed out, 
into some ideal or real context, or even into the 
immediate presence, of the tigers. It is known as 
our rejection of a jaguar, if that beast were shown 
us as a tiger; as our assent to a genuine tiger if 
so shown. It is known as our ability to utter all 
sorts of propositions which don't contradict other 
propositions that are true of the real tigers. It 
is even known, if we take the tigers very seriously, 
as actions of ours which may terminate in directly 
intuited tigers, as they would if we took a voyage 
to India for the purpose of tiger hunting and brought 
back of lot of skins of the striped rascals which we 
had laid low.19 
In this example, the thought of the tigers is the knower which 
is joined by conjunctive transitional experience to the percep-
tual experience of the tigers (assuming that we go to India 
to see them). And the percept of the tigers is the object 
known. 
To take another example, if while sitting in his bedroom 
a man thinks of a photograph which he believes to be hidden 
l9James, Pragmatism and Four Essays from The Meaning of 
Truth, p. 226. 
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in an old Bible on his library shelf, and if he gets up, 
walks to the library, looks on the shelf, finds the Bible, 
opens it, and finds the photograph, his thought of the photo 
when he was sitting in his room can now be said to have been 
trulY cognitive of the photograph hidden in the Bible. The 
percept of the photo is what his idea of it mea~t because his 
thought of it has passed into the percept by a ser~es of con-
junctive experiences. The felt transitions by which the con-
cept of the photo was finally corroborated is all that the 
knowing of a percept by an idea can possibly mean from a 
purely empirical--i.e., a radically empirical--point of view. 
The percept of the photograph in this instance not only veri-
fies the concept, but the percept's existence as the terminus 
of the chain of intermediary experiences actually creates the 
concept's function of knowing. 
James held that conceptual knowledge is made conceptual 
knowledge wholly by the existence of things that fall outside 
of the knowing experience itself, i.e., by intermediary exper-
iences and by a terminal percept into which the conceptual 
experience leads and which seems to fulfill it. But can the 
knowledge be said to be present before the intermediary exper-
iences occur and the fulfilling terminal percept is attained? 
James distinguished between knowing as verified and completed 
and the same knowing in transit or in process. It is only 
When our idea of an object has terminated actually in the per-
cept of the object that we know 'for certain' that from the 
beginning the idea was truly cognitive of that thing. "Until 
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established by the end of the process, its quality of knowing 
that, or indeed of knowing anything, could still be doubted; 
·and yet the knowing really was there, as the result now shows."20 
In other words, we were virtual .knowers of the object "long 
before we were certified to have been its actual knowers, by 
the percept's retroactive validating power."21 James claimed 
that the greater part of all our knowing never gets beyond 
this virtual stage. Obviously, our thinking about impercep-
tible things never gets beyond this point, because in this 
case, a verifying perceptual experience is not possible. But 
even when perceptual verification is possible, we often can-
not afford to wait for such verification because immediate 
action may be necessary.22 In such instances, if there is 
no contradicting truth in view, we often assume our ideas to 
be true and act accordingly. But to assume our ideas to be 
true without verification is an act of faith. Since the greate!:' 
part of our knowing never gets beyond this virtual stage--the 
. 
greater part of our 'knowing' involves faith of some kind or 
other. 
To continue thinking unchallenged is, ninety-nine 
times out of a hundred, our practical substitute for 
20James, 
21Ibid. 
> 
Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 68. 
22James himself had experienced the kind of paralysis 
which is attendant upon that attitude which prompts us to wait 
for proof before we act. In the emotional crisis of his youth, 
he had been, to some extent, paralyzed by doubts--doubts about 
freedom, his creative powers, the ultimate value of his activi-
ties. And he learned by painful experience that if we insist 
that the fruits of our actions be certified in advance, we may 
never act at all. 
kn.owing in the completed sense. As each experience 
runs by cognitive transition into the next one, and 
we nowhere feel a collision with what we elsewhere 
count as truth or fact, we commit22urselves to the current as if the port were sure. ~ 
Thus James succeeded in explaining knowledge, both per-
ceptual (intuitive) and conceptual, entirely in terms of 
experience as he lived it and the transitions which he felt 
therein, thereby avoiding the usual epistemological problem 
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ot getting knower and known together. In perceptual knowledge, 
he said, there is no gap between knower and object to be over-
come because knower and object are one and· the same bit of 
immediate experience considered from two points of view. 
And in conceptual knowledge, knower and object are two pieces 
of experience, an idea and a percept, actually or potentially 
joined by a series of experiences fluidly passing into each 
other. When the conjunction is actual, the percept is felt 
as fulfilling the idea. 
As we saw earlier, however, the cognitive relation is 
only one of the possible relations which those parts of expe-
rience known as personal selves can have with other parts of 
experience. Men are not merely cognitive beings; they are 
active beings as well. In fact, for James, the most important 
thing about a man is not what he knows (although that is impor-
tant too) but his conduct, his actions. According to James, 
knowledge is for the sake of activity. The purpose of knowl-
edge is to enable man to exercise his volitional powers in 
23James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 69. 
effective and fruitful activity in the world. And activity, 
.1n the sense of desiring and willing as well as the physical 
activities which follow upon them, is important because by 
means of it man moulds his own character, creates to a large 
extent his own experiences; 24 modifies his environment and 
thus fashions the world in the sense of changing it, completing 
it, and making it better or worse. 
It is an empirical fact that men desire (wish for and 
will) to feel, to do, and to have all kinds of things which 
presently are not felt, done or had. For James, the presence 
of desires in the world makes it a world of good and evil. 
ror the good is that which is desired by some conscious being; 
it is that which is appreciated and enjoyed by such a being; 
in short, it is that which is felt to be good by some one. 
So tar as a person "feels ~nything to be good, he makes it 
24It is true that the flux of pure sensational experience 
seems to be simply given. And it is simply given to the newly 
born infant; but once the very fir~ impression has been made 
upon the infant's sense, he reacts; and from then on his activ-. 
ities can so modify his environment that even future given 
sensations may in part owe their being to him. Furthermore, 
in regard to pure sensational experience, man exercises a 
certain selective activity insofar as a man's sense organs 
respond to only .a comparatively few of the infinite number of 
movements swarming about him. This selective activity con-
tinues when, from the flux of sensations, attention "picks out 
certain ones as worthy of its notice and suppresses all the 
rest." (James, The Principles of Psychology, I, 285.) Thus, 
under the influence of his own active nature, a man's world 
takes shape,. and the things with which his world is furnished 
are products of his own selective attention. Things, said 
J~es, are nothing "but special groups of sensible qualities, 
whhiich happen practically or aesthetically to interest us, to 
W ch we therefore give substantive names, and which we exalt 
to this exclusive status or independence and dignity." (Ibid.) 
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· good • .,25 It !.! good at least for him. Goods are, in James• s 
,,ords, "objects of feeling and desire,"26 the essence of good 
bej.ng"simply to satisfy demand."27 
Correlatively, evil is the frustration of desire; it is 
tbat which is repugnant or painful to a conscious be'ing; it 
is that which is felt to be bad or evil by someone. In James's 
view, if there were no beings with conscious desires in the 
world, no beings to feel things to be good or evil, there 
would be no good or evil. As it is, however, the world con-
tains both. It contains good insofar as there are things 
desired, appreciated and enjoyed by men; it contains evil 
insofar as there are frustrated desires, repugnances, suffer-
ing, and pain. 
The presence in the world of desires and human judgments 
of good and bad makes the world to be not only a world of good 
and evil but an ethical world as well. For every desire, by 
the very fact that it exists, constitutes a valid claim on 
the part of the person who experiences that desire. And wherever 
a claim is made by one consciousness, there is an obligation 
incumbent upon another. In James's words, "• •• every de facto 
claim creates in so far forth an obligation. • • .Arry desire 
-
is imperative to the extent of its amount; it makes itself 
25Yilliam James, "'l'he Moral Philosopher and the Moral 
Life," ~says on Faith and Morals, comp. by Ralph Barton Perry, 
Meridian Books (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing 
Company, 1962), p. lYU. 
261bid., p. 1y7. 
27 lbid.' p. 201. 
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valid by the ract that it exists at all."28 Thus, for James, 
every good, insofar as it is related in one way or another to 
desire (either as its object or its fulfillment) is in some 
sense a moral good. ln fact, James says, "there are no non-
moral goods."29 
The universe, for James, is thus an ethical universe--
a universe of experienced desires and, therefore, a universe 
of claims and corresponding obligations. Desires and claims, 
however, frequently conflict and it is not always possible to 
satisfy all demands. In the case of conrlict, how does one 
decide which claim should be fulfilled? James said that the 
guiding principle of moral philosophy should be to satisfy as 
many claims as possible. 
Since everything which is demanded is by that fact a 
good, must not the guiding principle for ethical phil-
osophy (since all demands conjointly cannot be satis-
fied in this poor world) be simply to satisfy at all 
times as many demands as we can? That act must be 
the best act, accordingly, which makes for the best 
whole, in the sense of awakening the least sum Ol'Ciis-
satisfactions.30 
But it is often impossible to know in advance and with certi-
tude. which act will make for the best whole. Certitude in 
ethical matters seems to be a practical impossibility inasmuch 
as every real dilemma of this sort is unique. And this points 
up the problem involved in all human activity--a problem the 
solution to which, as we shall discover, requires the recogni-
28~., p. 195. 
29Ibid., p. 209. 
30ibid., p. 205. 
~~on o! faith as a legitimate spring-board !or action. 57 
' ~ Action follows upon belief; it presupposes conviction. 
_])Oubt and indecision mean inactivity. And yet, from the point 
o! view of James's radical empiricism, absolute certainty 
regarding matters of fact--i.e., absolute certainty based upon 
empirical evidence or rational demonstration--seems to be 
practically impossible. Except for the datum of the immediate 
present, which we always without hesitation believe, it is 
aiways possible to doubt our judgments, as the following con-
siderations will show. 
The ideal, of course, is to be able to act on verified 
principles. For this reason, men persistently seek the veri-
fication of their beliefs. The scientist, for example, aims 
to have his theories empirically corroborated. He begins with 
an idea,' an hypothesis, and is led by it to perform a series 
ot operations and experiments which he hopes will terminate 
in a perceptual experience that will be the fulfillment and 
Yeri.tication of his original idea. But even when verification 
is attained," from the point of view of the empiricist, the 
verified proposition is still subject to further qualification 
3lJames's position on the relationship of belief to action 
was undoubtedly influenced not only by James's own experience 
but also by the thought of his friend and fellow member of 
"The Metaphysical Club," Charles Peirce. In "How to Make Our 
Ideas Clear," Peirce spoke of belief as "a rule for action." 
l>hiloso hical Writin s of Peirce, ed. by Justus Buchler rNew 
or : . over Pu ica ions, nc., 9551, p. 28.) And in "Tne 
lixation of Belief," he wrote, "Our oeliefs guide our desires 
~ shape our actions." (Ibid., pp. 9-10.) Belief "puts us 
'< ~to such a condition thai'°We shall behave in some certain way 
l!/f;:~ en the occasion arises." (1,lli., p. 10.) . ' ., ; 
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and correction. As James told us, radical empiricism consi-
ders its most assured conclusions regarding matters of fact 
as hypotheses liable to modification in the course of future 
experience, because experienced reality is constantly changing 
and what may be true of a given segment of it today may not 
necessarily be true of similar instances of it tomorrow. 
Furthermore, there is no absolute point of view. The world 
of radical empiricism is a world of many_minds,32 minds which 
are for practical purposes conterminous, i.e., they meet in the 
same objects.33 But even though the same object may be known 
by more than one person, no two persons perceive it from pre-
cisely the same posture. No two people share identical 
32How does a radical empiricist like James know that there 
are other minds in existence? In his own words--"Why do I 
postulate your mind? Because I see your body acting in a cer-
tain way. Its gestures, facial movements, words and conduct 
generally are 'expressive,' so I deem it actuated as my own is, 
by an inner life like mine. This argument from analogy is my 
reason, whether an instinctive belief runs before it or not. 
But what is 'your body' here but a percept in !)! field? It is 
only as animating that object, ~object, that I have any occa-
sion to think of y~t all •••• In that perceptual part of 
st universe which I call iour body, your mind and my mind meet 
and may be called conterminous. Your mind actuates that body 
and mine sees it; my thoughts pass into it as into their ha~­
monious cognitive fulfilment; your emotions and volitions pass 
into it as causes into their effects." (James, Essays in Radical 
.rlnpiricism, pp. ??-?8.) 
33James held that men's ~inds meet in a w~rld of objects 
which they share in common and which would still be there if 
one or several of the minds were destroyed. James wrote that 
if "one and the same experience can figure twice, once in a 
mental and once in a physical context • • • , one does not see 
why it might not figure thrice, or four times, or any number 
of times, by running into as many different mental contexts, 
just as the same point, lying at their intersection, can be 
continued into many different lines." (James, ~ssais in Radi-
cal .l!lnpiricism, p. 80.) James claimed that abolishing any 
number of mental streams would not destroy the experience 
itself or its other contexts. 
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perspectives or see the same object in exactly the same way; 
and no one man, :from James' s point of view, perceives an object 
in its entirety with all of its actual and possible relation-
ships. Thus no single person knows any thing completely; no 
one knows all that can be said about it. What may be true of 
it from one perspective, in one particular relationship, may 
not be tru~ of it from another perspective or in another rela-
tionship. Furthermore, each man sees an object in a unique 
light, the unique light provided by all of his past experience 
(which is never identical with any one else's) and by all of 
his previously espoused convictions and beliefs; and just as 
a visible object may appear differently in lights of various 
wave lengths, so the same object may appear differently to 
different persons in the light of their unique past experiences. 
This fact was forcibly impressed upon James himself by the 
many debates in which he engaged with family and friends, all 
of whom were sincere and honest in their search for truth. 
The fact that they did not all see reality in the same way 
made.it clear to James that it is not possible to consider 
the judgment of any one mind about an object as the absolutely 
incorrigible truth about the -.matter. 
The history of human thought is to a great extent the 
history of men's disputes about what is true or not true of the 
universe and about how men should act or not act in relation ' 
to the universe. It is also the history of men's attempts to 
settle these disputes. The most satisfactory way of resolving 
such issues, of course, is to point to the data of experience 
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veri!ying one hypothesis rather than another. Experience, 
however, is not always obliging enough to provide the needed 
data; on the other hand, it is at times too obliging, for not 
infrequently experience supports both hypotheses equally and 
leaves the issue thus unsettled, at least as far as empirical 
proof is concern.ed. Moreover, in regard to practical issues, 
experience never tells us in advance how successful or unsuc-
cessful a particular course of action wi_ll actually be. 
William James put forth his theory of pragmatism as a 
method of settling men's disputes about reality and about 
their practical relations with it. But, as a brief considera-
tion of his pragmatism will reveal, even it does not resolve 
issues so completely that there is no longer any possibility 
of doubt or need for faith. Although James speaks of pragma-
tism as a method, it is obviously more than a method; for a 
method of settling disputes must involve a theory of truth 
as well. As a method, pragmatism attempts to interpret each 
conflicting hypothesis by tracing its respective practical 
consequences. If the consequences of one alternative are in 
rio way different from ·those of another, then the alternatives 
mean practically the same thing and all dispute is idle. 
James's pragmatic rule states that the meaning 9f a concept 
may always be found, if not in some sensible particular which 
it directly designates, then in some particular difference in 
the course of human experience which its being true will make. 
"There can be no difference anywhere that doesn't make a dif-
-
ference elsewhere--no difference in abstract truth that doesn't 
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eXJ>ress itsel! in a difference in concrete fact and in conduct 
. consequent upon that tact, imposed on somebody, somehow, some-
· and somewhen."34 where, One can see in James's position not 
onlY bis radically empirical attitude but also the importance 
which he placed upon action. Knowledge is for the sake of 
action; and if two theories involve no differences whatsoever 
in the human conduct consequent upon their being accepted as 
true, then for practical purposes the two theories are the same.35 
Arr1 dispute about them is idle speculation and a waste of time.36 
But let us suppose that the practical consequences of one 
theory ~ different from those of another. How does one decide 
which of the two theories is the true one? There must be some 
criteria if the dispute is not to be settled arbitrarily. In 
34Jam.es, Pragm.atism and Four Essays from The Meaning of 
Truth, p. 45. . 
35The influence of Charles Peirce upon Jam.es is apparent. 
In "How to Make Our Ideas Clear, " _Peirce wrote, ". • • differ-
ent belief a are distinguished by the different modes of action 
to which they give rise. If beliefs do not differ in this 
respect, if they appease the same doubt by producing the same 
rule of action, then no mere differences in the manner of con-
sciousness of them can make them different beliefs, any more 
than playing a tune in different keys is playing different 
tunes." (Philosophical Writings of Peirce, p. 29.) 
36James•s intensely active and moralistic nature forbade 
him to waste time over merely academic questions, because he 
!elt that it was action that ··mattered not mere speculation. 
In early manhood, James was prone to such seemingly idle spec-
ulation and saw it as a fault which he resolved to overcome. 
"For the remainder of the year, I will abstain from the mere 
speculation and contemplative Grublei in which my nature takes 
most delight, and voluntarily cUitivate the feeling of moral 
freedom, by reading books favorable to it, as well as by acting. 
• • • For the present then remember: care little for speculation; 
much for the form of my action; recollect that only when habits 
ot order are formed can we advance to really interesting fields 
Of action--and consequently accumulate grain on grain of will-
ful choice like a very miser; ••• " ("Diary," The Writings of 
William James, pp. 7-8.) 
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oversimplified terms, the true idea is the idea that works. 
In Pragmatism, James explained: 
••• ideas which themselves 
ex erience ecome true ·us in so ar as e e 
us to get into satisfactory relations with other parts 
of our experience, to summarize them and get about among 
them by conceptual short-cuts instead of following 
the interminable succession of particular phenomena. 
A.ny idea upon which we can ride, so to speak; any idea 
that will carry us prosperously from any one part of 
our experience to any other part, linking things sat-
isfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving la-
bor; is true for just so much, true in so far forth, 
true instrumentally.37 
James tried to show that the pragmatic notion of truth 
is not unlike that of the traditionalists who defined truth 
as the agreement of our ideas with reality. However, he 
interpreted the terms, 'reality' and 'agreement,' somewhat 
more broadly than the traditionalists did. When James said 
that our ideas must agree with reality in order to be true, 
he recognized three kinds of reali tie·s with which ideas must 
be in harmony: 1) concrete sensible facts; 2) relations among 
purely mental ideas, i.e., abstract principles and definitions 
and the relations_ intuitively perceived among them--truths of 
logic and mathematics, for example; and 3) the whole body of 
other truths which we have already made our own. How do our 
ideas agree with such realities? In a narrow sense, an idea 
can agree with a reality by copying it. But for James, the 
word 'agree'· had a broader meaning. To. put it succinctly, an 
idea will agree with the three kinds of realities mentioned 
1) if it is either sensibly verifiable or at least not in 
37James, Pragmatism and Four Essays from The Meaning of 
Truth, p. 49. 
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contradiction with concrete sensible facts, 2) if it is logic-
allY consistent and consistent with our abstract· knowledge in 
general, and 3) if it is either supported by,- or at least in 
harmony with, all of our other beliefs about the world. Ideas 
that thus agree with reality work. They work in the sense 
that by believing them we can get about among the parts of 
our experience much more easily than if we did not believe. 
If nothing else, they work in the very minimal sense of not 
obstructing our progress as we move about in the empirical 
world.38 
For James, then, true ideas are ideas that work, ideas 
that put us in good working touch with reality. But even when, 
by the pragmatic method, one has decided which of two ideas 
works best, which one he will count as true, the issue is 
never absolutely settled for all time. Since reality is con-
tinually changing, what works now may not always work. Thus 
even those conclusions arrived at pragmatically are never 
entirely incorrigible. Doubt is always possible in regard to 
38James explained the agreement of an idea with reality 
as follows: "To 'agree• in the widest sense with a reality can 
only mean to be guided either strai~ht u~ to it or into its~ 
surroundings, or to be put into sue wor ing touch with it as 
to handle either it or something connected with it better than 
if we disagreed. Better either intellectually or practically! 
And often agreement will only mean the negative fact that 
nothing contradictory from the quarter of that reality comes 
to interfere with the way in which our ideas guide us else-
where •••• The essential' thing is the process of being guid-
ed. Any idea that helps us to deal, whether practically or 
intellectually, with either the reality or its belongings, 
that doesn't entangle our progress in frustrations, that fits, 
in fact, and adapts our life to the reality's whole settiiig-;-
will agree sufficiently to meet the requirement. It will hold 
true of that reality." (James, Pragmatism and Four J!,;ssays from 
The Meaning of Truth, p. 140.) 
·' 
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The good life, however, presupposes conviction. The 
good life is the moral life, the life to which James himself 
aspired and to which he resolved to dedicate himself. It is 
a life of productive hum.an activity in which one fashions the 
world and himself in such a way as to minimize the evil and 
the pain and to maximize the good and its accompanying joys. 
James held that the very purpose of thought and reflection is 
to facilitate such fruitful human conduct. But responsible 
human conduct presupposes belief--not merely opinion held as 
such--but conviction, for doubt and indecision result in apathy 
'and inaction. Here James's view of knowledge seems to present 
a stumbling block, because on his radically empiricist prin-
ciples, absolute certainty certified by evidence is rarely, if 
ever, possible in regard to matters of fact. On experiential 
grounds, a life of responsible moral action is thus impossible 
--impossible unless some other springboard for action can be 
found beside the belief that is certified by proof. Ye have 
two alternatives. ~ther we do not act at all or we act on 
an assumption; either we do not act at all or we act on faith. 
Faith, which is a believing attitude adopted on non-cog-
nitive grounds, is necessary for hum.an life, James said, not 
only Decause without it doubt would paralyze us most of the 
time but also becaus~ the moral life, gua moral, requires 1t. 
Moral action, the opposite ot determined, instinctive action, 
must be responsible and free. To act morally is to act freely 
and to be aware of one's freedom and one's consequent 
r .· ~ 
r responsibility. But in James's view, free will is not some-
thing which can be demonstrated or empirically proven. Hence, 
if one accepts it, he must accept it on faith as James himself 
did after reading Renouvier in 1870. Thus the moral life, 
Jl,U! moral, presupposes faith not only in the course of action 
one chooses to follow but in one's own freedom as well. 
In summary, we may say that the world, as experienced by 
James and as interpreted in his philosophy, is such that human 
.tulfillment, as well as the development and perfection of the 
world as a whole, requires the exercise of faith on the part 
of huinan beings. The world, as James lived in it and under-
stood it, is a world of changing, multiple phenomena--a world 
whose future is open--a world that is plastic in the hands of 
men. And men, James held, are primarily active beings. By 
their activities, not only do men create their own personali-
ties, fashion their own lives, and shape their own destinies, 
but also they make the world itself to be what it is. The world 
becomes better or worse in proportion to the quality of each 
human life within it. The good in the world can be augmented, 
James believed, and the evil lessened by responsible action on 
the part of human beings. Such responsible action, however, 
-
presupposes conviction. And since the changing character of 
experience and the limits of human knowledge make that convic-
tion which is certified by proof impossible in most practical 
situations, the responsible human action by which man fulfills 
himself and perfects the world requires the exercise of faith. 
James· thus affirmed the need for faith in the lives of 
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all men; and his affirmation was a philosophical_ one based 
upon his reflections on the changing character of reality--
bis reflections on man, man's active relationship to the world, 
and the apparent limitations of human knowledge. 
The distinctively human need for faith, however, was an 
exigency which James himself personally and urgently felt. 
And he allowed faith to play a prominent role in his own life 
--even in his philosophical speculation. To permit faith to 
influence one's philosophical views was, of course, a cardinal 
sin from rationalistic and positivistic points of view. Hut 
from James's point of view, there was no other choice. On the 
one hand, his empiricist view of knowledge made absolu~e 
proven certitude in most philosophical questions impossible. 
On the other hand, his moralism forbade forever suspending 
judgment--at least on matters so vital. Thus James was left 
with no alternative except faith. It was either faith or 
mental nullity and moral impotence. And James opted for faith. 
It became part and parcel of his pragmatic method insofar as 
that method allowed him to accept any hypothesis and act 
upon it if consequences useful to life flowed from it, even 
though no empirical verification was readily available. 
Furthermore, James used this pragmatic method himself in deter-
mining some of the fundamental features of his own world view 
--in arguing against materialism, for example,- in fighting 
determinism, and in defending theism. 
Thus James's moralism, the changing character of reality, 
the limits of purely empirical knowledge, and the practical 
6? 
necessity of dealing with the proader questions of existence 
forced James to make a place for faith in his philosophical 
view of life. But even if they had not, James would have had 
to take cognizance of faith at least as an empirical datum. 
Rightly or wrongly, the men of his day, like the men of every 
era, did believe without clinching evidence. Human faith, 
religious and otherwise, was an experienced fact then as it 
is now. And a radical empiricist who could exclude nothing 
of experience from the matter of philosophy would have to 
philosophize about faith--asking what it is, whence it comes, 
and whether or not it is legitimate. James asked himself these 
very questions and to his own satisfaction established faith 
as a valid mental attitude. As we shall see in the following 
chapters, from the viewpoint of his philosophy, which is at 
once radically empiricist in its outlook and moralistic in 
its aims, faith is an indispensable part of life and must be 
considered as a legitimate mental attitude providing a legiti-
mate basis for human action. 
• 
CHAPT.l!:R III 
THE VOLITIOliAL QUALITY OF BELIEF 
William James, whose radically empiricist principles for-
bade him to exclude anything of experience from the matter of 
philosophy, could hardly avoid philosophizing about faith. 
He had to deal with faith because it is a datum of experience 
that people do believe when the evidence is inconclusive. 
Moreover, a philosophy which is both empirical, insofar as it 
denies the existence of absolute certainty unless it occurs 
in the usual course of experience, and moralistic by its plac-
ing the value of life in responsible action grounded on per-
sonal conviction must provide some basis for action other 
than the certitude guaranteed by the theoretical posture of 
proof and demonstration. Assuming that certainty guaranteed 
by evidence.is unattainable in most practical problems, the 
other possible basis for responsible action is the certainty 
of faith, i.e., belief which is determined by man's volitional 
nature in the absence of any ··substantiating proof. . To have 
faith is to believe when it is still theoretically possible 
to doubt and involves a willingness to act even though the 
successful outcome of one's action is not certified in advance. 
An act of faith involves believing when the evidence available 
is insufficient to force the mind to assent. In such a case, 
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1•8 ., ~n a case in which there is not sufficient evidence to 
force assent, if a man believes, he believes because he chooses 
to do so tor reasons other than evidential. However, his 
reasons, while non-cognitive, are nevertheless empirical and 
may include preference, desire, emotion~ and need·, especially 
the need to act effectively in the concrete situations of 
life. To a greater or less degree, all men live by faith and 
rightly so. It is not only a justifiable attitude of man's 
mind; but it is a practical necessity for fruitful human 
existence. 
The value of faith has not always been admitted by phil-
osophers. In James' a own time, there were those thinkers who 
considered faith a type of intellectual vice. They were men 
who thought that faith was both irrational and unscientific--
a vice in which a conscientious thinker, aware of his respon-
sibility to seek truth and avoid error, would not allow him-
self to indulge. Their position implied that the primary duty 
ot a knower-is to avoid error; they held that believing in the 
face of insufficient evidence involves the unwarranted risk of 
making a mistake--a risk which a responsible thinker has no 
right to incur. The British-mathematician and philosopher, 
William K. Clifford (1845-1879), wrote: 
Belief is desecrated when given to unproved and unques-
tioned statements for the solace and private pleasure 
of the believer. • • • Whoso would deserve well of his 
fellows in this matter will guard the purity of his 
belief with a very fanaticism of jealous care, lest 
at any time it should rest on an unworthy object, and 
catch a stain which can never be wiped away •••• If 
Ea] belief has been accepted on insufficient evidence even though the belief be true, as Clifford on the 
same page explains] the pleasure is a stolen one. • • • 
, 
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It is sinful because it is stolen in defiance of our 
duty to mankind. That duty is to guard ourselves from 
such beliefs as from a pestilence which may shortly 
master our own body and then spread to the rest of the 
town •••• It is wrong always, everywhere, and for 
every one, to believe anything upon insufficient evi-
dence.l 
The position of men like Clifford was that belief, in 
order to be warranted, must rest entirely upon intellectual 
grounds, i.e., that belief can be justified only when it is 
supported by conclusive evidence. These thinkers claimed 
that preference, desire, and emotion may never lawfully deter-
mine a man's convictions. Because of their insistence upon 
the priority of the cognitive and the conceptual and their 
·refusal to allow man's volitional nature any legitimate role 
to play in establishing his beliefs, James referred to these 
philosophers as Intellectualists. His use of the word 'Intel-
lectualists, • however, needs some clarification. Because James 
did not always use the term in the same way·, its exact meaning 
must be determined·· by the particular context in which we find 
it. At times, James used the word 'Intellectualists' in a 
narrow sense to refer to the rationalists with their emphasis 
upon the conceptual and the logical, as he did when he at-
tacked the "vicious intellectualism"2 of Francis H. Bradley 
and Josiah Royce. At other times, however, particularly when 
he was trying to defend faith against the attacks of those who 
would deny it any legitimate role in human life, James 
1 James, "'l'he Will to Believe," .l!;ssays on Faith and Morals, 
p. 39, quoting .William K. Clifford, "TheEthics of Belief • 11 
2James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. bO. 
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broadened the terms to include anyone who would refuse to 
allow man's passional and volitional nature a part to play in 
the determination of his beliefs. In this sense, the Intel-
iectualists were those who insisted that conviction is solely 
a matter of cognition, that a man's beliefs can lawfully be 
determined only by evidence--either in the form of sensible 
reality impressing itself upon the mind, or in the form of 
logical demonstration coercing the mind to assent. Using the 
term 'inteliectualism' in this broadened sense, James spoke of 
two types of Intellectualists--the Rationalizing Intellectu-
alists, among whom he included Bradley and Royce, and the 
Empiricist Intellectualists including such positivists as 
William K. Clifford and Karl Pearson. 
Among intellectualists two parties may be dis-
tinguished. Rationalizing intellectualists lay stress 
on deductive and 'dialectic' arguments, making large 
use of abstract concepts and pure logic (Hegel, Brad-
ley, Taylor, Royce). .t:mpiricist intellectualists are 
more 'scientific,' and think that the character of 
the world must be sought in our sensible experiences, 
and found in hypotheses based exclusively thereon 
(Clifford, Pearson).3 · 
However the Rationalizing Intellectualists and the .t:mpir-
icist Intellect~alists may have differed, their views on 
human knowledge and belief bore marked similarities to each 
other and were, on the other hand, strikingly different from 
those of William James. 'A brief consideration of the differ-
ences between the Intellectualists' position in regard to 
knowledge and belief and that of James will help us to under-
3Yilliam James, Some Problems of Philosophy (New York: 
Greenwood Press, Publishers, l9b8), p. 221. 
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. stand more fully James's defense of faith in the chapters to 
follow. 
A fundamental difference between James's view and that 
o! the Intellectualists concerns the active character of the 
human mind. ~rom the Intellectualists' point of view, the 
mind is essentially passive and recep~ive; it is, so to speak, 
merely a kind of recording device upon·whieh reality somehow 
comes and registers itself. James, however, saw the human 
mind as essentially active; in his view, man's active and voli-
tional nattire has a vital part to play in all of man's mental 
activities--in sensation, in conceptualization, in reasoning, 
and above all in belief. First of all, man's active nature 
provides these processes with their very reason for being, for 
mental activity occurs primarily so that man can exercise his 
volitional powers in effective and fruitful action upon the 
world; secondly, man's volitional ·nature has a vital role to 
play in the internal mental processes themselves. 
Considering the human mind as active in both of these 
senses, we shall examine first of all James's position regard-
ing the mind's relation to external action. Unlike the Intel-
lectualists who stressed mants function as a knower, James saw 
man basically as an agent--an agent whose task is not only to 
survive in a relatively hostile environment but also to com-
piete and fulfill himself and the world by means of effective 
action. For the Intellectualists, man's glory is in knowing 
for the sake of knowing; but for James, man's glory is in 
Purposeful action in the world and knowing is for the sake of 
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such action. 
The differing views of the Intellectualists and James in 
regard to man and the purpose of knowledge imply differing 
views of the world itself. The Intellectualists' position 
implies that the world. is already finished and complete and 
basically unaffected by man's life. The world, from their 
point of view, can be known by man, but he cannot change it 
or make it more perfect. "'Intellectualism' is the belief 
that our mind comes upon a world complete in itself, and has 
the duty of ascertaining its contents; but has no power of 
re-determining its character, for that is already given."4 
James's position, on the other hand, is that the world is 
plastic and open. It is incomplete and can be completed only 
by fruitful human activity. Man by his actions can change and 
perfect the universe; he can redetermine its character so that 
it will become a better place in which to live--better not 
only for himself but for his fellows as well. To do this, 
however, man must understand the world. He must understand it 
in order to know how to act effectively in relation to it. 
It is for the sake of such effective action that man seeks 
knowledge. James would not deny that an individual man may 
desire to know for knowing's sake. But this is a special 
interest and not the most basic drive behind the search for 
truth. A man seeks to know, James tells us, so that he will 
feel at home in the world, but being at home in the world means 
\ 
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being able to act effectively in it. Most of the motives which 
iJDpel men to search for kno~ledge involve goods, both private 
and public, which can be attained only by action. 
Granted, then, that man's volitional nature supplies the 
very reason for knowledge to occur, let us examine the part 
which his volitional nature plays in the mental processes them-
selves, i.e., in sensing, conceptualizing, reasoning, and, more 
importantly, in belief. From the Intellectualists' point of 
view, the mind in these processes is basically passive; it is 
acted upon in some way by the world and s·imply reflects or. 
mirrors the world's contents. For William James, however, the 
human mind is internally active in all of these processes and 
man's volitional nature functions in each of them insofar as 
each one involves some kind of internal selective activity. 
Even sensation, in which the mind is customarily thought 
of as passive, involves selective activity from James's point 
ot view. True enough, the flux of sensational experience does 
seem to be simply given. But a kind of selection occurs inso-
far as the number of stimuli to which a man's sense organs 
respond are quite limited when compared to the infinite number 
of movements which, scientists tell us, swarm about him. The 
conformation of the organs of sense are such that they can be 
said to 'select' those movements to which they will react. 
To begin at the bottom, what are our very senses 
themselves, ••• but organs of selection? Out of the 
infinite chaos of movement, of which physics teaches 
us that the outer world consists, each sense-organ 
picks out those which fall within certain limits of 
velocity. To these it responds, but ignores the rest 
as completely as if they did not exist. Out of what 
is in itself an undistinguishable, swarming continuum, 
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devoid of distinction or emphasis, our senses make 
for us, by attending to this motion and ignoring that, 
a world full of contrasts, of sharp accents, of abrupt 
changes, of picturesque light and shade.~ 
In the view of James, however, the selective actiVity does not 
stop with sensation. Conceptualization, likewise, involves a 
kind of 'choice,' insofar as attention selects from the flux 
of experience those sensations, or groups of sensations, which 
concretely interest a man. 
If the sensations we receive from a given organ 
have their causes thus picked out for us by the confor-
mation of the organ's termination, Attention, on the 
other hand, out of all the sensations yielded, picks 
out certain ones as worthy of notice and suppresses 
all the rest. We notice only those sensations which 
are signs to us of things which happen practically 
or aesthetically to interest us, to which we there-
fore give substantive names, and which we exalt to 
this exclusive status of independence and dignity.6 
This selective activity by which attention cuts the sensible 
flux of experience up into 'things' is an integral part of the 
conceptual process. In James's words, 
Out of this aboriginal sensible muchness attention 
carves out objects, which conception then names and 
identifies forever--in the sky 'constellations,' on the 
earth 'beach,' 'sea,' 'cliff,' 'bushes,' 'grass.• Out 
of time we cut 'days' and 'nights,' 'summers' and 'win-
ters.' We say what each part of the sensible continuum 
is, and all these abstracted whats are concepts.7 
In reasoning too, the active nature of man is operative. 
The Intellectualists, of course, did not consider the mind to 
be passive in reasoning in the same sense in which they 
5William James, Pstchology, Premier Books (New York: 
Jawcett World Library, 963), p. 162. 
6Ibid. 
-7James, Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 50. 
considered it to be passive in sensation and conception. For 
in reasoning, the mind is to some degree active, even from the 
:rntellectualists' point of view, in the sense that it moves 
from premise to premise to conclusion. But in their view, 
man's volitional nature has no part to play in this process, 
and even in inference the mind is basically passive because 
it moves insofar as it is moved by the evidence and the force 
of logic. 
The position of William James, of course, differs. In 
reasoning one takes a given fact, 'S,' arid analyzes it into 
many attributes. He then notices one attribute 'M' which "he 
takes to be the essential part of the whole fact ['S'] before 
him. 118 But since in his world, 'M' is always joined with con-
sequence 'P,' the reasoner concludes that 'P' must also be con-
joined with •s.• In syllogistic form, 'M' is 'P,' 'S' is 'M,' 
:. 'S' is 'P.' 
Which aspect of the complex fact, •s,• is taken to be 
essential to it, however, depends upon the interests and pur-
poses of the one reasoning. To use James's own example, a 
piece of paper has many characteristics--whiteness, flatness, 
thinness, suitability for writing, combustibility. Which as-
pect a man attends to as essential depends upon his purpose. 
If he wishes to light a.fire, its combustibility is essential 
for his purpose. If he wishes to write a letter, its character 
as a writing surface is essential.9 
8James, Psychology, p. 313. 
9From James's point of view, the reality of 'paper' is 
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Reasoning is always to attain some particular 
conclusion, or to gratify some special curiosity. It 
not only breaks up the datum placed before it and con-
ceives it abstractly; it must conceive -it ri~htly too; 
and conceiving it rightly means conceiving i by that 
one particular abstract character which leads to the 
one sort of conclusion which it is the reasoner's tem-
porary interest to.attain.10 · 
Thus in inf'erence, as in sensation and conceptualization, 
the volitional nature of man has a dual role to play. First, 
it provides the very purpose for which reasoning takes place. 
Jor reasoning occurs only to satisfy the individual person's 
interests, needs, and desires--to help him achieve his personal 
goals, the most important of which is effective hum.an action 
in the world. "My thinking is first and last and always for 
ak f d · ull the s e o 'f1.ly' oing, • • • Secondly, the volitional 
nature of man is operative in the process of reasoning itself 
insofar as internal selective activity is an integral part of 
it. Moreover, the thinker's purpose, which inevitably involves 
some external action to be performed, provides the very prin-
ciples of this internal selection. 
far richer than a single vision or perspective can reveal, and 
therefore it is not possible to point to one attribute which 
is its single essence. "All ways of conceiving a concrete 
fact, if they are true ways at all, are equally true ways. 
There is no property ABSOLUT~Y essential to any one thing. 
'he same property which figures as the essence of a thing on 
one occasion becomes a very inessential feature upon another." 
(James, Psychology, p. 315.) 
. James·i~sisted that nthe only meaning of essence is teleo-
lo ical and that classification and conce tion are urel 
eleolo~ical weapons of the mind. 11 Ibid., p. 317. "The es-
se~ce o a thing," he wrote, "is that"'O'Ile of its properties 
~hich is so im ortant for m interests that in comparison with 
it I may neglect the rest." (.L!._. 
lOJames, PsycholoEQ", p. 318. 
11Ibid., p. 316. 
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The functioning of man's volitional nature is thus appar-
ent in all of man's mental activities--in sensation and concep-
tion, processes by which the mind ~pprehends objects, and in 
reasoning, the process by which the mind draws conclusions 
about objects from the relations which it intuits between them. 
sensation, conceptualization, and reasoning, however, are all 
antecedent to belief. And of these four, it is belief which 
is the most important for James, inasmuch as belief is a pre-
requisite for responsible moral action. 
Belief, like the mental activities preceding it, involves 
man's active and volitional nature. In fact, all of man's 
beliefs, whether they are classed as instances of faith or not, 
have a non-cognitive, but nevertheless experiential, element 
in them insofar as man's emotional and volitional powers some-
how enter into each one. The Intellectualists did not deny 
that these powers are in fact frequently involved in belief, 
but these men did deny the legitimacy of their influence. 
James, on the other hand, not only upheld the legitimacy of 
their influence, but said that the nature of belief is such 
that man's volitional powers cannot help being involved in 
every instance of it. 
Although 'faith' and 'belief' are identified by many 
thinkers, James found it necessary to distinguish between the 
two terms. 'Belief' was the broader term for him, faith being 
considered a species of belief. James never strictly defined 
belief, but he did describe it in experiential terms • 
. 
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Everyone knows the difference between imagining 
a.thing and believing in its existence, between suppos-
ing a proposition and acquiescing in its truth. In 
the case of acquiescence or belief, the object is not 
only appfehende~ by the mind, but is held to have 
reality. ~ 
Belief is the act by which we posit the reality of the world 
in which we live and act. It is the mental act of recognizing 
and accepting a thing as real and includes every degree of 
.... 
assurance, even the highest possible certainty and conviction. 
belief is not the mere apprehension of a thing, as perception 
and conception are; rather it is an active affirmation of that 
thing as real and involves a willingness to stake one's whole 
person upon the item's reality.13 Belief involves a readiness 
and willingness to act in relation to the thing believed, to 
allow it to influence the course of our active lives. To be-
lieve in something means to allow it to play a role in the 
direction of our activities, whether in a vitally significant 
way or to the minimal degree that, in fashioning ourselves and 
the world by our actions, we at least take it into account. 
Faith is an instance of belief; it is belief which out-
strips the evidence an~ involves positing as real an object 
12James,. The Principles of Psychology, II,283. 
l3The items proposed to a given man's belief are many and 
varied. They include not only.the objects of human sense 
experience, but also complex conceptual objects such as the 
truths of mathematics, the propositions of science and phil-
osophy, and the hypotheses of religion. In affirming the 
'reality' of such complex conceptual objects, a man accepts 
them as true and is willing to live by them. In believing 
in these objects, he holds them to be true not merely in a 
tthe?retical way but he is willing to stake his person upon 
heir truth by acting in accordance with them. 
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whose actuality is not proven either by empirical evidence or 
.~ · by rational demonstration. "Faith means belie.t in something 
concerning which doubt is still theoretically possible; and as 
the test of belief is willingness to act, one may say that 
faith is the readiness to act in a cause the prosperous issue 
of which is not certified to us in advance. 1114 
.An understanding of faith requires an understanding of 
James's psychology of belief in general. ·According to James, 
belief, or the "sense of reality,"15 is a kind of feeling 
which is more akin to the emotions than to anything else. It 
is similar to what is called consent in James's psychology of 
volition. 
It [belief] resembles more than anything what in the 
psychology of volition we know as consent. Consent 
is recognized by all to be a manifestation of our 
active nature. It would naturally be described by 
such terms as 'willingness' or the 'turning of our dis-
position.' What characterizes both consent and belief 
is the cessation of theoretic agitation, through the 
advent of an idea which is inwardly stable, and fills 
the mind solidly to the exclusion of contradictory 
ideas. When this is the case, motor effects are apt 
to follow. Hence the states of consent and belief, 
charact~rized by repose on the purely intellectual 
side, are both intimately connected with subsequent 
practical activity.16 
In opposition to the Intellectualists, James claimed not only 
that will is involved in belief, but that will and belief are 
simply two names for the same psychological phenomenon. Both 
14James, "The Sentiment of Rationality," Essays on Faith 
and Morals, p. 90. 
l5James, The Principles of Psychology, II, 283. 
16Ibid., pp. 283-84. 
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"ill and belief designate a certain relationship which the 
mind can have to those things upon which it focuses--a certain 
manner in which the mind attends to certain ideas. In ~he 
case of will and in the case of belier, a stable idea or 
object is present to the mind and commands its attention to 
the exclusion of a!~ contradictory or incompatible represen-
tations. uAll that the mind does is 1 in both cases [will and 
belief] the same; it looks at the object and consents to its 
existence, espouses it, says 'it shall be.my reality.• It 
turns to it, in short, in the interested active emotional 
way."l? 
The difference between will and belief lies in the fact 
that they deal with different classes of things. Yill is 
concerned directly with things to be done or things to be 
made, and the things willed depend for their very existence 
upon the willing. "The objects, in the case of will, are 
those whose existence depends on our thought, movements of 
our own body· for example, or facts which such movements exe-
cuted in future may make rea1.n18 For example, one wills to 
stand up; one wills to build a cabinet. The standing up and 
the bodily movements involved'in building the cabinet are the 
direct outward effects of the will and depend for their reality 
upon the willing. The cabinet, which is the direct effect of 
the bodily movements and the indirect effect of the willing, 
l?Ibid.' 320 
- p. • 
18~. 
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also depends for its reality as a cabinet upon the willing 
insofar as the bodily movements are dependent upon .the will. 
In the case of belief, however, the thing believed to be 
real does not in any way change in virtue of the belief alone. 
If one believes that the moon is real, the moon itself is not 
altered in any way by that fact. 
Objects of belief, ••• are those which do not change 
according as we think regarding them. I will to get 
up early to-morrow morning; I believe tha~got up 
late yesterday morning; I will that my foreign book-
seller in Boston shall procure me a German book and 
write to him to that effect. I believe that he will 
make me pay three dollars for it when it comes, etc. 
Now the important thing to notice is that this differ-
ence between the objects of will and belief is entirely 
immate~ial, as far as the relation of the mind to them 
goes.l~ 
The relation of the mind to its object is the same in the case 
of belief as it is in the case of will. In both instances, the 
mind gives its attention to the object before it, to the ex-
clusion of all incompatible objects. However, man's physiolog-
ical constitution is such that when the object occupying the 
mind without competition is the representation of a bodily 
movement, the bodily movement inevitably follows (unless pre-
vented, of course, by external causes). And the bodily move-
ment is said to have been willed--rather than believed. 
One must not think of the difference between will and 
belief, however, as the difference between the practical and 
the theoretical. On the contrary, action follows in some way 
upon both of them. In the case of will, the action to be 
• 
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performed is the thing willed and depends for its performance 
upon the willing; its performance is the direct effect of the 
willing. The action which follows upon belief, however, is 
not the direct effect of the belief. It is the direct effect 
of an act of will; but it can be said to follow from belief 
insofar as its being willed is a consequence of the belief. 
When we believe something, i.e., accept it as real, we are 
willing to act in regard to it. We are willing to vouch for 
the reality in which we believe with our lives and action. We 
do, in fact, act in some way upon each of our beliefs if only 
in the sense that a particular belief is one of the presupposi-
tions of our day to day living or in the sense that the thing 
believed is, insofar as it is believed, a part of the world 
of which we take account in the active course of our lives. 
Accepting William James's positio~ regarding the inner 
nature of belief and its kinship with will, one must still 
consider the conditions of its production, i.e., the circum-
stances under which a person thinks things to be real. ·The 
things which present themselves to consciousness for accep-
tance as real are many and varied. Some belong to the world 
of sensible things, i.e., to the world of man's lived expe-
rience; others, such as atoms, molecules, electrons, and the 
like belong to the world of science. Although the latter world 
Of '~solids ~d fluids and their 'laws ' n20 may be. considered by 
the scientist to be more real than any other, the world of 
20Ib1°d 292 _., p. • 
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science is quite barren when compared to the life-world of 
human experience. Not only is the world of human life. full of 
colors, sounds, odors, flavors, warmth, and the like for which 
the scientific world has no room except insofar as it deals 
with their causes; 21 but it is rich with the human felt activ-
ities of perceiving, thinking, believing, willing, and loving, 
none of which are accessible as such to the measuring tools of 
science. 
However, the items in the sensible world and the objects 
of science are not alone in their struggle to win the contin-
ual designations of 'reality.' There ·are still other candi-
dates for the title. Some of them belong to the world of 
ideal relations--the propositions of logic, mathematics, and 
metaphysics, for example; others belong to the world of what 
James called "idols of the tribe." James borrowed the term 
"idols of the tribe," from Francis Bacon to refer to "illu-
sions or prejudices common to the race"--the belief, for exam-
ple, that the sky moves around the earth and other similar 
cosmological ideas. 
All educated people recognize these ['idols of the 
tribe'] as forming one sub-universe. The motion of 
the skj round the earth, for example, belongs to this 
world. That motion is not a recognized item of any 
of the other worlds; but as an 'idol of the tribe' 
it really exists. For certain philosophers •matter' 
exists only as an idol of the tribe. For science, 
the 'secondary Qualities' of matter are but 'idols 
of the tribe. 1 22 
21
"The molecules and ether-waves of the scientific world, 
• •• simply kick the object's warmth and color out, they refuse 
to have any relations with thea." (Ibid., p. 293.) 
221bid., p. 292. 
-
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Also seeking recognition as real are the objects which belong 
to the various supernatural worlds of the different religions 
(the heaven and hell of Christian theology, for example), 
those which belong to the world of individual opinion, and, 
of course, the objects of sheer madness and insanity. In a 
certain sense, all of these things exist in some way. In one 
way or another, they are a part of someone's experience; they 
a.re either sensed, imagined, felt, or at least thought of. 
According to James, even objects of fancy, errors, hallucina-
tions, and dreams are parts of a man's life--"undeniable fea-
tures of the Universe.u23 They have some kind of existence 
. insofar as they are experienced phenomena even though they do 
not exist in the same way in which what James considers 'abso-
lutely real' things exist. 24 In the case of the individual 
mind to whom these phenomena appear, however, if any one of 
the phenomena, no matter how fanciful or illusory it may be, 
fills the mind and captures the attention to the exclusion of 
all contradictory and conflicting objects, it will be believed-
in unhesitatingly--it will while thus attended-to be real for 
that person. 
23Ibid., p. 291. 
~ 
. 
24rn using the term 'absolute,• James does not imply that 
there exists some reality which is completely independent of 
all.others and has no relation whatsoever to anything else. 
He uses the term, however, when speaking of the fact that men 
r~view the objects that come before them, compare the objects 
with one another, and consider some more real than others. 
Those objects in comparison with which others are considered 
less real, or even unreal, James speaks of, on at least one 
occasion, as absolutely real. 
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Believing something means accepting it and giving one's 
attention to it to the exclusion of all its competitors. 
• • • whatever excites and stimulates our interest is 
real; whenever an object so appeals to us that we turn 
to it, accept it, fill our mind with it, or practically 
take account of it, so far it is real for us, and we 
believe it. Whenever, on the contrary, we ignore it, 
fail to consider it or act upon it, despise it, reject 
it, forg~t it, so far it is unreal for us and disbe-
lieved.2.? 
The things in which we believe do not necessarily occupy the 
center of our attention, however. They may be at the fringes 
of our consciousness; they may be part of the context in which 
we live and act; they may be among the.many things which we 
take for granted in our daily living--the necessary presuppo-
sitions for our day to day activities. Whether the items 
believed occupy the center of our attention or are only at the 
.fringes of consciousness, believing nevertheless involves 
attending to them in some way or other. 
James pointed out that each thinker has dominant habits 
of attention--habits which are strongly influenced by his 
interests, needs, and desires and which "practically elect 
from among the various worlds [of items mentioned abov~ 
some one to be for him the world of ultimate realities."26 
For most men·, the things of sense hold this special position 
and constitute "the absolutely· real world's nucleus."2? But 
25James, The Principles of Psychology, II, 295. 
26Ibid., p. 293. 
27Ibid., p. 294. 
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Why' should the world of sense be counted more real than. 
the world of ~cience, or the world of abstract relations, or 
the supernatural world, or any of the others for that matter? 
According to James, this is due to the "everlasting partiality 
of our nature."28 To be real for us, to capture and hold our 
attention, a thing must be a practical item, one that appears 
both interesting and important to us, one that answers our 
emotional needs, our aesthetic needs, and our practical needs. 
And more than all the other things which present themselves 
to us--more than the objects of science, for example, more 
than the propositions of mathematics, logic, and metaphysics--
sensible things fulfill this requirement. 
Intellectualists, in their opposition to faith as having 
any importance in cognition, eliminate all that is personal 
from the valid motives of belief--the ideal in knowledge for 
them is complete· objectivity. But.James pointed out that the 
"fons et origo of all reality, whether from the absolute or 
the practical point of view, is ••• subjective, is our-
selves. "29 The following paragraphs will explain what James 
meant by this. 
James held that the obje~t of belief, namely real exis-
tence or reality, is different from a:n:y other predicate applied 
to a thing. All other predicates designate attrioutes or 
properties which in some way enrich the intrinsic content of 
28~. 
29 . Ibia., pp. 296-97. 
an object and enhance our idea of it. 
case with the predicate, 'existence.' 
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But such is not the 
Predicating existence 
ot a thing leaves the content of the object inwardly the same, 
but in some way "fixes it and stamps it in to ~·"30 To 
predicate existence of something is to affirm that it is a 
part of our lives, i.e., a part of the life-world in which we 
are actively engaged. 
As James pointed out, our own reality is the strongest 
certainty we have. Every moment of our experience is ·so per-
vaded with the sense of our own life that our own existence 
is indubitable. And it is only bY, becoming in some way related 
to this existence of ours that other things come to be accepted 
by us as real. We judge things to be real to the extent that 
they immediately affect our active lives or are related to 
things which do. We believe in them to the degree that they 
meet our personal needs, particularly our need to fulfill our-
selves by meaningful action in the world, or are related to 
things which do meet these needs.31 
30 Ibid., p. 296. 
-
3lwe believe that Alexander Graham Bell really existed, 
not because he has ever been an object of our immediate sensa-
tion or because his reality has ever directly stimulated our 
emotions or our volition, but because we have a 'dim sense of 
continuity' between Mr. Bell and his activities and our pres-
ent world in which Mr. Bell's telephone plays an important 
part in our everyday affairs. The following is James's own 
;x~ple: "When I believe that some prehistoric savage chipped 
his flint, ••• the reality of the savage and of his act 
aa.k~s no direct appeal either to my sensation, emotion, or 
Volition. What I mean by my belief in it is simply my dim 
se~se of a continuity between the long dead savage and his t~hl.ngs and the present world of which the flint forms part." 
· __ e Principles of Psychology, II, 320. 
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• •• our own reality, that sense of our own life which 
we at ever moment ossess is the ultimate of ultimates 
or our e ie • s sure as I exis ! -- is is our 
Uttermost warrant for the being of all other things • 
• • we all of us, feeling our own present reality ~ith absolutely coercive force, ascribe an all but 
equal degree of reality,32 first to whatever things 
32on more than one occasion, James, implying that there 
are varying degrees of reality, spoke of some things being 
judged more real than others. "As a whole, sensations ••• 
are judged more real than conceptions; things met with every 
hour more real than things seen once; attributes perceived when 
awake, more real than attributes perceived in a dream." (The 
Principles of Psycholo~, II, 300.) John Wild objects to~ 
'Tames's reference to ~ferent degrees of reality. In Wild's 
opinion, James's use of such terms as 'more real' and 'less 
real' tends to obscure the sharp difference between a real 
thing and a delusion as two distinct modes of being. (John 
Wild, "'William James and the Phenomenology of Belief," in ~ 
Essays in Phenomenolo~, p. 285.) 
From James 1 s radically empirical point of view, however, 
his use of such terminology in Chapter X:XI of The Principles 
of Psychology (Vol. II) was completely justified. After all, 
it was not James's purpose to distinguish between modes of 
being on a non-empirical basis. He was not concerned with 
modes of being independent of the way in which they are exper-
ienced. James' s chief conc·ern was with what the reality or 
unreality of the things that come before the mind is known as 
in human experience. He was interested in what the reality 
of things means to us in experiential terms. And he tells us 
that reality means relation to our emotional and active lives. 
Things that do not affect our lives in any way are considered 
by us to be simply unreal, while things that do affect· our 
emotional and active lives to any degree at all are counted 
as real. Things are related to our emotional and active lives 
in different ways, however. The relations which items in our 
experience have to our existence are more or less intimate; 
things influence· our lives in varying degrees. Things which 
touch our lives only at the periphery of consciousness, for 
example, things which affect our actions to only a minimal 
d!gree, things of which we take account in our active lives 
with only a minimum of emotional involvement--these are all 
re~ for us to the extent that they touch our lives at all. 
Bu~ they do not have the same vibrant reality for us as do 
th7ngs which occupy the center of our consciousness or things 
which vitally affect our everyday existence or the persons 
b1th whom we are emotionally involved. The trees in our neigh-
t or~ s yard, the pavement on which we walk, the engineer on the 
rain that takes us on a vacation--these are all real for us. 
But they may not be as vibrantly real as the roses we cultivate 
we lay hold on with a sense of personal need, and 
second, to whatever farther things continuously 
belong with these.33 
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Ve unhesitatingly believe in whatever things are intim-
ately related to our own lives. But specifically, what are 
the particular intimate relations with our life which prompt 
us to accept a thing as real?_ "An.y relation to our mind at 
all, in the absence of a stronger relation, suffices to make 
an ob,ject real, u34 James wrote. The barest appeal to our 
attention is sufficient for this if there is in our conscious-
ness no other thing with which the present item fails to har-
monize or with which it is incompatible. For example, the 
newborn mind of the infant will readily accept as real the 
very first impression that it encounters, for it has no basis 
in our own yard, the automobile we drive to work, the men and 
women we love. And of the roses, the automobile, and the 
people we love, the latter may be the more vividly real still 
because they exert a more profound influence upon our lives 
than the others. After all, it is. to them that we are usually 
willing to commit ourselves most completely. 
The fact that we are willing to commit ourselves more ac-
tively and more completely to some things in our experience than 
to others indicates that just as there are differing degrees 
of reality, -there are also differ·ent intensities of belief. 
A man's belief in the automobile which he drives is certainly 
of a different quality than his belief in someone he loves. 
Indeed, his automobile may elicit from him an active response; 
but it does not normally elicit from him the same emotionally 
charged response evoked by someone he deeply loves. He needs 
his automobile, he uses it, ne takes care of it. But he is 
not willing to lay down his life for it as he may be willing 
to do for a friend. Indeed, he believes in both his car and 
his friend; but his belief, experienced as his emotional and 
active response to them, is of a different quality and inten-
sity in each case. 
33James, The Principles of Psychology, II, 297. 
34Ibid., p. 299. 
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for doing otherwise. At that point, the first impression is 
the infant mind's only content. There are no other impressions 
vith which the first one can conflict or with which it can be 
incompatible. It is thus spontaneously believed. "Any object 
which remains uncontradieted [by the reality of something incom-
-patible with it] is ipso facto believed and posited as absolute 
reali t;y • "35 
- In the case of an adult, however, every new item, every 
possible reality, which presents itself to consciousness for 
acceptance as actually real pre$ents itself to a person who 
lives in a world already furnished with actual realities, i.e., 
with things which, because of their intimate relation to his 
lite, have already been accepted by him as real. If the new 
candidate for actual existence is to become a part of this 
real world, it must fit in with the realities already there. 
If it does not harmonize with them, if it is somehow incom-
patible with one or more items in a man's real lived-in world, 
then the man must decide between it, the possible reality, and 
the things already there with which it conflicts. 
'Whether the new item gains admittance to his real world 
or the old ones ·remain entrenched depends upon their relative 
power to hold the person's attention and especially upon their 
power to elicit from him an active response. For, as James 
.tells us, to· believe something, i.e. , to accept it as ·real, 
lleans to be ready and willing to act in regard to it, or at 
35Ibid., p. 289. 
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least to take it into account in our active lives. Now the 
items in our experience which most easily hold our attention 
and most readily stimulate us to action are those which most 
excite our emotional interest. Thus James says, "• •• reality 
means simply relation to our emotional and active life."36 
-
But the things which have easiest access to our emotional and 
active lives are those which are the most vivid, i.e., the 
most sensibly pungent especially by way of arousing pleasure 
or pain, and those which are the most persistent. Sensible 
things are more likely to be accepted as real than merely 
conceptual things; and the world which surrounds us in our 
waking hours is more likely to be believed, because of its 
persistence, than the relatively fleeting world of our dreams; 
and in the sensible world of our waking hours those things 
which are productive of ple.asure or pain are more belief-com-
pelling than those which are not. Thus James asserts that 
sensible vividness and persistence are the two qualities in 
things which more than any o~her prompt us to give the~ real-
ity and accept them as part of the world in which we are 
actively engaged. 
Sensible vividness or tungencf is then the vital factor 
in reality when once t e conf ict between objects, and 
the connecting of them together in the mind has begun. 
No object which neither possesses this vividness in its 
own right nor is able to borrow it from anything else 
has a c~ance of making headway aga~nst vivid rivals, 
or of rousing in us that reaction in which belief con-
sists .37 
36Ibid., p. 295. 
37~., p. 301. 
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James indicates, however, that things which are not them-
selves sensed but which are merely conceived may elicit from 
us an active response and in some instances be counted just as 
real as sensible items. These things may 'borrow• a certain 
vividness from sensible things to which they are related and 
may be accepted as real because of this relationship. "Con-
ceived molecular vibrations, e.g., are by the physicist judged 
more real than felt warmth, because so intimately related to 
all those other facts of motion in the world which he has made 
his special study. 1138 On the other hand, a conceptual item 
may elicit from us an active response because of its powerful 
effect upon our emotions. An idea which arouses our fears, 
allays our anxieties, promises the fulfillment of our hopes, 
or fills us with awe can sometimes be as belief-compelling as 
a sensible item of our experience. So powerful is the ilifluence 
of emotion upon belief, an influence which is due to the bodily 
sensations involved, that James wrote: 
The greatest proof that a man is sui compos is 
his ability to suspend belief in presence of an emo-
tionally exciting idea. To give this power is the 
highest result of education. In untutored minds the 
power does not exist. Every exciting thought in the 
natural man carries credence with it. To conceive 
with passion is eo ipso to af!irm.39 
For most men, however, sensible objects are either their 
realities or the tests of their realities. They posit as the 
unquestionably real world the realm or sense experience and 
3Sibid., pp. 300-301. 
-
39Ibid., p. 308. 
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demand that all our.concepts or conceptual theories be veri-
fied by, or at least lead us back to, the world of sensible 
things. "What science means by 'verification' is no more than 
this, that no object of conception shall be believed which 
sooner or later has not some permanent and vivid object of 
sensation for its term."40 This success with which sensible 
things gain access to the world we accept as unquestionably 
real is due to their stimulating effect upon our emotions and 
active powers. 
Our requirements in the way of reality terminate in 
our own acts and emotions, our own pleasures and pains. 
These are the ultimate fixities from which, ••• the 
whole chain of our beliefs depends, object hanging to 
object, as the bees, in swarming, hang to each other 
until, de proche en proche, the supporting branch, the 
Self, is reached and held.41 · 
It is interesting to note that those Intellectualistsof 
a positivistic bent who in~ist that beliefs are rendered ob-
jectively valid only when verified in terms of sense experi-
ence feel that this norm takes the subjective element out of 
belief and renders it completely objective and totally untainted 
by subjective interests. James held, however, that the very 
postulation of the sensible world as the real world and as 
the testing ground for the truth of all beliefs is itself the 
result of subjective interest. Indeed, to take the personal 
element out of belief is contradictory. 
William James praised Josiah Royce·• s explanation of man• s 
40Ibid., p. 301. 
41Ibid., p. 311. 
-
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belief in an external world in the latter's Religious Aspect 
· 0r Philosophy. "Chapters IX and X of Prof. Royce's work," 
James wrote, "are on the whole the clearest account of the 
42 psychology of belief with which I am acquainted." Accord-
illS to Royce, if one were to ask a man what he means by the 
external world, an honest answer would be: "I mean by the ex-
ternal world in the first place something that I accept or 
demand, that I posit, postulate, actively construct on the 
basis of sense-data. 1143 In the opinion of Royce, man believes 
in an external world because he wants one-
The ultimate motive with the man of every-day life is 
the will to have an external world. Whatever con-
sciousness contains, reason will persist in spontan-
eously adding the thought: 'But there shall be something 
beyond this.' ••• The popular assurance of an external 
world is the fixed determination to make one, now and 
hence.forth. 44 
When it is a question of the reality of comparatively 
simple objects--objects of perception and imagination and 
relatively simple conceptual objects--man believes in whatever 
has intimate and continuous practical relations with himself. 
But when it ·comes to a more complex conceptual system such as 
a philosophical system--a conceptual scheme designed to embrace 
and in some way explain the whole universe--the motives for 
. 
belief at first glance may not be too obvious. But even in 
42~., p. 318. 
43Josiah Royce, Reli~ious Aspect of Philosophy, quoted in 
James, The Principles ofsychology, lI, 317-18. 
44Ibid., p. 318. 
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tbiS case, the deciding vote is cast by man's volitional nature 
iJl the interest of his aesthetic, emotional and practical needs. 
Not only do our needs determine which of several possible 
philosophical explanations of the universe we are willing to 
accept, but our very search for such a conceptual system to 
exPlain the world is itself the result of need. Ye need an 
overall view of things; we need to understand as much of the 
world as we can in order to know how to act in it. 
James suggested that it is man's craving for rationality 
that prompts him to try to explain the universe philosophically. 
Philosophers philosophize, he said, because they "desire to 
attain a conception of the frame of things which shall on the 
whole be more rational than that somewhat chaotic view which 
every one by nature carries about with him under his hat."45 
As we shall discover in the foll~wing pages, however, the 
demands of rationality are not merely theoretical as they are 
often thought to be. They are practical as well. It is true 
that in searching for rationality we are indeed looking for a 
felicitous and comparatively easy way of mentally handling the 
manifold data of sense experience. 
and 
-
The facts of the world in their sensible diversity 
are always before us, but our theoretic need is that 
they should be conceived in a way that reduces their 
manifoldness to simplicity •••• The simplified re-
sult is handled with far less mental effort than the 
original data; and a philosophic conception of nature 
is thus in no metaphorical sense a labor-saving contri-
vance. 46 
45James, "The Sentiment' of Rationality," Essays on Faith 
Morals, p. 63. 
46~.' p. 65. 
r " ;: '1J,e rationality that we need, however, involves much more than 
·.erelY ease of mental tunction. It involves more importantly 
.tJle relative ease, effectiveness, and significance of our 
_,.8rnal activity as well. The rationality that we seek is 
. 8Jr-" 
one that will not only render our conceptual handling of the 
world easy and mentally satisfying but also render our active 
baJldling of it felicitous and fruitful. We seek a rationality 
that will make our active relations with the world effective 
and fUlfilling--fulfilling in relation to our own development 
and that of the world itself. 
In James's view, the need for rationality can be described 
as the need to feel at home in the world. But feeling at home 
in the world means more than merely understanding the world. 
It also means feeling that one's life and actions have mean.-
. ing and relevance to the world• s fulfillment. It means feeling 
that by one's actions one can help to shape the course of the 
-wniverse and contribute to its perfection. It is this need for 
rationality which prompts man to philosophize in the first 
place; and when he comes to accept or reject a particular 
, Philosophical explanation of the world, his acceptance or 
'1'e~ection of it will be on the basis of its rationality or 
lack Of it. 
The rationality of a conceptual system is generally held 
to be that characteristic which more than any other ought com-
, aend the theory to a man's belief. Of any two conceptual 
~ 
~theories offered for consideration, it is usually conceded 
ltbat a man will accept, or at least that he ought to accept, 
, the one which is 
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the more rational. But although it is agreed 
that men ought to believe what is rational in preference to 
what is irrational, there is no universal agreement about what 
constitutes rationality. According to one view, a conceptual 
theory is rational if it is consistent, i.e., if it contains 
no contradictions, and if the reasoning which went into its 
development was in accordance with the rules of formal logic. 
In this view, any theory which is logically inconsistent is of 
course non-rational. Allowing for some variations, rationality:., 
in philosophical circles at least, generaily means conformity 
to reason.and harmony with logical principles. But for WilliB.1D 
James, rationality involves more than mere conformity to reason. 
For James, it is not simply man's reason which decides an 
issue; it is not merely his intellect which believes or dis-
believes. Belief is an act of the whole man, and to be worthy 
of belief, a theory must be in harmony with the whole person. 
Thus ror James, rationality, considered as an attribute of a 
conceptual scheme, means not merely conformity with reason but, 
more importantly, conformity with man and his experience. 
Whatever professional philosophers may say about ration-
ality or about William James's notion of rationality, if one 
analyzes the way in which the man on the street judges the 
reasonableness of an idea, one finds that the ordinary man 
considers that idea the most reasonable which best answers to 
all of a man's needs and requirements-~not just to the require-
ments of the intellect. In fact, the ordinary man on the 
street may not even know the rules of formal logic. Neverthe-
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-· iess he does not hesitate to make judgments about the reason-
ableness of things, because while he may lack knowledge about 
the formal rules of thought, he has within himself, and in a 
sense!,! himself, the standard of rationality. 
William James tells us that we judge the reasonableness 
of an idea or of a system of ideas by certain effects which 
it has on us. Whatever we are able to think about ·without 
difficulty seems to us reasonable. "As soon, ••• as we are 
enabled from any cause whatever to think with perfect fluency, 
the thing we think of seems to us pro tanto rationa1. 1147 When 
our thinking about something is accompanied by strong feelings 
of ease, peace, and rest, we feel that the thing we ar~ think-
ing about is reasonable. "This feeling of the sufficiency of 
the present moment, of its absoluteness,--this absence of all 
need to explain it, account for it, or justify it,--is what I 
call the Sentiment of Rationality. 1148 
What is the source of this feeling of rationality in our 
thinking? What characteristics must a theory itself have in 
order for a man to be able to think about it with such freedom 
and ease that it will be rational? In the view of some, the 
requirements of rationality are purely theoretical. From 
James's point of view, however, the requirements of rationality, 
as indicated above, are practical as well as theoretical. In 
fact, a perfect rationality that is purely theoretical is (for 
p. 64. 
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•ost people) impossible in James's opinion. 
Elaborating on this point, James said that a man's phil-
osophic attitude is determined by two intellectual cravings 
and by the degree to which one balances the other. These two 
desires are l) the passion for simplicity and economy in 
thought (the distinctively philosophical passion) and 2) the 
passion for clearness. The passion for clearness demands 
detail, integrity of perception, and faithfulness to facts and 
shuns a.n:y abstract way of conceiving things which, while sim-
plifying them, might obscure their differences. James felt 
that a perfect theoretical rationality demands the complete 
satisfaction of the distinctively philosophical craving for 
simplicity. This urge to simplify things and to explain them 
in the most parsimonious manner has driven philosophers to 
posit greater and greater unity in reality. But the unity 
which they have succeeded in achieving in their conceptual 
schemes has been attained in most cases by classifying things 
according to their similarities and ignoring their differences. 
Obviously, such classifications, being necessarily abstract, 
are distasteful to those philosophers in whom the passion for 
clearness predominates, for abstractness and clarity are in-
versely related. Moreover, they cannot satisfy _fully even the 
passion for simplicity. In the process of classification, 
those attributes which cannot be identified with the nature 
considered common to the members of a given class are omitted. 
However, while they are left out of consideration as far as the 
classification itself is concerned, they nevertheless remain 
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the scene empirically associated with the common nature but 
at the same time lacking all rational relation to it. For 
this reason, James claimed that all efforts to achieve perrect 
theoretical rationality, i.e., rationally to account for every-
thing in this manner, are doomed to failure. For there is 
always something left outstanding and perfect unity is never 
accomplis.hed. 
In "The Sentiment of Rationality," however, James asked 
his readersto suppose that such perfect unification could be 
achieved. Suppose that a single concept could be formed tinder 
which all things could in some way be subsumed. Suppose that 
all things could be unified as parts, aspects, or instances of 
a single datum which left nothing out. Would not such a con-
cept, such a datum, satisfy the craving for unity completely 
and be considered rational in itself? Would not such a phil-
osophical view be characterized by a perfect theoretical 
rationality? Would it not seem that with no "otherness being 
left to annoy us, we should sit down at peace"?49 Not accord-
ing to William James, for man is so accustomed to seeing an 
'other' beside every datum in his experience that if an abso-
lute all-embracing datum were presented to him, he would per-
sist in looking around for some 'other' with which to contrast 
it. He would begin to think or non-being itself as an 'other' 
opposed to the Absolute presented to him. He would puzzle 
over how to bridge the gap between the 'two'--between being 
49Ibid., P• ?l. 
-
and non-being. He would ask, "Why is there something rather 
thB.Il nothing? Why this world rather than another?" Even in 
the most unified philosophical system, according to James, 
the mystery o:f reality always remains. "Absolute existence 
is absolute mystery, :for its relations with the nothing remain 
unmediated to our understanding. 1150 "The bottom o:f being is 
left logically opaque to us, as something which we _simply come 
upon and find, and about which (i:f we wish to act) we should 
pause and wonder as little as possible. 11 51 
For James, then, a perfect rationality achieved logically 
and theoretically is impossible. Rati~nality means unimpeded 
mental function. But in the purely speculative realm, even if 
all other impediments are successfully by-passed, man's mind 
will eventually bump into the inevitable question 'Why?' when 
it comes to being. James, however, felt that impediments 
inescapable in the theoretical realm might be avoided, i:f man's 
mind were to leave the theoretical order and look to the prac-
tical sphere :for the final word on rationality. A philosophi-
cal theory which might :fail to satisfy perfectly the mind's 
craving for simplicity-and unity and thus fail to appear per-
fectly rational :from a purely theoretical point of view, may 
nevertheless provide a man with a :feeling of rationality be-
cause of the theory's consonance with his active nature--
because of its ability to awaken his active impulses and to 
50ibid., p. ?2. 
51~.' p. ?3. 
103 
'.te.tisfY his aesthetic and emotional needs. 
From James's point of view, the human mind is triadic in 
.structure, being capable 1) of receiving impressions, 2) of 
Onceptualizing, reflecting, and reasoning, and 3) of reacting • . c 
,. .A~cordingly, James spoke, somewhat figuratively, of three 
"departments" of man's nature: a 11feeling department," a "con-
ceiving department," and a "willing department. 11 52 The "feel-
ing department" and the "conceiving department," he said, are 
both subordinate to the "willing department." Sensory impres-
sion occurs for the sake of reflection; and reflection in turn 
qccurs for the sake of action. As James expressed it, "percep-
tion and thinking are only there for behavior's sake."53 The 
conceiving and reasoning powers of the human mind function for 
the sake of ends which are set up for them by man's passional 
and volitional powers, in the sense that the very purpose of 
thought is to enable man to get along in the world and to ful-
fill his aesthetic, emotional, and practical needs. Man's 
nvolitional nature,".54 James said somewhat ambiguously, sup-
plies the very motives for thinking. But more than this, it 
has the last word to say about the conclusions arrived at by 
aan• s thought. 
James held that in order for any theory, simple or complex, 
52James, "Reflex Action and Theism," Essays on Faith and 
Morals, p. 114. . 
53Ibid. 
-54Ibid., p. 117. 
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felt as rational, it must satisfy the demands of all 
aspects of man's nature. To satisfy the "feeling depart-
". t " it must be at least in harmony with all the data of 
' ••Jl ' 
sense experience; to satisfy the reflective part of man, it 
aust be logically self-consistent. But even if a theory should 
pass these first two tests, if it fails to provide man's fun-
4aJBental active and emotional powers with adequate objects 
outside of themselves on which to react, a man's "volitional 
;nature" will reject it.. It will not feel rational. Thus, 
action is the final arbiter. 
Let us take as an example a man's choice of a philosophi-
cal system. Intellectualists would have us believe that only 
·two factors influence a man's choice in this regard--empirical 
ctata and logical consistency. Furthermore, they would have 
us believe that it is not a matter of choice at all, but that 
a valid philosophical outlook is simply a question of the 
··intellect's recognizing what experience and logic make evi-
·4ent. For William James, however, adopting a philosophical 
. 
··attitude is a truly human choice in the fullest sense of the 
term. Philosophy is certainly more than the mere mental 
·· reproduction of sensed data in an orderly fashion. No mere 
assemblage of concepts representing perceptual facts, however 
logical and complete, deserves the name of a philosophical· 
Bystem. Genuine philosophy stri ve.s to interpret the data of 
Bense in terms of causes, meanings, and values;_ and its inter-
Pretati ve function carries it far beyond the purely perceptual 
-~. 
;,·-1'8.nge into areas where sense and reason alone are not competent 
' 
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to decide the issues. 
It is in fact possible for two diverse philosophical sys-
tems to be equally in harmony with the sensible data supplied 
bY man's perceptive faculties and equally consistent from the 
point of view of logic. In such a case, why does a man accept 
one and not the other? Certainly not because sense and reason 
verify one and falsify the other. As James clearly indicated, 
a man accepts a given philosophical system because he chooses 
to do so. And how does he make his choice? James pointed out 
that a man chooses from among the alternative philosophies 
presented to him that system which, because it best satisfies 
the demands of his active nature, seems the most rational to 
him. But what are the demands of man's active nature--the 
needs which a philosophical conception must satisfy in order 
to be deemed rational? 
First of all, in order to satisfy the requirements of the 
"willing department" of man's nature, a philosophical theory 
"must, in a general way at least, banish uncertainty from the 
future."55 It must in a general way tell a man what to expect, 
tor uncertainty regarding the future is a mental irritant and 
breeds uneasiness. James did not mean to suggest that a phil-
osophical theory can tell a man precisely what to expect at 
every moment of his life. On the contrary, since experience 
is ever changing, since no moment in experience ever exactly 
duplicates another, every moment of our existence is tinged 
&nd ?5James, "The Sentiment of Rationality," Essays on Faith 
-- Morals, p. 77. 
~,ath the novel and the unexpected. 106 However, while a philosophy 
cannot foretell every future detail of experience, it can so 
describe its ultimate principle as "to define expectancy. 1156 
If, for example, a philosophy describes its ultimate datum in 
terms of goodness, perfection, or reason, "we may set our 
minds at rest in a general way, • • • by the reflection that 
whatever is in store for us can never at bottom be inconsis-
tent with the character of this term."5? In such a case, "our 
attitude even toward the unexpected is in a general sense 
defined• 1158 
Secondly, a philosophical theory must define the future 
. "congruously with our spontaneous powers."59 It need not be 
a completely optimistic philosophy; but on the other hand, it 
cannot be totally pessimistic in the sense of offering no 
hope at all for the fulfillment of man's cherished dreams. 
To be acceptable, a philosophy must present man with a world 
in which he can exercise his distinctively creative powers--
a world which is open and to some degree plastic in his hands, 
a world upon which he can leave his mark for better or worse, 
a world in which he can make a uniquely personal contribution. 
. . 
Only a philosophy which presents man with a universe that is 
incomplete, unfinished, and susceptible to change, a universe 
56Ibid., p. ?9. 
5?Ibid., p. 80. 
58Ibid. 
-59~.' p. 82. 
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.~. t!18.t depends on man's commitment and active contribution for 
·its fulfillment, can satisfy the practical requirements of 
rationality. A theory which describes the world as closed, 
as already finished, or as completely determined independently 
o! all human activity has the paralyzing effect of depriving 
Jl8ll of all motives for action. Such a philosophy renders his 
active powers, indeed his very life, meaningless and absurd. 
J..s J8Jlles put it, an acceptable philosophy must give a man a 
·universe for which his "emotions and active prop~nsities shall 
60 be a match," and in which the ideals which he admires, loves, 
ll'ld works to attain are at least real possibilities. 
rt is true, of course, that men's active impulses differ 
ll'ld that a philosophy which suits one man may not suit another. 
However, there are certain active propensities which are com-
aon to most men--the need to use one's powers in the accomplish-
aent of worthwhile goals, for example, the need to feel that 
one's life has meaning, significance and relevance in the whole 
~cheme of things. But, according to James, there is one ten-
dency in mos~ men that many philosophers overlook and others 
m"to huddle out of sight."61 And that is the tendency to 
believe beyond the evidence--the aptitude for faith. "In the 
average man, • 
• • the power to trust, to risk a little beyond 
the literal evidence, is an essential function. n62 Just as a 
GOibid., p. 84. 
olill,g_., p. 90. 
·;. 62~., p. 91. 
~'· 
'" 
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a touch of uncertainty in .his philosophic creed, enough to 
allOW a man an opportunity to play his hunches and to indulge 
. b.iS faith-tendencies, adds gusto to his speculative undertak-
ings as well. 
A philosophy such as monism which posits a deterministic 
universe that is finished and complete with nothing left to 
be accomplished by man's efforts, wi·th no truth left to be 
discovered by experimentation, trial and error, leaps in the 
dark--such a philosophy takes the zest out of living. A PAil-
osophic view of the world which leaves no room for faith or 
risk, a world formula which denies to man the opportunity for 
adventure of a speculative and theoretical sort, as well as of 
an active kind, will never satisfy all of man's active propen-
sities. It will not be in harmony with the full man and will 
not seem rational. 
The ultimate philosophy, ••• must not be too 
strait-laced in form, must not in all its parts divide 
heresy from orthodoxy by too sharp a line. There must 
be left over and above the propositions to be sub-
scribed, ubi~ue, semper, et ab omnibus, another realm 
into which t e stifled soul may escape from pedantic 
scruples and indulge its own faith at its own risks; 
and all that can here be done will be to mark out dis-
tinctly the questions wh_?.ch fallJWithin faith's sphere.63 
Thus, in the opinion of William James, man's volitional 
nature, the Intellectualists' objections notwithstanding, has 
a vital role to play in determining man's beliefs--whether the 
objects of his beliefs be relatively simple or as complex as 
63 . ~·' p. 110. 
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·a whole philosophical system. In James's opinion, man's 
active nature will not sanction any philosophical view which 
denies man the right to gamble a little, to act when the re-
sults are not guaranteed in advance, to believe beyond the 
evidence. Man's active nature will not approve a world picture 
in which faith is left out because not only is it an empirical 
fact that men do live by faith to a greater or les~ degree, 
but it is also a fact that faith is necessary !or human life. 
A prohibition upon faith is a prohibition upon· human fulfill-
ment, indeed a prohibition upon the fulfillment of the universe. 
The perfection of human life, as well as the progress, develop-
ment, and perfection of the open world in which man lives, 
depends upon man's commitment and .creative action. But action 
presupposes conviction; and sense and reason alone are notori-
ously inept at providing a solid basis for conviction except 
in very limited situations. Thus, faith is not only a !act 
which philosophy cannot overlook but it is a necessity !or that 
fruitful human action which is man's only means of fulfilling 
himself and the world. 
Because faith--indeed all belie!--involves the will, 
-believing, generally speaking, is a moral act according to 
James. A man's beliefs are things for which he is responsible. 
Since belief and will are but two names !or the same psycholog-
ical phenomenon, what is true of will is, for the most part, 
true of belief. Thus if will is free, as James held, then 
belief is free also or at least it can be free. 
Obviously, James did not hold that every act of belief is 
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a free responsible act anymore than he would be able to .say 
that every process of volition is a deliberate and responsible 
one. One apparent obstacle to considering belief a free moral 
act at all is James's defining it in a manner that makes a 
man's emotional reactions such influential determining factors. 
Belief is an act of the whole man, not simply of his intellect 
and not merely of his will in the narrow sense of the term, 
but an act involving the whole person--intellect, will, emo-
tions and so forth. But some would say, "'We cannot control 
our emotions. How then can we believe at will, how can our 
beliefs be free and responsible?" James would reply that it 
is true that a man may not be able to believe at will abruptly. 
Nature sometimes produces in us instantaneous beliefs by sud-
denly putting us in a vitally active connection with objects 
in which we previo~sly had ·no interes·t, objects for which we 
previously had no feeling. Such instantaneous beliefs, of 
course, are not achieved by any effort of the will. But, said 
James, gradually our wills can, by dint of effort, lead us 
to the same results by a very simple method: 
~hus 
we need only in cold blood ACT as if the thing in 
guestion were real, and keep acting as if it were real, 
and it will infallibly end by growin~ into such a 
connection with our life that it wil become real. 
It will become so knit with habit and emotion that our 
interests in it will be those which characterize be-
lief. ~hose to whom 'God' and 'Duty• are now mere 
names can make them much more than· that, if they make 
a little sacrifice to them every day.64 
we can, by an erfort of our will, freely believe. 
b4 James, The Principles of Psychology, II, 321-22. 
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The line between faith and the belier which is not called 
·faith is not as sharp in James's philosophy as it may appear 
to be. There is a sense in which ~lmost all belier, even 
that which is said to be based upon conclusive evidence, parti-
cipates in faith. James described faith as believing when it 
is still theore~ically possible to doubt. But in James•s 
view, except for the immediate data of the present moment and 
except for those self-evident propositions which concern only 
the relations 01· abstract concepts with one another (the prin-
ciples or identity and contradiction, for· example), it is 
always theoretically possible to doubt our judgments. Now, 
the evidence may be so strong that it would be foolish to do 
so, but it is still possible to do so. There is more than one 
reason for this. The changing character of reality, for one 
thing, makes it always possible to question the perfect appli-
cability of a judgment made about an object yesterday to that 
same object today. But another source of possible doubt con-
cerns not the object so much as the knower. Every knower sees 
an object from his own peculiar point of view. And almost 
every knower can recall occasions when after adopting one 
posture, he found it necessary to adopt a different one. Such 
experiences make one aware of the possibility of error. 
According to James, every representation per se is be-
lieved, while,it persists, to be of something absolutely !.2• 
It becomes relative and dubitable only when 'reduced' in the 
light of further consideration--only when one confronts it 
With other data which can render it questionable. In James's 
r ,,ordB• "the reductive of most of our confident beliefs abou~2 
Being is the reflection that they are .QB!:. beliefs; that we 
are turbid media; and that a form of being may exist uncon-
taminated by the touch of the fallacious knowing subject."65 
Thus, beyond the assurance of the immediate present, 
doubt is always possible in regard to our judgments about 
matters of fact. 66 Skepticism can always have the final word 
because after every definition that we make of an object, 
•reflection may arise, infect it with the cogito, and so dis-
criminate it from the object in se."67 • That we do not allow 
65James, "Lewes's 'Problems of Life and Mind,'" Collected 
Essays and Reviews, pp. 5-6. 
66Although it may not be vitally important in purely specu-
lative matters, doubt arises as a critical issue in practical 
affairs because of its paralyzing effect upon our active powers. 
As James's friend, Charles Peirce, pointed out, most frequently 
"doubts arise from some indecision however momentary, in our 
action." ("How to Make Our Ideas Clear, 11 Philosof.hical Writings 
of Peirce, p. 27.) "It is certainly best for us,' Peirce 
wrote, "that our beliefs should be such as may truly guide our 
actions so as to satisfy our desires; and this reflection will 
make us reject every belief which does not seem to have been 
so formed as to insure this result. But it will only do so by 
creating a doubt in the place of that belief." ("The Fixation 
of Belief," Philosophical Writings of Peirce, p. 10.) 
. 
67James, "Lewes's ·'Problems of Life and Mind,'" Collected 
Essays and R~views, p. 10. The term 'in se' in the above quo-
tation is but one example of James's frequent use of terms 
with a scholastic flavor. Throughout James's writings, one 
finds terms such as 'essence' and 'nature' and such Latin 
phrases as 'in se' and 'per se •. ' Of course in James's works, 
these terms do not have precisely the same connotations which 
they have in the writings of medieval philosophers and later 
scholastic authors. 'Essence' and 'nature,' for example, do 
not have the overtones of permanence and immutability which 
they often have in scholastic texts. The reader must be care-
ful, therefore, not to attribute to James a scholastic per-
~pective which would be more rationalistic than empiricist • 
. ames wanted to develop a philosophy of e~-perience, and he did 
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:· skepticism to have the last word is due to the fact that most 
o! us, realizing the futility of searching for absolute certi-
tude and the intellectual stagnation and moral paralysis which 
are the normal accompaniments of un~ridled skepticism, assume 
some things for true and act upon them. 
Insofar as the bare possibility of doubt is present, 
every belief, from James's point of view, has an element of 
taith in it. At least every belief presupposes some previous 
act of faith in the sense that even our most assured convic-
tions presuppose our belief in the very possibility of the 
human mind's ability to attain truth--a belief which can neither 
be empirically verified nor logically demonstrated. Such pre-
suppositions, accepted without proof, may rarely be in the fore-
ground of consciousness. But they are at the fringes of con-
sciousness, making up the context of our day to day activities 
and providing the foundation for our most confident convictions. 
Thus it is clear that the distinction between faith and 
the rest of belief is based not so much on the possibility of 
doubt as it is upon the presence or absence of conclusive evi-
dence. When conclusive evidence is lacking, then one's belief 
. . is called faith. 
not intend his language to convey more than the flux of expe-
rience could yield. Much confusion would have been avoided, 
of course, had James invented a new vocabulary for his pur-
pose. But a man can do only so much in a lifetime. Develop-
1:ig a new philosophy was a monumental task in itself, and the 
limitations of time and the human condition made it necessary 
for James to use the vocabulary already at hand and to give 
new meanings to the old words. 
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But whether conclusive evidence is present or not, because 
o! the influence of the will upon belief, man's beliefs belong 
to his moral life. He is responsible for them. And while it 
iS possible for him to believe almost anything he would like 
to believe and, on the other hand, to doubt almost anything he 
wishes to doubt, a la Descartes, there are times when it is 
lfiser to believe than to doubt and other times when it is 
wiser to doubt than to believe. From the point of view of 
James, however, there can be no question about the fact that 
man has a natural right to believe even when the evidence is 
less than coercive. There can be no doubt that faith is both 
permissible and a practical necessity for meaningful human 
existence. What must be determined then, according to James, 
is not the legitimacy of faith as such but rather those 
spheres of belief and action in which faith is the most appro-
priate mental attitude to adopt. 
CHAP!'ER IV 
FAITH AND HUMAN LIFE 
William James held that, whether men are willing to admit_ 
the fact or not, they all live by faith. It is our purpose in 
this chapter to consider what faith is, how it differs from 
man's other beliefs, and the conditions under which it is 
justified and even necessary. We will not consider in any 
detail the specific motives which may prompt a particular 
individual to adopt onebelief rather than another 
when the evidence is less than coercive, nor will we attempt_ 
to judge the relative merits of one particular faith as opposed 
to another. However, we wi·ll attempt. to show that there are 
• 
certain areas in which faith is the most appropriate and fruit-
ful mental attitude to adopt; that faith is a necessity for· 
thought, action, and human fulfillment; and :t'urthermore that 
it has a vital role to play in the destiny of' the universe as 
a whole. Although James's special concern was the justi:t'ica-
tion of religious faith, the vastness of' the topic precludes 
our discussing religious belief to any extent here. However, 
we will ext;mine it in depth in Chapters V and VI. 
As we saw in Chapter III, every belief', whether it can be 
called faith or not, involves the whole man. It is not merely 
an intellectual apprehension of' something, but it is an active 
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espousal of that thing as real. It is an espousal which car-
[:. rieS with it a willingness· to stake one's person upon the 
object's reality. Belief involves not merely man's 'head' but 
aiso his 'heart.' James felt that these work together in 
determining a man's convictions, and he could not understand 
the gulf which some men put between them. "I can understand 
now no more than ever," he wrote to his father, "the world 
wide gulf you put between 'Head' and 'Heart'; to me they are 
inextricably entangled together. • • • As we have seen, no 
act of belief occurs, according to James, that does not in some 
way involve man's volitional and passional nature. As a mat-
ter of fact, will and belief are, from a psychological point 
of view, the same, insofar as in each case the relation between 
the mind and its object is identical. In will as in belief, 
. 
the mind gives its attention to the item before it to the 
exclusion of all items incompatible with it. Will and belief 
differ, however, in their objects, in the sense that the object 
of will depends for its very existence upon the willing, while 
the object of belief is not directly dependent for its existence 
upon the believing. 
The influence of man's passional nature upon belief be-
comes apparent when we analyze why a person believes one hypo-
thesis rather than another. We find that there is no evidence 
of any human belief that does not, in at least a very minimal 
sense, involve preference and subjective interest of some kind. 
1Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, II, ?OS. 
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EVen a belief in something as seemingly indubitable as the 
principle of contradiction involves personal interest. For 
one's belief in the principle of contradiction not only pre-
supposes his believing in truth and in the human mind's 
ability to attain it but also involves his believing in the 
relevance of the principle itself to his future experience. 
And from James's point of view, these latter beliefs are the 
result of personal preference. We believe in truth and in the 
possibility of acquiring it, James said, because we want to 
have a truth and want to think it accessible to us. 
Our belief in truth itself, for instance, that there 
is a truth, and that our minds and it are made for 
each other,--what is it but a passionate affirmation 
of desire, in which our social system backs us up? 
We want to have a truth; we want to believe that 
our experiments and studies and discussions must 
put us in a continually better and better position 
towards it; and on this line we.agree to fight out 
our thinking ·lives. But if a pyrrhonistic sceptic 
asks us how we know all this, can our logic find a 
reply? Nol certainly it cannot. It is just one voli-
tion against another,--we willing to go in for life · 
upon a trust or assumption which he, for his part, 
does not care to make.2 
Similarly, a person is inclined to believe in the universal 
significance of the principle of contradiction because he 
wants the kind of stable and predictable world which the prin-
ciple of contradiction seems to guarantee. Even in those 
judgments which seem to be the most unimpassioned and objec-
2James, "The Will to Believe," Essays on Faith and Morals, 
pp. 40-41. 
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!_tiYe, man's entire being participates; his intellect, will, 
;~ desires, and emotions cooperate to various degrees. Contrary 
~-
~: · to the Intellectualists' view, there.fore, every belief to some 
. extent involves non-cognitive elements; .for every belief is 
psychologically the same as an act of will and every belief 
presupposes some degree of personal interest. 
The Intellectualists' disavowal o.f .faith on the grounds 
that it involves non-cognitive elements is not entirely to 
the point. James suggested that man's .full and active nature 
is involved in all belief; hence, the difference between faith 
and the rest o.f man's convictions cannot be the presence or 
absence of a non-cognitive factor. The difference is in the 
quality o.f the evidence in response to which a man accepts 
an object as real. The difference is in the degree of proba-
bility involved. In some cases, the evidence is so over-
whelmingly coercive that a man bel~eves without question. 
Either there is no evidence which conflicts with the proposed 
bn>othesis and it does not occur to a man to doubt at all; or 
the evidence in favor of an hypothesis so outweighs any oppos-
ing data that he dismisses the possibility of doubting as 
ridiculous. His unhesitating belief in such instances is not 
normally called faith. However, whenever the evidence in sup-
port of an hypothesis is less than conclusive, whether it be 
minimal or more or less persuasive, then the belief, i.e., the 
assent to the reality or truth of the hypothesis, is considered 
to be an act of .faith. 
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In instances ·o:f this sort, however, instances in which 
there is a lack o:f compelling evidence, the Intellectuaiists 
counsel us not to believe. They tell us to suspend judgment, 
for to believe what has not been logically demonstrated or 
empirically verified is, :from their point o:f View, irrational 
and unscientific. Intellectualists bid us avoid error at all 
cost and prohibit :faith as involving an unwarranted risk--the 
risk o:f making a mistake. They enjoin us to refuse to believe 
anything concerning which evidence has not yet come in and 
never to allow our preferences, emotions or desires to move 
us to believe anything which has not been logically or empir-
ically verified. 
William James himself, however, did not take the Intel-
lectualists' advice too seriously. As he pointed out. to a 
greater or less degree, everyone, even the Intellectualist, 
habitually lives by faith o:f one kind o:f another. When a man 
crosses a bridge, :for example, he has no proof that the bridge 
will not collapse under him; but he believes that it w~ll sup-
port him. His belief is :faith. When a man plans to accomplish 
a particular ta'~k tomo~row, he has no guarantee that the world 
I, • 
will have a tomotrow, or that he himself will be here even i:f 
tomorrow does come for the rest of the world. But he believes 
that the sun will rise again as usual and that he himself will 
wake· again to· do the work of another day~ His belief is faith. 
The latter example points up the fact that the temporality of 
our experience requires the exercise of faith in the day to 
day conduct of our lives. Human living, after all, is, to a 
r. . . 120 r great extent, a series of choices and actions. It is a series 
' 
' of actions willed and actions performed. We will to do things 
and then we do them; our.living thus involves a continual 
projection of ourselves into the future--into a future that 
is in no sense guaranteed. We have no proof that the future 
will come at all, although it always has come for us in the 
past; and if it does come, we do not know in advance what its 
character will be, although we have certain expectations in 
this regard. We live by continually projecting ourselves into 
a future that we take on faith. 
This attitude of faith, which is in some sense common to 
all men, is not something merely to be tolerated as an unavoid-
able evil. It is, under the proper circumstances, totally 
justified and at times indispensable. There are cases in which, 
in spite of a lack of evidence, a decision must be made either 
because action is required or because a valuable truth or good 
may be lost if we do not decide. For example, a young man 
just graduated from school must decide what to do with his 
life whether for a short period of time or for a longer one. 
Although he has no absolute guarantee that one way 0£ living 
will prove more happy and successful than another, in this 
instance action of some kind is required and a choice must be 
made. There are other cases, of course, in which immediate 
action is not required. But in some of these instances at 
least, although a decision is not a strict necessity, a sus-
pension of judgment, a failure to decide, entails the loss of 
a valuable good. For example, it is an hypothesis of religion 
~ thllt belief in 121 God entails tremendous benefits for the be-
11ever in this life as well as after death. To suspend judg-
ment in regard to the question of God is, of course, theoreti-
cal.3Y possible. But ta do so amounts to forfeiting the benefits 
held to be consequent upon one's belief in Him. In a case 
like this, James said, man's passional nature not only may but 
must determine his decision, because in fact the consequences 
---or suspending judgment are equivalent to disbelieving. 
James recognized the importance of considering whatever 
evidence is available in forming one's beliefs. But realizing 
the inability of intellectual considerations alone to settle 
not only the practical questions of daily living but also the 
larger philosophical issues about life, he saw the overriding 
importance of non-cognitive factors in determining human con-
victions. In James's words: "OUr passional nature not only-; 
may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever 
it is a genuine option that cannot by-; its nature be decided on 
intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, 
'Do not decide, but leave the guestion open,' is itself a pas-
sional decision,--just like deciding yes or no,--and is atten-
ded with the same risk of losing the truth."3 
James was not advocating a careless attitude regarding 
the truth. He was not suggesting that a man under any and 
all circumstances may believe wha teve·r he wants· to believe 
without discrimination. James was careful to spell out the 
3 . Ibid.' p. 42. 
122 
conditions which would render faith lawful and necessary. His 
contention was that faith is lawful and indispensable when the 
option to be decided is a genuine option which cannot be 
decided on intellectual grounds, i.e., a genuine option with 
j.n.sufficient evidence to support either of the hypotheses 
involved. What did James mean by the key phrase, 'genuine 
option'? One can describe an option as a decision to be made 
between any two hypotheses, theoretical or practical, proposed 
to one's belief or as a decision to believe or not to believe 
a given hypothesis. In order for an option to be genuine, 
however, it must have certain characteristics; it must, James 
said, be living, momentous, and forced. 
An option is living, according to James, if the hypotheses 
involved are alive. To be alive, an hypothesis must be seen 
as a real possibility by the person to whom the option is pro-
posed. It must be seen as something upon which that person 
could act--something upon which he would be willing to act if 
he accepted it. It must be an hypothesis, the truth or fal-
sity of which would make a difference in his active life. If 
an hypothesis has no bearing at all on a person's way of liv-
ing, then for all practical purposes, it is dead for him. 
Obviously, liveliness signifies a relation which an hypothesis 
may have to.an individual thinker, and _a given hypothesis may 
be alive to one person but dead to another. What has made it 
alive or dead for someone in the first place, however, may 
very well have been his own passional nature. As James pointed 
out in regard to hypotheses which are already dead for us, 
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• • • what has made them dead for us is for the most 
part a previous action of our willing nature of an 
antagonistic kind. When I say 'willing nature,' I do 
not mean only such deliberate volitions as may have 
set up habits of belief that we cannot now escape from, 
--I mean all such factors of belief as fear and hope, 
prejudice and passion, imitation and partisanship, 
the circumpressure of our caste and set.4 
It is as though every new hypothesis proposed for our 
belief must pass before a reviewing board constituted by all 
of our past experience, feelings, desires, emotions, active 
inclinations, prejudices, and opinions--opinions which may be 
original with us, opinions inherited from.our ancestors, as 
well as opinions espoused because of their current popularity 
or prestige. Any new hypothesis proposed to us will either 
be congenial with, i.e., in harmony with, the members of this 
reviewing board or not. If it is congenial, we will see it 
as alive, i.e., as having a bearing upon our active existence. 
If not, it will be dead for us and incapable of affecting our 
lives in any way. Here again we see the practical impossibil-
ity of totally extricating human convictions from all personal 
influences. · As objective as one tries to be, one cannot see 
reality except rrom the perspective of the particular vantage 
point which he occupies in history and in the unique light of 
his own experience, education~ social involvement, and personal 
inclinations. 
Granted that an option is living, however, faith is neces-
sary only if the option is also momentous and forced. It is 
mom~ntous, James said, if what is at stake is vitally signifi-
4 lbid., pp. 39-40. 
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cant, if the opportunity presented by the option is unique, 
or if the decision, once made, is not reversible. Obviously, 
trom James's point of ·view, it is only the consequences which 
tollOW upon an option--consequences in the way of actions and 
their effects--which render an option momentous. It is only 
in ter~s of such consequences that we can speak of vitally 
significant stakes or of an option as presenting a unique 
opportunity or of a decision as being irreversible. 
If believing one hypothesis rather than another were sig-
nificantly to affect the way of life of the believer or to 
influence in any important way the lives of others, the life 
of the community, or the destiny of the universe, then surely 
the option in question would involve vitally significant 
stakes and could be considered momentous. There are in fact 
many options of this kind, options which are momentous to a 
greater or less degree. Some of t~ese options involve very 
general questions--for example, whether or not this is a moral 
universe in which persons can make demands which other persons 
are obliged to honor; whether or not among the claimants 
there is a God who makes demands of man and who is aware of 
man's needs and responsive to his pleas. Other options in-
volve more specific questions: whether or not one's involve-
ment in a particular war is justified; whether or not a man 
may be forced to fight in a war which he considers to be 
immoral; whether or not civil disobedience is a justifiable 
means of pointing up what one may consider to be evils in 
society; whether a liberal or a conservative would make a 
125 
better government official. What one believes in regard to 
these questions determines how one acts in particular circum-
. stances • And how one acts in these circumstances can affect 
. one's entire life, the lives of others, and the course of the 
-orld to a greater or less degree. In questions like these, 
tbe stakes are significant and the options momentous. 
As far as the uniqueness of an option and the irreversi-
bility of a decision are concerned, these, too, have meaning 
onlY in terms of the consequences of belief. It is difficult 
to think of an hypothesis which, if not believed today, cannot 
be believed tomorrow or next year on the assumption that one 
is still alive to believe tomorrow and next year. It is diffi-
cult to think of a belief that one cannot reverse. Many people 
who believed in the usefulness of capital punishment ten years 
ago do not believe in it today. However, to believe in some-
thing today may enable one to avai~ himself of a unique oppor-
tunity for action--an opportunity which may never present it-
self again. For example, if one believes that surgically 
transplanting an organ from one human being to the body of 
another is morally justifiable, then he may avail himself of 
the unique opportunity to save the life of a friend by donat-
ing to that friend an organ from his own body. If, on the 
other hand, he believes such an operation to be an unwarranted 
and even evil tampering with the order of nature, he will not 
avail himself of the opportunity. True enough, he may come 
to believe in the good of such surgical procedures in years to 
come, but the opportunity presented by the option today--the 
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,, opportunity to save the life of this particular friend in this 
·particular way--will never come again; and for this reason, the 
·_option is momentous. It is momentous also because in terms 
o! its consequences the decision is not reversible. Whatever 
w the person may believe in the future about such operations, 
'
:_ .... ~ 1;11e consequences of today's belief or disbelief cannot be 
changed. 
l It is interesting to note that in giving an example of a 
(:. momentous option in "The Will to Believe," James himself did 
~~ 
not give an example of an option between two hypotheses pro-
~· 
posed to one's beli.ef, al though it is this type of option 
which he started out to explain. Instead,. he gave us as an 
example the choice between following or not following a 
proposed course of action. "Finally, if I were Dr. Nansen 
and proposed to you to join my North Pole expedition, your 
option would be momentous; for this would probably be your only 
similar opportunity, and your choice now would either exclude 
1ou from the North Pole sort of immortality altogether or put 
at least the chance of it into your hands. n5 In using such an 
example, James seemed to shift his discussion from one type 
·· ot option, a decision between two hypotheses proposed to one's 
belief, to another type of option, a decision to act or not to 
act in a particular way. Whether or not the shift was inten-
tional, it serves to emphasize a very important point in 
James's philosophy. And that is that a choice between 
5Ibid., p. 35. 
-
,b1Potheses proposed to one's belief' is at bottom a choice 
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' between modes of action. For as we saw in Chapter III, be-
_ lie! always involves action in some way, and thus a decision 
to believe or not to believe a given hypothesis is a decision 
to act or not to act in a particular manner. The intimate 
connection between belief and action becomes still more appar-
ent when we considt:r what James called a forced option. 
If an option is not momentous, i.e., if the decision is 
reversible or if the stakes are trivial or if the opportunity 
to decide is likely to present itself again, then, of course, 
there is no urgency about making a decision--unless the option 
is a forced one. A forced option, James said, is a "dilemma 
based on a complete logical disjunction, with no possibility 
of not choosing."6 Strictly speaking, however, there is no 
such thing as a forced option in the sense of a case in which 
one must either profess belief in an hypothesis or reject it. 
It is always possible, theoretically at least, to suspend 
·judgment. But when one considers the consequences of accept-
ing an hypothesis, rejecting it, and suspending judgment in 
the matter, one discovers that there are certain cases in 
which the consequences of suspending judgment--consequences 
in the way of action--are equivalent. to those of rejecting 
the hypothesis. Let us take as an example the hypothesis that 
' the~e is a G~d who cares about man, make.a demands of him, and 
is responsive to his needs. If we neither accept nor reject 
6Ibid.' p. 34. 
-
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tbiS proposition but rather suspend judgment in regard to it, 
our actions, our way of living, will not be those of a believer. 
'; 
on the contrary, we will live as though there were no God 
~-,. even though we have not openly professed disbelief in him. 
Tb,US the failure to accept this proposition, the suspension 
of judgment is, practically speaking, equivalent to rejecting 
it• From the point of view of our active lives, w~ either 
accept this proposition or reject it. From the point of view 
of action, there is no middle ground, and the option can thus 
be considered a forced one. 
Assuming that one is faced with a genuine option, as 
described above, James held that the decision ought be made 
on intellectual grounds, i.e., on the basis of evidence, if 
sufficient evidence is at hand. But if sufficient evidence 
is not available (and this is often the case), then the deci-
sion can only be made on non-intellectual grounds. If the 
option is living, momentous, and forced, and if the intellect 
is not coerced by evidence to assent to one horn of the 
dilemma, then the choice must be determined by man's willing 
nature. In this case, faith is the only appropriate response. 
There are, of course, many options presented to us which 
are trivial and which are not forced. The consequences of 
the truth or falsity of the hypotheses involved are relatively 
insignificant for us, the community, and the world. In such 
i_nstances, it is not necessary to choose and it is usually 
Wiser to suspend judgment until all the evidence is in. How-
ever, even here, if the evidence is lacking, we are free to 
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believe at will. Ye are free to believe what we want to believe 
in the case of any living options which the intellect by it-
self cannot resolve, but we do so or not at our own risk. 
And at times wisdom is best served by caution. For example, 
most of us, in our efforts to get to know more about the ob-
jective nature of the world in which we live through the 
study of science, are simply recorders of scientific informa-
tion. Although there may be many other cases in which we 
make the truth to some degree, in matters of science, the 
-
data is independent of most of us. Thus in our efforts as 
laymen to learn more about the constitution of the universe, 
there is rarely an urgent need for us to believe any theory 
for which there is not sufficient evidence. Although a view 
of the world may indeed be personally supportive and although 
the discoveries of science Yery often.influence the way in 
which we manage our everyday affairs, still there are many 
scientific theories, the truth or falsity of which will not· 
significantly change our lives in any way. No dire consequences 
will follow if we do not believe them. In cases like these, 
it seems wiser to suspend judgment than to risk making a mis-
take. In such instances, the questions are relatively trivial, 
the choice is seldom forced, and in James's words, "The atti-
tude of sceptical balance is therefore the absolutely wise 
one.if we wo~ld escape mistakes."? 
But there are other questions which man cannot afford to 
?Ibid., p. 51. 
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approach dispassionately, questions which are most satisfac-
torily answered by a believing attitude in spite of the lack 
of evidence. The cases in which faith is the most appropri-
ate and fruitful mental attitude fall into two groups. 
First, there are those cases in which being skeptical 
would amount to losing the truth forever or in which skepticism 
would be equivalent to disbelief. Here we have those questions 
.which, of their very nature, can never be answered by sense 
and reason alone in the ordinary course of human life. Moral 
and religious questions are examples of issues of this type. 
They are not questions concerning sensible facts which are 
easily subject to empirical verification; and while men have 
attempted to resolve them by reason and logic, men have not 
succeeded in coming up with any universally accepted answers. 
In cases of this sort, an attitude of faith is appropriate, 
because sensible proofs and ration~l demonstrations which are 
generally convincing are not readily available. And to wait 
for evidence which either cannot come or is not likely to come 
would mean losing the truth forever (or at least acquiring it 
too late) or else be practically equivalent to disbelief. 
Inasmuch as belief entails action, there are instances in 
which suspending judgment involves acting as if the proposed 
hypothesis were false, as we noted above. In such .cases, 
refusing to judge until the evidence is all in is, for prac-
tical purposes, equivalent to disbelieving. 
Secondly, there are those cases in which faith can bring 
about its own verification. According to James, there are 
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·· JJ.UJllerous instances (some of them involving the moral and reli-
gious questions mentioned above) in which faith can and does 
verifY itself. Frequently, for example, a desirable situation 
can oe brought about only by a certain kind of action. But 
the action necessary to create the desired situation will be 
successful only if one believes that the desired state of 
affairs can and will be achieved. For example, one· can become 
a pianist only if he studies and practices diligently. But 
if he believes that he is not capable of attaining the goal, 
he will not even try to do so. He will not put forth the 
necessary effort and will not become a pianist. On the other 
hand, if one believes that the desired goal is attainable, 
then he will be inclined to put forth his best efforts, and 
in all probability he will succeed. In such a case, his faith 
in the possibility of success is an indispensable factor in 
achieving success. In an instance of this sort, faith, or 
confidence, is the most prudent mental attitude to adopt. 
Certainly when faith can transform a believed hypothesis into 
a desired fact, it would be foolish not to believe. 
One of James's favorite examples of faith verifying it-
· self appears in "Is Life Worth Living" and in "The Sentiment 
of Rationality." In these essays, James asked his readers to 
imagine that while climbing the Alps, he found himself in a 
precarious position the only escape from which involved a 
terrible leap. Having had no past experience of precisely 
this kind, he had no certain knowledge of his ability _to exe-
cute the leap successfully. Nevertheless, faith--hope and 
r 
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confidence--saved him. 
• • • hope and confidence in myself make me sure I 
shall not miss my aim, and nerve my feet to execute 
what without those subjective emotions would perhaps 
have been impossible. But suppose that, on the con-
trary, the emotions of fear and mistrust preponderate; 
or suppose that, having just read the Ethics of Belief 
rwritten by W. K. Clifford], I feel it would be sinful 
to act upon an assumption unverified by previous ex-
perience ,--why, then I shall hesitate so long that at 
last, exhausted and trembling, and launching myself 
in a moment of despair, I miss my foothold and roll 
into the abyss. In this case (and it is one of an 
immense class) th~ part of wisdom clearly is to believe 
what one desires;~ for the belief is one of the indis-
pensable preliminary conditions of the realization of 
its object. There are then cases where faith creates 
its own verification. Believe, and you shall be right, 
for you shall save yourself; doubt, and you shall again 
be right, for you shall perish. The only difference 
is that to believe is greatly to your advantage.iO 
8James's example reminds one of Kierkegaard's leap of 
faith--the leap into the absurd by which Abraham chose to obey 
God's command to sacrifice Isaac in spite of the irrationality 
of the act, and the leap of faith by which a man accepts Chris-
tianity in spite of the fac.t that it is beyond reason. Whether 
James intended it to do so or not, hi·s example points up the 
fact that every act of faith involves a kind of leap--a leap 
by which we bridge the gap between the available evidence and 
the thing to be believed. If neither empirical evidence nor 
logical arguments take us right up to the object and bring us 
into direct contact with it, then we can only get to the object 
by a 'leap of faith.' And just as the physical leap in 
James's example involved formidable dangers so too the 'leap 
of faith' always involves risks. 
9Technically, the word 'desires' is correctly used here. 
But it is an unfortunate choice of words because at least one 
meaning of the term refers to physical or sensual appetite 
and even to lust. A word such as 'wants' or 'wishes' would 
have been less open to misunderstanding. James's thought here 
is simply that in a case such as the one described, it is 
wise to believe what one wants to believe, wishes to believe, 
or even needs to believe. 
lOJames, "The Sentiment of Rationality," Essays on Faith 
and Morals, pp. 96-97. 
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According to William James, faith is indispensable for 
both knowledge and action. But faith always involves risks. 
J.S a matter of fact, in the case of any genuine option which 
cannot be resolved on the basis of evidence, there are risks 
J,nvolved in not believing as well as in believing. Whether we 
choose to believe or not to believe depends upon what risks 
we prefer to take. We believe at the risk of making a mistake 
or being duped, for example; on the other hand, we disbelieve 
or suspend judgment at the risk of losing the truth. But 
there are more risks involved in each alternative than simply 
the risk of making a mistake or the risk of losing the truth. 
For, according to James, when any two hypotheses are opposed 
to each other, the practical consequences of one must be dif-
ferent from those of the other. Thus choosing to believe or 
not to believe is more than a choice between truth and falsity; 
it is also a choice between the practical consequences of the 
two alternatives in question. The risks involved include more 
than the risk of losing the truth by refusing to believe or 
the risk of being duped by believing a false proposition. But 
for the present, we will confine our remarks to these purely 
intellectual hazards. 
There are two obligations incumbent upon would-be knowers: 
1) to believe truth and 2) to avoid error. These are not sim-
ply ·two expressions or one law, but are in fact two separate 
commandments. And as potential knowers, we can give primacy 
to one or to the other. In fact, the whole tenor of our 
intellectual lives will depend upon which of these two 
r U4 
directives we consider primary. For James, the search for 
truth is or first importance; avoidance of error is secondary. 
por an Intellectualist, however, the situation is reversed: 
one's primary duty as a knower is to escape error; acquiring 
truth is secondary. The Int~llectualists reject faith be-
cause they are convinced that faith is not a valid grounding 
for decision; it continually involves the ri.slr: or making a 
mistake since it does not always infallibly put us in touch 
with the +·acts. Intellectualists believe that by resisting 
faith always, they can be sure of never being wrong. James, 
on the other hand, would prefer to risk making a mistake than 
to give up his chance of winning the truths which only .faith 
can gain for him. 
For James, faith, instead of being the enemy of truth (as 
it is for the Intellectualists), is its indispensable ally. 
It is in some degree necessary for all thought and is an atti-
tude of mind in which everyone who claims to know anything de 
-
facto indulges. For the existence of truth and the ability 
of the human mind to attain it are not facts which can be 
empirically proven or rationally demonstrated, as we have 
already seen. In fact, any attempt at empirical proof or 
rational demonstration presupposes them. Thus even those 
who forbid faith and demand proof for everything, de facto, 
indulge in the very faith they abhor. Not only do they accept 
on faith the very possibility of knowledge but their postula-
tion of avoiding error as a knower's primar.J duty is a matter 
of faith on. their part. For one cannot decide which duty is 
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primary--to gain truth or to avoid error--on the basis of any 
evidence. One's choice is a matter of preference and desire 
and, perhaps, even a matter of fear. As James put it, "• •• 
these feelings of our duty about either truth or error are in 
any case only expressions of our pa~sional life. 1111 It is a 
question of what one fears most--making a mistake or losing 
the truth. The Intellectualist is one who is a slave to his 
private horror of being a dupe. But James wrote: "For my own 
part, I have also a horror of being duped; but I can believe 
that worse things than being duped may happen to a man in this 
world. • • • 
The Intellectualists, prizing security above all else, 
prohibit faith because of the risks it entails. But their 
prohibition, if obeyed, would stifle man's intellectual facul-
ties and paralyze his active powers. It would stifle his 
intellectual faculties by bidding him be so circumspect in 
his intellectual gaze that he would never be allowed to look 
up from the world certified by sense and reason. In effect, 
if obeyed, it would put forever out of reach a whole world of 
possible realities simply because_ they cannot be logically or 
empirically verified. It would put forever out of reach all 
those truths which cannot be known by sense and reason alone 
and all of those possible realities which man's actions could 
effect if he had sufficient confidence in his abilities and 
11James, "The Will to Believe," Essays on Faith and Morals, 
p. 49. 
12Ibid., pp. 49-50. 
-
r ~ 
sufficient faith in the desired goal. The necessity of faith 
tor the well-being of mari was apparent to William James. 
Without faith, man would be deprived of that good which is 
tru.th, that good which is responsible hum.an action itself, 
and all those physical and spiritual goods which, by his 
actions, man can effect for himself and the world. 
James believed that there are certain areas in which only 
faith can get at the truth.13 And if faith is forbidden, then 
in regard to these questions, man must remain forever in the 
dark. These areas include morality, religion, in general 
most of the larger questions about life that philosophers 
ask, and, in some instances, science as well. 
Moral questions cannot be answered on the basis of empir-
ical proof or logical demonstration, for a moral question is 
not a question of what sens~bly exists but rather of what is 
good or of what would be good if it did exist. Science cannot 
tells us the value of a thing, for simply under the aspect of 
its material being, a thing is neither good nor bad. According 
to James, the good is what is felt to be good--what is desired 
by a sentient being. "Science can tell us what exists; but 
to compare the worths, both of what exists and of what does 
not exist, we must consult not science, but what Pascal calls 
. l30n thi_s point, James might be accµsed of failing to 
address himself to the problem of false consciousness raised 
by Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. It must be noted, however, 
that the problem of false consciousness was not part of 
James's tradition. James was realistically inclined to take 
the deliverances of experience at face value, and false con-
sciousness was simply not a problem for.him. 
r 
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In the ethical philosophy of William James, the essence 
of good is simply to satisfy demands. But demands conflict 
80 that some goods are incompatible with other goods; and if 
one prevails, a good that is incompatible with it must be 
given up at leasttemporarily. The moral philosopher is one 
who looks for a rule that will tell him which of all conflict-
ing demands ought to be satisfied to the frustration of others. 
In general, the guiding principJeof ethical philosophy, as 
James saw it, can only be that as many demands as possible 
ought be satisfied. The best act, he said, is the one which 
makes the best whole by producing the least amount of dissatis-
faction. But in the concrete, it is not possible to know in 
advance and with absolute certitude all of the consequences 
which a particular act will entail in terms of the total num-
ber of desires it will satisfy or frustrate. In James's words, 
"• •• the exact combination of ideals realized and ideals 
disappointed which each decision creates is always a universe 
without a precedent, and for which no adequate previous rule 
exists. nl5 
Thus, neither a moral philosopher nor an o~dinary man, 
seeking the best course of action to follow in a particular 
concrete dilemma, can expect to find any rule of action which 
14James, 11 The Will to Believe," Essays on Faith and Morals~ 
p. 53. 
l5James, "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life," 
~says on Faith and Morals, p. 20~. 
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,,J.• certified in advance to be the right one. "The philosopher, 
;then, gu~ philosopher, is not better able to determine the 
best universe in the concrete emergency than other men."16 
And he, like other men, must adopt an attitude of £aith if he 
18 to make a decision at all. 
The solVing word, for the learned and the unlearned 
man alike, lies in the last resort in the dumb willing-
nesses and unwillingnesses of their interior charac-
ters, and nowhere else. It is not in heaven, neither 
is it beyond the sea; but the word is very nigh unto 
thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart, that thou mayest 
do it.17 
Religious questions are similar to mo~al questions in 
that sense and reason alone cannot proVide the answers; at 
least sense and reason cannot provide answers which are gen-
erally accepted. Religion, in the traditional sense of the 
term, posits the existence of an unseen order beyond the world 
of our experience; and religion states that it is in its rela-
tion to this unseen world that our present life finds its true 
significance and that our interests even now are best served 
16Ibid. 
-17Ibid., p. 215. This passage, with its biblical tone, 
calls our-ittention to the colorful literary style for which 
William James is noted. No doubt the way in which James wrote 
about reality reflects to a large extent the way in which he 
experienced it. But one suspects that his style of writing 
served a definite purpose as well--the purpose of giving his 
readers a 'feeling' of reality rather than merely an abstract 
conceptual view of it. James's colorful examples, his vivid 
descriptions, his liberal use of metaphor give his philosophi-
cal writings the same kind of color, variety, and excitement 
that he found in experience itself. But life is not merely 
Colorful and exciting. It is serious business. And, whether 
he intended it to do so or not, James's occasional use of a 
biblical style serves to emphasize the grave import of the 
questions under consideration and to point up the serious-
ness of living itself. 
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by our believing in this invisible realm. The affirmations o:f 
religion are obviously not subject to empirical verification 
in the ordinary co'l.lt'ai! o:f human life. Mystical experience, not 
given to most o:f us, may serve as empirical evidence :for the 
mystic; but :for the rest o:f us, :faith is our only recourse. 
sense experience as such does not reveal the spiritual world 
to us; nor can reason, in the strict sense o:f a :faculty o:f 
inference, give the religious hypothesis a solid :foundation. 
For all those who think that they have used reason success-
fully to prove religious beliefs to be true, there are others 
who :feel that reason has succeeded quite well in proving them 
false. James believed that the intellect is unable to confront 
religious issues and resolve them on the basis o:f evidence 
alone. Only our passional nature can resolve such issues; 
and it must do so. The option presented to us by the reli-
gious question is a living option; if not, to discuss it would 
be pointless. It is also momentous; the stakes are certainly 
not trifling. And, James said, it is a :forced option. In his 
words: 
••• we see, :first that religion offers itself as a 
momentous option. We are supposed to gain, even now, 
by our belief, and to lose by our non-belief, a certain 
vital good. Secondly, religion is a :forced option, so 
:far as that good goes. We cannot escape the issue by 
remaining sceptical and waiting :for more light, because, 
although we do avoid error in that way i.f religion be 
untrue, we lose the good, i:f it be true, just as cer-
tainly as i:f we positively chose to disbelieve.JS 
18James, "The Will to .Believe," .!!:ssays on Faith and 
!!9rals, p. 57. 
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The religious issue is a fine example of a case in which sus-
pending judgment is practically equivalent to choosing not to 
believe. Religious belief is such that it gives rise to a 
way of life and mode of action vastly different from that of 
the non-believer; thus whether one positively disbelieves or 
simply postpones judgment, he does not act as though the 
religious hypothesis were true. He acts as though it were false. 
In general, the larger questions of life--the questions 
which philosophers deal with specifically and which most people 
ask at one time or another, if only in a vague and general 
way--can rarely, if ever, be answered to everyone's satisfac-
tion on the basis of empirical evidence or rational demonstra-
tion alone. Philosophers often give lengtpy arguments, based 
upon logic and what they consider to be empirical evidence, in 
support of their positions;· but the !.act that different phil-
osophers, apparently looking at the same !acts, come to dif-
ferent and even contradictory conclusions indicates that their 
conclusions are not propositions to which they are forced to 
assent by the weight of the evidence. It indicates that there 
is more involved in their convictions than the evidence alone; 
it indicates the influence o! non-cognitive elements. 
The very nature of philosophical questions is such that 
empirical evidence and rational demonstration cannot give us 
definitive answers to them. Like religion, philosophy tries 
to interpret the total character of.the world, to determine the 
individual's place in it, to discover ~he meaning or life as 
a whole. But no philosopher experiences the total character 
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of the world. Reality is so vast and diverse that each phil-
osopher experiences only his own sector of' it 1 and hence no 
philosophical system can ever explain it completely and be 
absolutely verified empirically. Thus in whatever stand a 
philosopher takes, faith plays an important part, his protests 
to the contrary notwithstanding. A philosopher may attempt to 
maintain a purely speculative attitude in regard to- philosophi-
cal issues; he may make every effort to avoid err·or? by refus-
ing to believe whenever the evidence is not conclusive. And 
indeed there may be a few philosophical questions that he 
can afford to approach in such an impersonal way and in regard 
to which he can afford not to make a decision. But mos.t of 
the questions of philosophy, like those of religion, are such 
that one cannot afford to suspend judgment •. One's mode of 
life even now depends upon what he believes about the universe, 
the meaning of life, and his role in the whole scheme of things. 
If a philosopher, or any other man, is to live and to act, he 
must take a stand on these issues. And since he cannot take 
it on the basis of conclusive evidenc~, he is left with one 
alternative--faith. 
James claimed that, de facto, a man's philosophical view 
is an expression of hi.s temperament; it is more 9r less a "dumb 
sense of what life honestly an~ deeply means."19 James agreed 
with Hegel that the aim of knowledge is to make a man feel 
more at home in the world. But the world is a multi-faceted 
l9James, Pragmatism and Four Essays from The Meaning of 
~Uth, pp. 17-18. 
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reality. And depending upon his temperament and character, 
one facet of it may be more congenial to a given man than 
another. A man will feel more at home in the world if his own 
particular temperament is considered to be an essential feature 
of the universe. As James put it, "Different men find their 
minds more at home in very different fragments of the world."20 
Thus all philosophers "have conceived of the whole-world after 
the analogy of some particular feature of it which has partic-
ularly captivated their attention."21 
A man's temperament influences his philosophical think-
ing more than any strictly objective premises. "It loads the 
evidence for him one way or the other •••• 1122 A man trusts 
his temperament. He wants a universe that suits it and he 
believes in a conception of the universe which does suit it. 
I 
"If we take the whole history of philosophy, the systems reduce 
themselves to a few main types which, under all the technical 
verbiage in which the ingenious intellect of man envelops them, 
are just so many visions, modes of feeling the whole push, and 
seeing the whole drift of life, forced on one by one's total 
character and experience, and on the whole preferred--there is 
no other truthful word--as one's best working attitude. 1123 
That faith plays a part in religious issues is fairly 
20James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 11. 
21Ibid., p. 8. 
-22James, Pragmatism and Four Essays from The Meaning of 
Truth, p. 19. 
23James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 20-21. 
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well conceded by almost everyone. That it enters into philos-
ophical judgments is, of course, a less acceptable.view. But 
that it comes into play in matters of science--this is the 
least acceptable opinion of all. From an Intellectualist's 
point of view, such a suggestion is preposterous. And yet it 
vas James's opinion that scientists rely upon faith, not only 
ill their day to day living as other men do, but also in their 
work as scientists. 
Like all men, scientists have faith in the capacity of 
man's mind for truth, the lack of proof notwithstanding. But 
more than that, a fundamental principle of science, in fact a 
principle upon which all scientific progress depends, ~s 
unquestionably a matter of faith. That principle is the 
assumption that nature is intelligible and that nature always 
acts in the same way. It cannot be proven that nature tomor-
row will follow exactly the same laws that it follows today, 
and yet the scientist, as well as the layman, believes and 
acts upon the principle that the course of nature is uniform. 
It can be said that this uniformity is congenial to both of 
them. And indeed progress in science, as well as the smooth 
operation of everyday affairs, seems to owe much to the fact 
that men accept this principle of uniformity and.live by it. 
Furthermore, men of science have their own individual 
faiths--their own pet theories (sometimes no more than hunches) 
Which they work tirelessly to verify. Sometimes experimenta-
tion proves them wrong, but often their faith, patience, and 
effort lead to the discovery of a truth which otherwise would 
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not be known. Many a truth would remain undiscovered and 
maDY a technological advance would not be made if men of 
genius--scientists, philosophers, and others--did not follow 
their hunches and cling to their beliefs in spite of the lack 
of supporting evidence. Galileo, for example, clung to his 
belief in the Copernican theory that the earth is but a planet 
moving around the sun, in spite of the fact that the everyday 
experience of most men seemed to support the view that sun, 
moon, and stars moved around the earth. And by his investiga-
tions, Galileo contributed to the wealth of evidence in virtue 
of which the theory of Copernicus is today the commonly accep-
ted view. In the area of technology, modern communication owes 
much to the work of Alexander Graham Bell. It was Bell's 
faith in the theory that the varying sound of a person's voice 
could be made to vary the intensity of an electrical current, 
which varying electrical current could then be reproduced as 
speech, that inspired the tireless investigation and experi-
mentation which culminated in his perrecting the telephpne. 
Science owes its progress and advancement to the desires 
or individual men to get their own faiths confirmed, to th~ 
determination with which men of sensitivity and imagination 
hang on to their uncertified belief that the truth must lie 
in one direction rather than in another. In science, it is 
not uncommon for two men, observing the same data, to espouse 
contradictory theories about them. One might well wonder how 
it is that one scientist can believe a theory on the basis of 
the same empirical facts which prompt another to reject it; 
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but according to James, this is possible because everyone of 
any mental originality is sensitive to evidence that bears 
in some one direction. The fact that two scientists, looking 
at the same empirical data, espouse contradictory theories 
indicates that more is at work in the game than their intel-
lects alone. Desire, instinct, and feeling are active too. 
For the purely judging mind, i.e., for the speculative 
mind, perhaps a cautious skepticism in matters of science is 
better than faith. As we pointed out earlier, this is true for 
the layman in science; he can afford to wait for the evidence 
without any great loss. But for purposes of discovery, it is 
better to risk making an error than to risk not finding the 
truth at all. If nothing is ventured, nothing is gained. 
Thus, in scientific investigation, skepticism and faith work 
together. "The most useful investigator, because the most 
sensitive observer, is always he whpse eager interest in one 
side of the question is balanced by an equally keen nervous-
ness lest he become deceived. 1124 
It is evident, then, that there are certain kinds of 
truth--moral, religious, philosophical, and scientific--that 
would never be had were faith !J.Ot permitted to enter into 
one's mental life. It could even be suggested that the Intel-
lectualists' prohibition of faith is a prohibition of mental 
fecundity. But to forbid faith is not only to forbid intel-
lectual progress--to forbid faith is to forbid life. It is 
24James, "The Will to Believe," Essays on Faith and Morals, 
p. 52. 
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to forbid action and all those goods which human·actions can 
create. 'Without faith, action, understood in a human sense, 
is impossible. For in any complex problem, our conclusions 
about what is the best course of action to follow can, from 
the point of view of the conclusiveness of the evidence, never 
be more than probable. Assuming that time will continue and 
that the items in our present situation will continue into 
the future (beliefs for which we have no guarantee), we can 
never be absolutely certain what the consequences of our pro-
posed actions will be. If the environment affected by our 
activities were fixed or stabilized, ~f we knew all the proper-
ties of the items in it and how these things would react in 
all possible circumstances, then we could foresee all the 
possible consequences of our actions. In such a case, we 
could decide which consequence we would prefer and, at least 
being certain of getting a desired result, act accordingly. 
But we live and act in a world which no one of us can know 
completely--a world which is continually changing. Hence we 
cannot, with either absolute certitude or, in many cases, even 
relative certitude, predict what effects our actions will have 
on the world. F.rom an ethical point of view, that action is 
best which satisfies the greatest number of desires and claims 
at the least cost; but not only are we unable clearly to fore-
see the results of our action on the empirical world, we are 
not perfectly aware of all the desires and claims of those 
whom our actions may affect. Thus in deciding which of several 
alternative courses of action to follow, the most we can hope 
14? 
for is a high degree of probability. But according to James, 
even a degree of probability is rarely able to be proven. ·. Hence 
we must let our 'feelings' and our 'good will' tell us where 
the greater probability lies and act upon it as though the 
iesser probabilities did not exist. In other words, for prac-
tical purposes, we act as though the most probable view were 
the certain view. The probability of our action having the 
desired effect may be expressed in a fraction or percentage. 
For example, a particular act may produce a certain effect 
four times out of five, or eighty per-cent of the times. But 
we cannot translate the fractional probability of success 
into a fractional action. We cannot perform only four~fifths 
or eighty per-cent of the act in question. We must either act 
or not act; there is no middle ground which might match the 
probability of the possible results. Thus when we act we must 
go all the way and in the example given incur a twenty per-
cent risk of failure. We must act wholly for one or the other 
alternative. ln other words, we must act on faith. "We must 
go in for the more probable alternative as if the other one 
did not exist, and suffer the full penalty if the event belies 
our faith. 1125 To act only upon oeliefs certified by evidence 
would in most cases be not to ~ct at all, and of.ten not to act 
on one belief is equivalent to acting as if the opposite belief 
were tru1::. 
The necessity of faith for action is thus apparent. Any 
2 5James, Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 22?. 
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action that is not merely instinctive presupposes conviction. 
But, as we have seen; except for the data of the.immediate 
present, doubt concerning matters of fact and the possible 
outcome of proposed courses of activity is always possible. 
For the most part, the beliefs which precede responsible activ-
ity cannot be certified by proof and therefore fall into the 
category of faith. Responsible action requires faith not 
only in regard to the best course of activity to follow but 
also in regard to our own freedom. If action is ~o be respon-
sible, we must be aware of our freedom not to act at all; we 
must be aware of our freedom to act otherwise than we do. But 
from the point of view of James, freedom is not something which 
can be empirically proven or rationally demonstrated. It is 
something which one must accept without proof--it too is a 
matter of faith that must be lived daily. 
Thus, to forbid faith is to render man sterile and unpro-
ductive from the point of view of both knowledge and action. 
To prohibit faith is to render unattainable all of the truths 
which sense and reason alone cannot discover, all of the real-
ities which responsibl~ human action can bring into being, and 
also all the truths and realities which faith itself can help 
to create in those unique instances in which it verifies itself. 
The fact that faith in certain instances ~ verify itself 
makes faith a formative factor in the shaping of our world. 
We can to some degree make the world what we want it to be, if 
we but believe it to be so and act as it it were so. If we 
believe the world to be all bad and the evil to be irremediable, 
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for example, we will do nothing to improve things (on the as-
sumption that the situation is hopeless) and our despair and 
gloom will add to, and be part of, the world's bad character. 
But if we believe that the world is to some degree good and 
that it can be made better, we will. act accordingly. We will 
fight the evils and try to alleviate them, and the world will 
be better for that, at least in the sense that it will contain 
the manly virtue and courage that our own actions exhibit. 
According to James, the Intellectualists suppose that the 
world, for all practical purposes, is completely finished in 
advance of our dealings with it, and that our beliefs and 
actions, while somehow a part of the world, cannot change it 
in any important way or contribute significantly to its meaning. 
Thus, from an Intellectualist's point of view, faith has no 
significant role to play i~ determining the world's destiny. 
James, however, maintained that the world is not completely 
finished and that it is an empirical fact that human actions 
and beliefs can shape the course of experience and sig~ificantly 
determine to some degree the very character of the universe 
itself. There are questions about the universe, questions 
about reality, the answers to which can actually be created by 
faith at least in part. For example, is life worth living? 
Is this a moralistic world? Can the world be improved--made 
better? Lif·e is worth living; this is a moral universe; this 
~a melioristic world, i.e., human action can bring this 
pluralistic world to greater perfection. These are all exam-
ples of faiths which, to a degree, can verify themselves. As 
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James put it, "• •• often enough our faith beforehand in an 
uncertified result is the only thing that makes the result come 
26 true." 
----- Optimism and pessimism were topics much discussed in 
James's day especially in Germany, and James was very much 
interested in the debate. From his point of view, the mental 
attitude which best fits the character of the universe depends 
upon the individual and upon his trust or mistrust of the uni-
verse. If one believes that the world is all bad, and that 
life is not worth living, and if he ends his life by suicide, 
then he makes the world, his world at least, all bad by his 
act and deprives it of whatever perfection he might have con-
tributed to it had he continued to live. If, on the other 
hand, he believes it to be good, at least partially so, and 
if, instead of despairing, he braves the evils he finds in 
life, defies pain and fear, he will prove the world to have 
some goodness about it. It will be good not only to the extent 
that his own moral courage, which is an integral part of it, 
is good but also to the extent that the world, with whatever 
evils it contains, called forth his heroic efforts in the first 
place. As James· put it, the bad character of the world was 
the conditio sine qua non of the good character of the man's 
actions. A world which can produce heroic virtue cannot be 
all bad. And the exhilaration which one derives from the 
battle with evil as well as the satisfaction and joy which 
26James, "Is Life Worth Living?" ..l:!;Ssays on Faith and 
!'!_orals, p. 28. 
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accompanies each new victory can certainly make life worth 
living for a man at least on a day to day basis. 
Thus, if we believe the world to be bad, our belief will 
. help to make it so; but if we believe the world to be good, 
it will be good. And if we believe that life is worth living, 
our faith will make it worth living. The character of the 
universe depends upon each man's personal contribution to it. 
But each one's contribution depends upon what he believes the 
world's character to be. James wrote: 
Wherever the facts to be formulated contain such a 
contribution, we may logically, legitimately, and 
inexpugnably believe what we desire. The belief cre-
ates its verification.27 The ~hought becomes liter-
ally father to the fact, as the wish was father to 
the thought.~8 
The moral or non-moral character of the universe is another 
question the answer to which depends at least in part upon a 
man's belief in one alternative or the other. Is this a moral 
27James would not have us think that, in each and every 
instance of believing what we want to believe, the belief will 
verify itself. There are obviously cases in which it may not. 
One of James's own examples of beliefs which can verify them-
selves, but are not guaranteed to do so, involves human rela-
tions. Let us assume that I want a particular person to like 
me, but I have no evidence that he does so. If I believe that 
he likes me and, confident of a friendly response on his part, 
act amiably toward him, my action may elicit from him an ex-
pression of friendship. It may elicit from him the expression 
of a liking which he already felt or it may evoke the liking 
itself. However, it is always possible that my strategy will 
not work, that forthcoming evidence will show my trust to have 
been misplaced. This is the risk involved in faith; but if I 
am unwilling to take this risk, I may well lose a good that 
can come, if it comes at all, only through believing. 
28James, "The Sentiment of Rationality," Essays on Faith 
!nd Morals, p. 103. 
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universe? Are judgments of right and wrong objectively valid; 
or are they merely expressions of our own uniquely personal 
and subjective sensibilities? Is there such a thing as moral 
obligation? Is there incumbent upon man an obligation to act 
in a certain way--an obligation that stems from the very 
nature of things and the fulfillment of which is necessary for 
the world's welfare? Is there a certain kind of conduct which 
is required for the well-being of the universe and its inhabi-
tants? 
From James's point of view, there is no strictly logical 
demonstration which will give us an absolutely certain 'yes' 
or 'no' in answer to these questions. Nor is there any single 
scientific experiment the result of which will definitively 
solve the problem for us once and for all. Rather the whole 
of one's life is a kind of experiment which will contribute 
its share to the total solution. The answers can come only 
if each of us assumes one position or the other and acts ac-
cordingly. Suppose we assume that this is a moral universe 
imposing obligations upon us and suppose that we act to ful-
fill them. If we are right, the consequences of our actions 
will serve to verify in part our belief. Perhaps we shall see 
the world, at least the small part of it affected by our acts, 
visibly improved by our doing what we conceive to be our duty. 
But even if the salutary effects of our good deeds are not 
immediately apparent and our belief does not receive any posi-
tive verification during our lifetime, our faith may still be 
partially verified in a negative way insofar as nothing in the 
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·course of experience, as affected by our actions, will conflict 
with our belief and force us to reverse it. 
However, whatever the nature of the universe may be from 
a moral point of view, our discovery of the truth in the matter 
depends upon our assuming one position or the other and acting 
upon it. The verification of either alternative--the moral 
character or the non-moral character of the world-~depends upon 
our believing in it in advance. If we are right, experience 
will back us up; at least it will not force us to reverse our 
position. 
In a question as broad as this, of course, complete veri-
fication is not the work of one man. Whether or not the uni-
verse in its overall character is moral cannot be empirically 
known, according to James, until all races of men have contrib-
uted their actions to it. Only the experience of the entire 
human race can make the verification of either alternative. 
In a question of this sort, every person must take a stand, 
for· this question involves a forced option. There is no mid-
dle ground. To remain skeptical about the validity of moral 
obligations is to act as though they were invalid. In James's 
words, 
He who commands himself not to be credulous of God, 
of duty, of freedom, of immortality, may again and 
again be indistinguishable from him who dogmatically 
denies them. Scepticism in moral matters is an active 
ally of immorality. Who is not for is against. The 
universe will have no neutrals in these questions. 
In theory as in practice, dodge or hedge, or talk as 
we like about a wise scepticism, we are really doing 29 volunteer military service for one side or the other. 
29~., p. 109. 
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In regard to the melioristic character· of the universe, 
James held that the world is a pluralism of independent.powers 
which by their activities can bring it to greater perfection 
or reduce it to rubble. But whatever good they succeed in 
accomplishing will depend in large measure upon their antece-. 
dent belief in each other. A social organism can be a success 
only if each member does his duty with a trust that the other 
members will at the same time do theirs. "Wherever a desired 
result is achieved by the co-operation of many independent 
persons, its existence as a fact is a pure consequence of the 
precursive faith in one another of those immediately con-
cerned. "30 
In social action, in playing our parts in the social whole, 
there is always risk involved. We may do our best, but others 
may not do theirs. And their actions or failures to act will 
influence the.result. If they do not cooperate, our efforts 
may be wasted. According to James, we can take one of four 
attitudes in regard to the other powers: 
1. We can follow the Intellectualist's advice, wait for 
the evidence, and, while waiting, do nothing. 
2. We can mistrust the other powers and, sure that the 
universe will fail, let it fail. 
3. We can trust them and, in any case, do our best in 
spite of the.uncertainty of the outcome~ 
4. Finally, we can flounder, trusting them one day and 
30 . James, "The Will to Believe," Essays on Faith and Morals, 
p. 55. 
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mistrusting them the next. 
According to James, "This 4th way is no systematic solu-
tion. The 2d way spells faith in failure. The 1st way may in 
practice be indistinguishable from the 2d way. The 3d way 
seems the only wise way."3l 
If we do our best and the other powers do theirs, this 
world will be perfected. As James pointed out, th~s propo-
sition is not a statement of fact. But it is like the major 
premise of a hypothetical syllogism. What is needed is a 
premise of fact--the actual good will and the best efforts of 
all the powers concerned. If the premise of fact is supplied, 
the perfected world will emerge as the logical conclusion. But 
the premise of fact will not be supplied unless, trusting that 
our fellows will do their share of the work, we proceed to put 
forth our best efforts. If, believing in one another; we all 
do our best, we shall create the direction of development; and, 
James said, "only so can the making of a perfected world of 
the pluralistic pattern ever take place."32 
Thus faith is indeed a formative factor in the destiny of 
the universe. Insofar.as there is still work to be done in the 
world, insofar as the character of the world's results may in 
part depend upon our actions, and insofar as our actions depend 
upon our beliefs, the shape or' the world depends upon our 
indulging our faith-tendencies. According to James, these 
faith-tendencies are simply expressions of good will toward 
31James, Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 230. 
32Ibid. 
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certain forms of results. They exert a powerful influence upon 
man's thinking--in his attempts to answer the larger questions 
of life as well as in his practical decisions. These faith-
tendencies are very active psychological forces, which con-
stantly outstrip evidence and lead men to conclusions which 
are beyond the powers of sense and reason alone to corroborate. 
As James pointed out, the logic of faith is not the logic of 
reason. James spoke of the stages through which the mind 
passes in its ascent from a simple tendency to believe to a 
full-blown conviction as the "faith-ladder."33 The steps in 
the faith-ladder, i.e., the affirmations which the mind makes 
in its ascent are as follows: 
1. There is nothing absurd in a certain view of 
the world being true, nothing self-contradictory; 
2. It might have been true under certain conditions; 
3. It ~al be true, even now; 
4. It is fit to be true; 
5. It ouglirto be true; 
6. It must be true; 
7. It sna!l be true, at any rate true for ~.34 
These steps are not a chain of inferences, but, according to 
James, they constitute "a slope of good-will on which in the 
larger questions of life men habitually live."35 But the 
simple tendency ~o believe which impels us to climb the ladder 
in the first place springs from the creative regions of the 
heart--from the most secret recesses of our being where our 
Willingnesse~ and unwillingnesses, our loves, desires,. hopes, 
33~.' p. 224. 
34Ibid. 
35~. 
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and fears lie hidden. The heart, said James in eulogistic 
fashion, is our deepest organ of communication with the nature 
of things. He no doubt saw that genuine knowledge of anything 
is more than a matter of purely intellectual or sensory appre-
hension, that it is a matter of sympathy as well--a matter of 
love by which we somehow enter into the very interior of the 
reality. As Martin C. D'Arcy, S.J., has pointed out, "It 
[knowledge] is galvanized and interpenetrated through and 
through with love •••• "36 James knew that the deepest know-
ledge that we can have of anything involves a kind of intuition 
analogous to the ineffable knowledge which a lover has of his 
beloved. The heart, he said, is the source of all our outer 
deeds and decisions. And although we may not always be able 
to defend our beliefs and actions with arguments that will 
satisfy the scientist and the logician, the consonance of our 
beliefs, or the objects of our beliefs, with our passional 
nature is enough to make us cling to them and vouch for them 
with our active lives. 
The Intellectualists, however, discount the significance 
of climbing the faith-ladder. They claim that truth can best 
be served only if we resist our faith-tendencies and believe 
nothing for which we do not have conclusive evidence. From 
the Intellectualists' point of view, the heart has no place 
in the determination of our beliefs. The intellect alone, 
responding to evidence, is the only legitimate determinant of 
36Martin c. D'Arcy, S.J., The Mind and Heart of Love, 
Meridian Books (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1956), p. 311. 
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our convictions. In thus forbidding us to climb the faith-
ladder, the Intellectualists, as we have seen, debar us from 
ever attaining any truths which cannot be readily verified by 
logic or experience. What is more, they render inaccessible 
all those truths which sense and reason could verify, if our 
original belief in them was sufficient to prompt us to seek 
the verification. And, of course, the intellectualists put 
forever out of reach all those truths which faith itself can 
help to create, i.e., all those truths which can exist only 
on the assumption that actions based on faith in a desired end 
bring them about. 
James believed that the Intellectualists' attitude is an 
irrational one. 
I, therefore, for one, cannot see my way to accepting 
the agnostic rules for truth-seeking, or wilfully agr~e 
to keep my willing nature out of the game. 1 cannot do 
so for this plain reason, that a rule of thinking which 
would absolutely prevent me from acknowledging certain 
kinds of truth if those kinds.of truth were really there, 
would be an irrational rule. That for me is the long 
and short of the formal logic of the situation, no mat-
ter what the kinds of truth might materially be.37 
Although James succeeded in justifying a believing atti-
tude in regard to any question for which there is not suffi-
cient evidence to make a decision, his special concern was to 
. -justify faith in religious matters. He felt that religion was 
perhaps man's most important function and that defending reli-
gious belief might be his own uniquely religious act. As we 
have noted, he spoke of using faith to answer such questions 
37James, "The Will to Believe," Essays on Faith and Morals, 
pp. 59-60. 
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as "Is life worth living?"--"Is this a moral world?"--"Should 
the definition of the world be optimistic, or at le.ast melior-
istic ?" He showed how faith can answer all these questions 
affirmatively and can contribute to the actualization of the 
desired state of affairs. But at bottom all of these questions 
rest upon the religious question. They lead us to the reli-
gious question, for we cannot confront them without confronting 
it. To give an unqualified affirmative answer to them, an en-
thusiastic affirmation without any reservations, one must be-
lieve in the affirmations of religion. 
Whatever satisfaction may come in day to day living from 
the struggle to overcome evil and to increment the good, if 
there is no power which will somehow guarantee that the values 
for which we fight will be eternally preserved, there is still 
something left to be desired. The effort to overcome evil and 
to bring about good in the world may make life worth living 
on a day to day basis; but without a God, it cannot make life 
worth living_ in the long run. 
If this were merely a human world without a God, it would, 
according to James, still be a moral world. It would still be 
a world in which each man's needs and desires would function 
as valid claims upon other men. It would still be a world of 
objective demands and obligations. But without a God among the 
claimants, the appeal to our moral nature would fall short of 
its maximum stimulating power. The claims of other men, unless 
these men be persons with whom we are closely associated or to 
whom we are bound by ties of love, are seldom enough to spur 
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us on to heroic virtue or enthusiastic effort. But the demands 
of a Divine Claimant call forth the best that is in all of us. 
"~very sort of energy and endurance, of courage and capacity 
for handling life's evils, is set free in those who have 
religious faith."38 In a world without God, life, to be sure, 
would still be "a genuinely ethical symphony";39 but, according 
to James, it would be played "in the compass of a couple of 
poor octaves, and the infinite scale of values"40 would fail 
to open up. 
In regard to the question of opti~ism versus pessimism, 
if there is no God, if the world's destiny is controlled by 
the blind forces of matter, if the end of everything is the 
dissolution of all that is good and beautiful (as the mechan-
ical evolutionists say it is), then.the definition of the 
universe cannot be an optimistic one. It cannot even be meli-
oristic, because whatever improvements human actions may make 
in the world will one day be reduced to nothing. If there is 
no God, the definition of the universe can only be pessimistic. 
The faith that is needed to make· life really worth living 
in the long run, to spark us into energetic and enthusiastic 
moral action, to enable us to take an optimistic, or at least 
a melioristic, view of the world must be a faith.that over-
arches all of these issues. It must be a religious faith. 
38 James, "'l'he Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life," 
Essays on Faith and Morals, p. 213. 
39Ibid., p. 212. 
40Ibid. 
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J.D.d because religious faith is so needed, it is, in William 
James's mind, justified. 
CHAprER V 
THE LIFE OF RELIGION: "MANKIND'S MOST 
IMPoRTANT FUNCTION"l 
Yilliam James held that the purpose of thought.and convic-
tion is to specify, as well as partially to evoke, our active 
response to the universe as we experience it. Thought comes 
to rest in belief; belief gives rise to action. And what we 
believe about the world determines the kind of activity by 
which we respond to the impressions which it makes upon us. 
"Beliefs, in short, are rules for action," wrote James in 
agreement wi~h Charles Peirce, "and the whole function of 
thinking is but one step in the production of active habits."2 
Though a man can react to the world in many way~, James felt 
that the type of responses engendered by a man's belief in the 
hypotheses of religion are more fruitful and salutary to him-
self and to the world at large than any other. Nothing fulfills 
the task of making life·worth living quite as well as religious 
·conviction does. 
Our purpose in this chapter will be to examine in detail 
the religious response to the universe. After briefly compar-
ing this response in a general way with other possible modes 
II, 
1Letter 
12?. 
2James, 
from James to F. R. Morse, Letters of Yilliam James, 
The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 339. 
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of reacting to the world, we shall give special consideration 
to the nature of religious belief itself, its causes, and its 
effects upon the life of the individual believer as well as 
upon the world as a whole. We shall not examine doctrines 
which are peculiar to any given cult, but will confine our 
attention to that general vision of reality which appears to 
be common to all religions. The question of the truth of 
this religious vision, however, will be left for in depth dis-
cussion in Chapter VI. 
The universe presents itself to most men at one time or 
another as a place of pain. There may be some 'congenitally' 
happy individuals by whom the evils of the world pass unno-
ticed.3 But few men of sensitivity and perception can over-
look the presence of evil in the world. Moreoever, every man 
must decide for himself how he will respond to this world with 
its evils. After tasting the sorrows of life, he may decide 
that life in this world is not worth living and try to escape 
from it by committing suicide as many men have done. 4 The sui-
. cide of the man who feels that life is not worth living, how-
ever, is a negative response as far as this world is concerned. 
3"Inmany persons," James said, "happiness is congenital 
and irreclaimable." (The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 
?7.) "With many men,"· he wrot~, "the question of life's worth 
is answered by a temperamental optimism which makes them in-
capable of believing that anything seriously evil can exist." 
("Is Life Worth Living?," ~ssays on Faith and Morals, p. 2.) 
411That life is not worth living the whole army of sui-
cides declare,--an army whose roll-call, like the famous evening 
gun of the British army, follows the sun round the world and 
never terminates." (James, "Is Life Worth Living?," Essays on 
Faith and Morals, p. 6.) 
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It provides no real remedy for the evils of life. In fact the 
act of suicide only adds to the evidence that the world is a 
dark and forboding place. 
If you surrender to the nightmare view and crown the 
evil edifice by your own suicide, you have indeed made 
a picture totally black. Pessimism, completed by your 
act, is true beyond a doubt, so far as your world goes. 
Your mistrust of life has removed whatever worth ~our 
own enduring existence might have given it •••• 5 
From a pragmatic point of view, then, suicide in itself accom-
plishes nothing positive in the fight against evil6 and amounts 
to forfeiting the chance of winning whatever goods might come 
as a result of staying around to brave the struggle. 
The man who chooses to remain in the world, however, must 
somehow face the ills and misfortunes of life and overcome 
them if he can. The search for happiness is likely to be his 
chief concern. "How to gain, how to keep, how to recover 
happiness, is in f~ct for .most men at· all times the secret 
motive of all they do, and of all they are willing to endure."? 
But the search for human happiness for oneself and for others 
involves the effort to alleviate pain and suffering--to find 
some remedy for the evils which afflict mankind. 
One form of .suffering which seriously interferes with 
human happiness is the sense of division which most men 
5~. t p. 29. 
· 
6It is possible, of course, that one person's suicide may 
call the attention of other people to evils prevalent in the 
community or in the world and prompt these people to try to 
alleviate the evils. However, the act of suicide itself is 
not a remedy for them. 
?James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. ?6. 
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experience within themselves at one time or another during 
their lives--the experienced inner struggle between conflict-
ing tendencies. This discordancy may vary "from something so 
slight as to result in a merely odd or whimsical inconsisten-
cy, to a discordancy of which the consequences may be incon-
venient in the extreme."8 A small degree of inconsistency 
may be relatively harmless. 
This amount of inconsistency will only count as 
amiable weakness; but a stronger degree of heterogen-
eity may make havoc of the subject's life. There are 
persons whose existence is little more than a series 
of zigzags, as now one tendency and now another gets 
the upper hand. Their spirit wars with their flesh, 
they wish for incompatibles, wayward impulses inter-
rupt their most deliberate plans, and their lives are 
one long drama of repentanQe and of effort to repair 
misdemeanors and mistakes.~ 
A man becomes aware of his inner division in his relations 
with the world that he encounters in experience. Actively 
respond to this world he must; but he sometimes experiences 
simultaneous tendencies to respond to it in opposite ways. 
And in choosing one response, he knows that he must lose, at 
least for a ~ime, the advantage attached to the other. The 
internal struggle itself is painful and the pain is increased 
by the anticipated loss of some wished-for good. Such discor-
dancy often makes a man hesitant and indecisive in his response 
to the universe. It results in delayed action. In some cases, 
it results in the failure to act at all and the consequent loss 
of whatever good, private or public, prompt resolute action 
8 Ibid., p. 141. 
9Ibid., p. 142. 
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]11.ight have accomplished. 
The divided man is an unhappy man, not only because in-
ternal conflict is itself painful and because much good can 
be lost as a result of his indecision and failure to act, but 
alSO because such internal division seems to intensify those 
sufferings which are foisted upon him by the external world. 
Our externally inflicted wounds are more difficult to bear 
insofar as we are internally torn asunder by simultaneous 
tendencies to respond to them in opposite ways. For instance, 
a man injures us and we are torn between the magnanimous ten-
dency to forgive him and the selfish inclination to take revenge. 
The pain of internal torment is thus added to the externally 
caused sorrow. To take another example, society itself is in 
turmoil and we as individuals, as well as the community as a 
whole, suffer from it. How do we respond? We are torn between 
the selfish tendency to look out fo~ our own in~erests, to 
lessen our own sufferings while letting our neighbors take 
care of themselves, and the expansive desire to help the com-
munity at large even though in so doing we may not fare quite 
so well as far as our own private interests are concerned. 
Not only is the externally ca~sed suffering aggravat~d by the 
internal conflict but the somewhat paralyzing indecision which 
accompanies the conflict often renders our efforts to overcome 
the evils that afflict us and our neighbors ineffective. If 
we had perfect control over ourselves, we could more easily 
cope with the enemy without. 
It seems, then, that if we reject suicide and elect to 
16? 
stay here and fight, a prerequisite to overcoming the evils 
in the external universe is the unification of our own person-
alities. Psychologists tell us that some persons 
are born with an inner constitution which is harmoni-
ous and well balanced from the outset. Their impulses 
are consistent with one another, their will follows 
without trouble the guidance of their intellect, their 
passions are not excessive, and their lives are little 
haunted by regrets.10 
' 
But most of us are not so fortunate. Not constituted by nature 
with such an abnormally harmonious personality, most of us 
must struggle to overcome the division witllin ourselves so that 
we can focus all of our efforts upon the task of meeting the 
world as whole men. 
Now in all of us, however constituted, but to a 
degree the greater in proportion as we are intense and 
sensitive and subject ~o diversified temptations, and 
to the greatest possible degree if we are decidedly 
psychopathic, does the normal evolution of character 
chiefly consist in the straightening out and unifying 
of the inner self. The higher and the lower feelings, 
the use1·u1 and the erring impu:;t.ses, begin by being a 
comparative chaos within us--they must end by forming 
a stable system of functions in right subordination.Il 
Divisions within a man are usually the result of his 
being attracted by incompatible goals, i.e. by goals which 
cannot be realized simultaneously because of the limitations 
of time and space. An individual :z::i.ormally has many purposes 
and ends which, together with ~he ideas associated with them, 
take turns in occupying the center of his attention; but when 
these goals are incompatible with each other and when the 
Person's interest shifts rapidly from one to another, he can 
lOlbid., p. 141. 
111bid., p. 143. 
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be said to have a divided personality. A man may be said to 
be divided also, but in a somewhat lesser sense, when one group 
o! goals occupies the center of his interest and is the main 
principle of his activities while another group of goals, that 
cannot be realized at the same time as the first group, occu-
pies the periphery·of his consciousness as mere pious wishes.12 
A less complete way in which the self may be divided 
is the simultaneous coexistence of two or more different 
groups of aims, of which one practically holds the right 
of way and instigates activity, whilst the others are 
only pious wishes, and never practically come to any-
thing. Saint Augustine's aspirations to a purer life 
• • • were for a while an example. Another would be 
the President in his full pride of office, wondering 
whether it were not all vanity, and whether the life 
of a woodchopper were not the wholesomer destiny. Such 
fleeting aspirations are mere velleitates, whimsies. 
They exist on the remoter outskirts of the mind, and 
the real self of the man, the centre of his ene~gies, 
is occupied with an entirely different system.L? 
James pointed out that as life goes on, there may be a 
more or less constant change of our interests and "a consequent 
change of place in our systems of ideas, from more central to 
more peripheral, and from more peripheral to more central 
parts of consciousness. 11 14 James explains such changes as 
follows: 
What brings such changes about is the way in which 
emotional excitement alters. Things hot and vital to 
us today are cold to-morrow. It is as if seen from the 
12James apparently presumed that words like 'goal' and 
'end' were so well understood that they would present no prob-
lems for his readers. At any rate, he did not attempt to 
explicate them philosophically in his writings; rather he left 
this task for his fellow pragmatist, John Dewey. 
13James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 160-61. 
14Ibid., p. 161. 
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hot parts of the field [of consciousness] that the 
other parts appear to us, and from these hot parts 
personal desire and volition make their sallies. They 
are in short the centres of our dynamic energy, whereas 
the cold parts leave us indifferent and passive in pro-
portion to their coldness.15 
James said that when there is great fluctuation .in a man's 
emotional interest, the man is divided more or less seriously. 
Now there may be great oscillation in the emotional 
interest, and the hot places [in the field of one's 
consciousness] may shift before one almost as rapidly 
as the sparks that run through burnt-up paper. Then we 
have the wavering and divided self •••• 16 
Such a divided self will become unified, however, if the "focus 
of excitement and heat 1117 comes to lie permanently within a 
certain system of ideas. The unified self is one whose interest 
is more or less permanently centered on one group of related 
goals and the ideas associated with them and who is not peri-
pherally distracted by ideas opposed to them. James called the 
group of aims and ideas to which a man devotes himself and 
from which he works "the habitual centre of his personal ener-
,g;r.1118 The life of the unified self is more or less perma-
nently dominated by this one system of goals; and all of his 
activities, if not directly conducive to their attainment, are 
at least not detrimental to it. All events are judged in the 
light of their relation to this vital center of interest. All 
decisions are made, all problems solved, with these ends in 
l5Ibid. 
16~., p. 162. 
l7Ibid. 
18Ibid. 
.i 
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view; if these aims are not always in the foreground of a 
xnan's thinking, they are at least exerting their influence in 
the background insofar as they form the habitual focal point 
of bis energies. 
The system of aims and ideas which comes to occupy the 
center of a man's interest and to govern his active life may 
be religious, non-religious or even irreligious. A man's life 
can be ruled by religious ideals, by ambition, by revenge, by 
cupidity, by patriotism, by love for mankind, or by any num-
ber of other interests, good or bad. In James's words: 
• • • to find religion is only one out of many ways of 
reaching unity; and the process of remedying inner in-
completeness and reducing inner discord is a general 
psychological process, which may take place with any 
sort of mental material, and need not necessarily as-
sume the religious form •••• For example, the new 
birth may be away from religion into incredulity; or it 
may be from moral scrupulosity into freedom and license; 
or it may be produced QY the irruption into the indi-
vidual's life pf some new stimulus or passion, such as 
love, ambition, cupidity, revenge, or patriotic devotion. 
In all these instances we have precisely the same psy-
chological form of event,--a firmness, stability, and 
equilibrium succeeding a period of storm and stress 
and inconsistency.19 
Whatever the principle of unification, the unification, 
once achieved, brings with it a characteristic type of relief 
insofar as the internal strife is ended, even though other 
evils yet remain to be faced. James felt, however, that the 
kind of unification which brings with it the greatest peace and 
produces the most lasting and most salutary effects is that of 
religious conversion as a result of which religious ideas, 
19Ibid., pp. 146-47. 
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previously peripheral in a man's consciousness, take a central 
place and "religious aims form the habitual centre of his 
energy. 1120 Unification under the banner of self-gratification 
and immorality only results in disintegration again; for the 
desire ror pleasure always wars with the necessity for resig-
nation to those sufferings which are unavoidable in human life. 
And this disintegration which is inevitable in a life abandoned 
to self-indulgence renders a man's efforts to cope with the 
external world haphazard and ineffectual. Thus it is only when 
the self is unified (whether for religious or merely moral 
reasons). in the service of that which is good--good not merely 
for oneself but also for others--that self-unification can be 
permanent and can enable one to engage in the battle against 
pain and suffering with any hope of success. 
Eliminating s~icide, then, as a negative response and 
immorality as a response which is both unproductive and harm-
ful, we are left with morality and religion as the only two· 
ways of reacting to the universe which can offer us any hope 
of a fruitful and relatively happy existence. Although moral-
ity and religio~, as ways of responding to the world, are not 
totally unlike, their differences are striking. They have this 
in common, of course, that the moral man and the religious man 
are less co~cerned with their own private interests than they 
are with the good of others and the well-being of the world as 
a whole. In speaking of morality, James wrote, "A life is 
20Ibid., p. 162. 
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manly, stoical, moral, or philosophical, we say, in propor-
tion as it is less swayed by paltry personal considerations 
and more by objective ends that call for energy, even though 
that energy bring personal loss and pain. 1121 The religious 
man, too, manifests a deep concern for the welfare of others. 
As James pointed out, a man reaches the height of religious 
perfection in saintliness, one of the features of which is a 
"shifting of the emotional centre towards loving and harmoni-
ous affections, towards 'yes, yes,' and away from 'no,' where 
22 the claims of the non-ego are concerned." 
In comparing and contrasting the moral and the religious 
types of personality, James indicated that both the moral man 
and the religious man accept the world with its evils as well 
as their responsibilities to it. They both shoulder their bur-
dens and undertake to perform their duties, however difficult, 
without complaining. And yet the s~irit with which the one 
responds to the world is vastly different from the spirit of 
the other. 
Morality pure and simple accepts the law of the whole 
which it finds reigning, so far as to acknowledge and 
obey it, but it may obey it with the heaviest and 
coldest heart, and never cease to feel it as a yoke. 
But for religion, in its strong and fully developed 
manifestations, the servic·e of the highest never is 
felt as a yoke. Dull submission is left far behind, 
and a mood of welcome, which may fill any place on 
the scale between cheerful serenity and enthusiastic 
gladness, has taken its place.23 
21~., p. 52. 
22~., p. 217. 
23~., p. 49. 
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The moral man enlists in the service of the good despite 
the dangers to himself; he does not shrink from his task. 
There is in the moralistic personality a kind of stoical resig-
nation in the face of suffering and a courageous determination 
to continue the fight against evil in spite of personal loss 
and pain. James had great respect for the moral man and 
described the moral response to the universe in glowing terms: 
And for morality life is a war, and the service of the 
highest is a sort of cosmic patriotism which also 
calls for volunteers. Even a sick man, unable to be 
militant outwardly, can carry on the moral warfare. 
He can willfully turn his attention away from his own 
future, whether in this world or tne next. He can 
train himself to indifference to his present draw-
backs and immerse himself in whatever objective inter-
ests still remain accessible. He can follow public 
news, and sympathize with other people's affairs. · 
He can cultivate cheerful manners, and be silent about 
his miseries. He can contemplate whatever ideal as-
pects of existence his philosophy is able to present 
to him, and practice whatever duties, such as patience, 
resignation, trust, his ethical system requires. Such 
a man lives on his loftiest, largest plane. He is a 
high-hearted freeman and no pining slave.24 
The religious man, like the moral man, also engages in 
the struggle against evil and the service of the good without 
regard for personal risks, but his attitude toward the surfer-
ings that befall him is ·not one of stoical resignation. Rather 
the attitude of the deeply religious man toward suffering .is 
one of enthusiastic espousal; he is even known to.rejoice in 
suffering as a form of sacrifice to God. 
The differences in the attitudes of the moral man and the 
religious man toward life can no douot be traced to the different 
24Ib.d 
--2:_·' p. 52. 
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.,,ays in which the two men experience the world and themselves. 
Both the moral man and the religious man experience the world 
as a place of joy and sorrow, pleasure and pain, good and evil. 
As James wrote to Tom Ward, "• •• the fact remains empirically 
certain ••• --that men suffer and enjoy. 1125 And the experi-
ences of both the moral man and the religious man testify to 
the fact that the suffering and enjoyment of individuals depend 
not only upon those individuals' own actions but upon the ac-
tions of other men as well. Both the moral man and the reli-
gious man are empirically aware that their actions can affect 
the lives of other men for better or worse. And both assume 
the responsibility of affecting them for the better. The 
moral man and the religious man alike, aware that they can 
lessen the pain of others and increase their joy by effective 
; I 
:·,I 
' 
action, undertake the task of fighting evil and promoting good. . I 
But the experienced world in which the religious man performs 
his task has a spiritual dimension of which the moral man is 
not aware. The religious man senses that his world is but a 
part of a wider, more spiritual world. He has a conviction, 
"not merely intellectual, but as it were sensible, 1126 of the 
existence of a higher, more spiritual power with whom he is in 
touch. And it is also his experience that he receives help 
from this higher power as a result of prayer and sacrifice. 
Thus, in somewhat mythical fashion, he sees the fight with 
25Letters of William James, I, 130. 
26James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 216. 
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evil, not as his own private battle, but as a joint venture in 
which he and God cooperate in the achievement of ideals which 
somehow have everlasting value. For the religious man, the 
good life is not merely a matter of fighting evil and promoting 
good. It is that, of course, as it is for the moralist. But 
for the religious man, it is at the same time the service of 
"the deepest power in the universe 1127--a power who holds dear 
the things which man holds dear, "the things themselves being 
all good and righteous things 1128--a power who is friendly to 
man and upon whose help and protection he can rely. The reli-
gious man feels that his true destiny lies in trustful self-
surrender to God's will and in loving cooperation with the 
Divine purposes. "To co-operate with his [God's] creation by 
the best and rightest response seems all he wants of us. In 
such co-opera ti on with his .purposes, • • • must lie the real 
meaning of our destiny. 1129 
The vision of the moral man, on the other hand, is con~ 
fined to this world; he does not experience himself or· his 
world as having any relation to a higher unseen order. He is 
not aware of his fight against evil as having significance in 
any world beyond this world of his day to day experience. Nor 
is he aware of the existence of any higher spiritual power who 
is friendly to him and from whom he receives help in performing 
27James, "Reflex Action and Theism," Essays on Faith and 
Morals, p. 122. 
28Ibid. 
29Ibid., p. 141. 
~s task. He is not conscious or receiving any or the sup::~ 
' natural assistance upon which the religious man c·ounts. From 
the point of view of his own conscious experience, then, the 
moral man fights his battle alone (except for whatever help 
other men may provide). Because of this fact, the moral man's 
response to the world with its strange mixture of good and 
evil requires great volitional effort. And as long as he can 
maintain this effort, the moralist will indeed be a match for 
the universe. However, as James pointed out, there are times 
in the life of almost everyone when this effort cannot be sus-
tained. Strenuous moral effort becomes increasingly more 
difficult in times of illness, in old age, and in the face ~f 
approaching death. There are occasions when it becomes·vir-
tually impossible to maintain the moral attitude. At such 
times the insufficiency of morality becomes apparent •. In 
James ' s words : 
The moralist must hold his breath and keep his muscles 
tense; and so long as this athletic attitude is possi-
ble all goes well--morality suffices. But the athletic 
attitude tends ever to break down, and it inevitably 
does break down even in the most stalwart when the 
organism begins to decay, or when morbid fears invade 
the mind. To suggest personal will and effort to one 
all sicklied o'er with the sense of irremediable impo-
tence is to suggest the most impossible of things. 
What he craves is to be consoled in his very power-
lessness, to feel that the spirit of the universe recog-
nizes and secures him, all decaying and failing as he 
is. Well, we are all such helpless failures in the 
last resort. The sanest and best of us are of one clay 
with lunatics and prison inmates, and death finally 
runs the robustest of us down. And whenever we feel 
this, such a sense of the vanity and provisionality of 
our voluntary career comes over us that all our moral-
ity appears but as a plaster hiding a sore it can never 
,j' 
cure, and all our well-doing as the hollowest substi-
tute for that well-being that our lives ought to be 
grounded in, but, alas! are not.30 
l?? 
That sense of well-being which James says "our lives ought 
to be grounded in" can be had only in religion; :for it is only 
the loving and sacrificial spirit o:f religion that can make a 
man :find joy in suffering and peace and security in the face 
of the :failure, tragedy, and death which are so much a part o:f 
the human situation. 
And here religion comes to our rescue and takes our 
:fate into her hands. There is a state o:f mind, known 
to religious men, but to no others, in which the will 
to assert ourselves and hold our own has been dis-
placed by a willingness to close our mouths and be as 
nothing in the floods and waterspouts of God. In this 
state of mind, what we most dreaded has become the 
habi ta ti on of our safety, and the hour of our mora·1 
death has turned into our spiritual birthday. The time 
for tension in our soul is over, and that of happy 
relaxation, of calm deep breathing, of an eternal pre-
sent, with no discordant future to be anxious about, 
has arrived. Fear is not held in abeyance as it is 
by mere morality, it is positively expunged and washed 
away.31 
Thus morality alone can enable a man to get through life 
only up to a point. It can enable him to do what is necessary 
in a manly dignified and even admirable way; it even adds zest 
to li:fe--the zest that·accompanies victory when one conquers 
an evil, the satisfaction that comes with the achievement of 
some desired good. Morality can indeed make life worth living 
on a day to day basis. But all of man's best efforts terminate 
in death, and whatever joys and satisfactions he may have in 
this life are always marred by the threat of impending loss. 
30James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 53. 
31rbid. 
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I! one's attitude toward life is merely moralistic, if one 
does not see himself and his world as part of a larger more 
spiritual order, if one sees reality entirely from a material-
istic point of view, i.e., as inevitably subject to dissolu-
tion, then he must expect that whatever good he accomplishes, 
whatever ideal values he may realize, will not survive this 
life any more than he will. Thus will his victories always be 
tinged with bitterness. 
It was James's opinion that in order for life to be worth 
living in the long run--not merely on a day to day basis--a man 
needs more than simple morality, i.e., more than morality 
unrelated to religion. A man needs to feel that his ideals 
and values will be cared for long after he has ceased to be 
able to fight for them; he needs an everlasting moral order in 
which his values will be forever preserved. "This need of an 
eternal moral order," James wrote, "is one of the deepest 
needs of our breast. 11 32 And, James said, the "notion of God, 
• • • however inferior it may be in clearness to those·mathe-
matical notions so current in mechanical philosophy, has at 
least this practical superiority over them, that it guarantees 
an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved."33 In 
order for man to enjoy the fullest measure of that well-being 
which James believed man ought to have, man needs to believe 
32James, Pragmatism and Four Essays from The Meaning of 
Truth, p. 77. 
33Ibid. 
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that there is a God who cares for, and will continue to care 
for, him and the things he loves--a God who will guarantee that 
goodness and righteousness and beauty will survive permanently 
and will not decay along with the material universe. "A world 
with a God in it to say the last word, may indeed burn up or 
freeze, but we then think of him as still mindful of the old 
ideals and sure to bring them elsewhere to fruition; so that, 
where he is, tragedy is only provisional and partial, and ship-
wreck and dissolution not the absolutely final things. 1134 
It is the conviction that the world is in the hands of 
God and that, because of Him, all will be well in the long 
run, no matter how difficult things may seem here and now, 
that makes religious men feel that life is worth living in an 
unqualified sense. The religious man does not necessarily 
suffer any fewer misfortune~ than the non-religious man. His 
troubles, sorrows, and afflictions may be as numerous and, in 
some cases, even more numerous than those of the non-religious 
man. But the conviction that the whole world is in friendly 
divine hands35 makes him better able to support the trials and 
tribulations of life than the man without religious faith and 
enables him to function productively and happily in spite of 
life's hardships. The religious man's belief that the whole 
34Ibid. 
35"Most religious men believe (or ,·know,' if they be mys-
tical) that not only they themselves, but the whole universe 
of beings to whom God is present, are secure in his parental 
hands. There is a sense, a dimension, they are sure, in which 
we are all saved, in spite of the gates of hell and all adverse 
terrestrial appearances." (James, The Varieties of Religious 
~perience, p. 390.) 
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world, himself included, is in the care of a superior benevo-
lent power elicits from him "a willing self-surrender to its 
control."36 And it is this surrender, which is truly a self-
unification in the sense that all personal desires and con-
cerns are subordinated to, indeed abandoned to, the will of 
God, that especially distinguishes the religious man from the 
merely moral man. "This abandonment of self-responsibility 
seems to be the fundamental act in specifically religious, as 
distinguished from moral practice."37 
In this self-surrender the religious man finds happiness 
and joy even in the face of outward misfortune; indeed he 
finds a kind of happiness and joy which no merely moral effort 
seems able to produce. Religion "adds to life an enchantment 
which is not rationally or logically deducible from anything 
else. 11 38 It is true "that the moral person shoulders his re-
sponsibilities and per±·orms his duties manfully and without 
complaint; it is true that he endures pain and suffering with 
courage and .resignation. But the religious man, the saintly 
man in particular, meets his responsibilities with happy enthu-
siasm and embraces suffering with joy. 
If religion is to mean anything definite for us, it 
seems to me that we ought to take it as meaning this 
added dimension of emotion, this enthusiastic temper 
of espousal, in regions where morality strictly so 
called can at best but bow its head and acquiesce •• 
36Ibid., p. 217. 
37Ibid., p. 229. 
38Ibid., pp. 53-54. 
• • 
This sort of happiness in the absolute and ever-
lasting is what we find nowhere but in religion.39 
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James saw the religious life not only as happier than the 
moral life; he saw religion also as necessary for the general 
well-being of the individual and indispensable for the welfare 
of the world as a whole. In order to understand James's 
position in this regard, it behooves us to consider in some-
what greater detail what, in his view, the religious response 
to the world actually entails. 
James defined religion in The Varieties of Religious Exper-. 
ience as "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men 
in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand 
in relation to whatever they may consider the divine. 1140 He 
pointed out, however, that there are cults which are considered 
religious but which do not seem to worship a concrete personal 
Deity--cults similar to the·Ema:'Sonian transcendentalism of his 
own day, for example. "Not a deity in concreto, not a super-
human person, but the immanent divinity in things, the essen-
tially spiritual structure of the universe, is the object of 
the transcendentalist cult. 1141 Because of this fact, James, 
in defining religion, was careful to interpret the term 'the 
divine' somewhat broadly. For the purposes of his description 
of religious phenomena, he defined the divine as whatever a man 
considered to be the most primal and most enveloping r~ality, 
39Ibid., p. 54. 
40ibid., p. 42. 
41Ib"d 
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but "only such a primal reality as the individual feels impelled 
to respond to solemnly and gravely, and neither by a curse nor 
42 
a jest." 
James recognized the difficulty involved in trying to draw 
sharp lines of distinction in the area of religious phenomena. 
As he pointed out, 
solemnity, and gravity, and all such emotional attri-
butes, admit of various shades; and, do what we will 
with our defining, the truth must at last be confronted 
that we are dealing with a field of experience where 
there is not a single conception that can be sharply 
drawn •••• Things are more or less divine, states of 
mind are more or less religious ••• ·.43 
Realizing that where the religious state of mind is only weakly 
manifested, there may be some question about its being reli-
gious at all, James chose to concern himself in The Varieties 
of Religious Experience only with those phenomena which are 
unquestionably religious. Accordingly, the examples which he 
gave us of religious individuals are largely persons in whom 
the religious characteristics are marked and often exaggerated. 
"The only cases likely to be profitable enough to repay our 
attention," he wrote, "will therefore be cases where the reli-
gious spirit is unmistakable and extreme. 1144 
As James's definition of religion implies, religion in-
volves a vision of reality and a way of life consonant with 
that vision. James said that the religious man, whatever the 
42Ibid., p. 47. 
43Ibid. 
-
44Ibid., p. 48. 
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t specifics of his individual creed may be, sees the visible 
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world as "part of a more spiritual universe from which it draws 
its chief significance • ••• "45 The meaning of the term 
•spiritual' in this passage needs some clarification. Although 
James used the term 'spirit' differently in different texts, 
the word seems to have a fundamental meaning to which his 
various uses can be related in one way or another. Basically 
James used the term to distinguish the mental aspects of reality 
from the non-mental or material aspects of it. He used the 
term 'spiritual' rather broadly, for example, to refer to the 
mental aspect of experience, i.e., to that aspect of expe-
rience which can be called mind or consciousness--not, however, 
to mind or consciousness considered merely as knowing but 
to mind considered also as willing. Thus the spiritual aspects 
of reality.are the mental and moral aspects of experience. 
When James wrote that the religious .man sees the visible world 
as part of a more spiritual universe, he meant that for the 
religious man, the actual universe is one in which mind or 
consciousness exerts much more influence and control over things 
than it appears to exert in the immediately visible world. For 
the religious man, the world is ruled, not by blind physio-
chemical forces but by mind and will, or specifically by 
mental and moral powers superior to man's. (Although cults 
similar to the transcendentalism mentioned above46 do not 
4-5Ibid., p. 47. 
46see above, p. 181. 
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worship any superhuman consciousness, for the most part, James 
confined his discussion in The Varieties of Religious E?Cperience 
to the phenomena of more traditional religion.) The world of 
the typically religious man is thus a spiritual world--a 
world in which some kind of superhuman consciousness; friendly 
to man, is in control of things and has the last word. The 
religious man sees union with this higher spiritual power as 
man's true end and communion with it as bringing him salvation 
and happiness. 
One might wonder what it is that leads a man to see real-
ity in this way. James believed that in most cases it is a 
man's feelings of weakness, wrongness, and need that bring him 
to this view of life. In James's opinion, religious belief is 
grounded in feelings of this kind, particularly in a sense of 
uneasiness·, which, "reduced to its simplest terms, is a sense 
that there is something wrong about us as we natura1)Jr stand. 1147 
This uneasiness may be only a vague sense of disquietude--a 
kind of nameless fear. It may be a feeling of helplessness 
in the face of suffering and pain; or it may be a sense of the 
hollowness and "vanity.of mortal things. 1148 In more mentally 
developed persons, James said, the feeling of uneasiness is the 
feeling that there is something morally wrong about them--some-
thing morally wrong from which.they need to be. saved. "In 
those more developed minds which alone we are studying, the 
47James, The Varieties of Religious .Experience, p. 383. 
48Ibid., p. 136. 
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wrongness takes a moral character, and the salvation takes a 
. 1 t' 1149 myst1ca 1nge. 
By moral wrongness, James apparently meant a wrongness 
about our active lives. This wrongness may or may not involve 
a conscious failure to fulfill moral obligations. The feeling 
that there is something morally wrong about one may or may not 
be a sense of sin. For example, with no feeling of guilt, one 
may simply feel an inability actively to cope with the problems 
of life--an inability to make decisions perhaps or an inabil-
ity to carry out decisions once made. With no sense of sin, 
he may experience a sense of failure--perhaps only the failure 
to achieve the goals which he has set up for himself. In some 
cases, however, the feeling of wrongness may be the feeling 
that there is something wrong about the human situation in gen-
eral. It may be a.sense of futility 1n relation to all human 
goals and pursuits. The inevitability of death, for instance, 
may make all human life and activity devoid of meaning. James 
gave us a fine example of this latter kind of uneasiness in 
the experience of Tolstoy. "I felt," wrote Tolstoy, "that 
something had broken within me on which my life had always 
rested, that I had nothing left to hold on to, and that morally 
my life had stopped."50 Again James quoted Tolstoy: 
ttWhat-will be the outcome of what I do to-day? Of what 
I shall do to-morrow? What will be the outcome of all 
49Ibid., p. 383. 
50James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 130, 
quoting Tolstoy, l'1y Confession. 
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my life? Why should I live? Why should I do anything? 
Is there in life any purpose which the inevitable death 
which awaits me does not undo and destroy? 11 51 
"Tolstoy's preoccupations were largely objective," James said, 
"for the purpose and meaning of life in general was what so 
d h . 1152 trouble im. • • • 
In many another individual cited by James., however, the 
experienced moral wrongness was of a much more personal char-
acter and did involve an acute feeling of guilt or sense of sin. 
such was the experience of John Bunyan as recorded in his 
autobiography, Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners, and 
quoted by James as follows: 
"But my original and inward pollution, that was 
my plague and my affliction. By reason of that, I was 
more loathsome in my own eyes than was a toad; and I 
thought I was so in God's eyes too. Sin and corrup-
tion, I said, would as naturally bubble out of my heart 
as water would bubble out of a fountain. 11 53 
James did not .elaborate in any of his writings upon the 
nature of the moral wrongness known as sin. In a very general 
way, of course, moral wrongness of this type can be described 
as an unwholesome condition of one's personal self. However, 
it is clear that, for James, this unhealthy condition of the 
self, more often·than not, implies unacceptable relations with 
other persons. The predominantly social aspect of ethics in 
James's philosophy may not be obvious in The Varieties of Reli-
gious Experience, although it is frequently suggested there; 
51Ibid., p. 131. 
52 ibid.' p. 133. 
531bid _ .. , p. 134. 
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but it is clearly indicated in James's essay, "The Moral Phil-
. . 
osopher and the Moral Life." The essay stresses the fact that 
ethical obligations are rooted in the demands and claims made 
by conscious beings upon one another. Morality, for James, 
is primarily a social affair; and while it may surely involve 
satisfying a man's own personal needs and desires, it requires 
that in satisfying them, he consider ~he desires and claims 
of other persons (one or whom may well be divine) and that he 
always aim at a state of affairs in which the greatest number 
of goods (i.e., satisfied demands) are realized at the least 
cost.54 From James's point of view, it is a man's failure, 
real or fancied, to meet this requirement that usually gives 
rise to his uneasy feeling that there is something morally 
wrong with him in the sense that there is about him a sinful-
ness from·which he needs to. be delivered. 
Whatever the kind of wrongness with which men feel them-
selves afflicted, however, it is as the means of deliverance 
from this wrongness, as the remedy for their uneasines$, that 
religion most frequently offers itself to them. Religion prom-
ises men salvation--salvation for themselves and for the world 
--if, by prayer and self-surrender, they make the proper con-
nection with higher, more spiritual powers operative in the 
universe. Thus, James said, all religion (with a few excep-
tions) involves an 'uneasiness' and 'a solution'--an uneasiness 
in the sense of a consciousness of evil, a consciousness of 
54see above, p. 56. 
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being in need--a solution in the sense that man is aware of 
deliverance, salvation, or redemption coming as a result of 
communion with powers higher than himself. "The solution," 
t n· th t d f th James wro e, is a sense a we are save rom e wrongness 
by making proper connection with the higher powers."55 
Before we proceed further, however, it must be pointed out 
that there are some religious people for whom religion is not 
at all a matter of redemption from a state of being wrong. 
These are the healthy-minded people with an habitually optimis-
tic view of life as opposed to those morbid-minded people, 
described above, who have such an acute sense of evil in their 
own lives and in the world that only a supernatural power can 
cure them.56 Although the more common religious experience is 
that of morbid-minded persons, our consideration of religious 
belief would be incomplete if we did not include a description 
of the religion of healthy-mindedness. Accordingly, before 
examining the experience of salvation and deliverance which 
characterizes the religious life of morbid-minded individuals, 
we will digress and briefly consider the healthy-minded person-
ality and some of the characteristics of healthy-minded reli-
gion. 
Healthy-minded people are optimistic people. Their 
55James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 383. 
56The difference between healthy-minded and morbid-minded 
temperaments should not be understood as the difference between 
non-pathological and pathological mentalities. For, as a mat-
ter of fact, both types of temperament can be either non-patho-
logical or pathological. 
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attention is habitually focused upon what is good in this world; 
and if they are not altogether unaware of evil, they either 
ignore it, deny its reality, or refuse to give it any signifi-
cance in their reflections upon life. James distinguished 
between two types of healthy-mindedness--an involuntary type 
and a voluntary type. "If, then, we give the name of healthy-. 
mindedness to the tendency which looks on all things and sees 
that they are good, we find that we must distinguish between 
a more involuntary and a more voluntary or systematic way of 
being healthy-minded."57 Involuntary healthy-mindedness is a 
"way of feeling happy about things immediately. 11 58 People of 
this temperament are spontaneously happy; they either do not 
see the evil in the world at all or the goodi appears so obvious-
ly and overwhelmingly abundant that evil seems quite insigni-
ficant to them. Their optimistic attitude is not one that is 
consciously cultivated but is the result of a natural tempera-
mental bias. A person of this type has "a itemperament organic-
ally weighted on the side of cheer and fataJlly forbidden to 
linger, as those of opposite temperament linger, over the darker 
aspects of the universe."59 Unlike the morbid-minded person 
who is more or less habitually pessimistic and who is "congeni-
tally fated to suffer1160 from the consciousness of evil, the 
57James; The Varieties of Religious :Experience, p. 83. 
58Ibid. 
59 Ibid.' p. 79. 
60
rbid., p. 116. 
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spontaneously healthy-minded person is endowed with a "tempera-
ment which has a constitutional incapacity for prolonged suffer-
ing, and in which the tendency to see things optimistically is 
like a water of crystallization in which the individual's char-
. t 1161 
acter is se • 
Systematic healthy-mindedness, on the other hand, is a 
deliberately adopted mental attitude. James described systema-
tic healthy-mindedness as "an abstract way of conceiving things 
as good. 1162 And just as in every abstract way of conceiving 
something, one aspect of the thing is considered essential to 
it, at least at that time, while other aspects are ignored, so 
too systematic "healthy-mindedness, conceiving good as the 
essential and universal aspect of being, deliberately excludes 
evil .from its field o.f vision. 1163 James pointed out that while 
a systematically healthy-minded attitude is an unrealistic way 
o.f looking at li.fe, experience points to its advantages. It 
is an empirical .fact, for example, that evils often lose much 
of their painfulness for us if we deliberately face up to them 
and try to bear them cheerfully. 
Refuse to admit their badness; despise their power; 
ignore their presence; turn your attention the other 
way; and so far as you yourself are concerned at any 
rate, though the facts may still exist, their evil 
character exists no longer. Since you make them evil 
or good by your own thoughts about them, it is the rul-
ing of your thoughts which proves to be your principal 
concern.64 
61rbid., p. i12. 
62Ibid., p. 83. 
63rbid. 
64Ibid., p. 84. 
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Moreover, experience shows that an optimistic view of things 
iS not only salutary for us as individuals but makes life ea-
sier for those around us and thus commends itself to us on 
altruistic grounds. 
The attitude of unhappiness is not only painful, it is 
mean and ugly. What can be more base and unworthy than 
the pining, puling, mumping mood, no matter by what 
outward ills it may have been engendered? What is 
more injurious to others? What less helpful as a way 
out of the difficulty. It but fastens and perpetuates 
the trouble which occasioned it, and increases the 
total evil of the situation. At all costs, then, we 
ought to reduce the sway of that mood; we ought to 
scout it in ourselves and others, and never show it 
tolerance.65 
Although healthy-minded people are not necessarily reli-
gious, among those who are, we can distinguish two types of 
religious attitudes corresponding to the two types of healthy-
mindedness described above. Let us take as our first example 
the religion of those spontaneously happy people who are pos-
sessed of an involuntarily healthy-minded temperament. With 
them, happiness is congenital; they do not seem to need salva-
tion or deliverance. At least they do not feel any such need. 
From the beginning of their conscious lives, they are pos-
sessed of an acute sense of the goodness of God and of all 
that God has made and they rejoice in the divine goodness. 
"It is to be hoped," James wrote, "that we all have some friend, 
perhaps more often feminine than masculine, and young than old, 
whose soul is of this sky-blue tint, whose affinities are 
rather with flowers and birds and all enchanting innocencies 
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than with dark human passions, who can think no ill of man or 
God, and in whom religious gladness, being in possession from 
the outset, needs no deliverance from any antecedent burden."66 
such is the religious outlook of persons endowed with a spon-
taneously healthy-minded temperament. 
There is another religious attitude, however, which, while 
optimistic, is not naturally and spontaneously so. Rather its 
optimism is a deliberately adopted posture; it involves the 
systematic cultivation of healthy-mindedness. Such consciously 
adopted optimism can be found in varying degrees among the 
members of many different religious sects. There are some 
religious movements, however, in which the deliberate cultiva-
tion of healthy-mindedness plays a relatively significant role. 
In fact, there are some religious cults in which it is a central 
theme. 
Although James did not consider healthy-mindedness to be 
an attitude typical of traditional Christianity, he did feel 
that it was making significant inroads into the Christian 
religion during-his time. 
The advance of liberalism, so-called, in Christian-
ity, during the past fifty years, may fairly be called 
a victory of healthy-mindedness within the church over 
the morbidness with which the old hell-fire theology 
was more harmoniously related. We have now whole congre-
gations whose preachers, far from magnifying our con-
sciousness of sin, seem devoted rather to making little 
of it. They ignore, or even deny, eternal punishment, 
and insist on the dignity rather than on the depravity 
of man. They look at the continual preoccupation of 
the old-fashioned Christian with the salvation of his 
66Ibid., p. 77. 
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soul as something sickly and reprehensible rather than 
admirable; and a sanguine and 'muscular' attitude, which 
to our forefathers would have seemed purely heathen, 
has oecome in their eyes an ideal element of Christian 
character.67 
The significance of systematic healthy-mindedness as a reli-
gious attitude, however, can best be seen in a religious move-
ment which was just getting under way in James's day, a reli-
gious movement which James variously designated as the 'Mind-
cure Movement' or the 'New Thought.' Although the several 
sects of the movement may differ from one another in various 
ways, they all agree in their optimism. James described the 
'.New Thought' as "a delioerately optimistic scheme of life, 
with both a speculative and a practical side. 1168 On the specu-
lative side, the individual creeds of the disciples of the 'New 
Thought' differ in particular details, but the common thread 
running thl:-ough them all is the doctrine that the sub-conscious 
part of man's higher nature is really one with God and that 
since all is well with God, all is well with man. "The spiri-
tual in man appears in the mind-cure philosophy as partly con-
scious, but chiefly subconscious; and.through the subconscious 
part of it we are already one with the Divine without any 
miracle of grace, or abrupt creation 01· a new inner man. 1169 
On the practical side, the 'Mind-Cure Movement• bids its fol-
lowers to think and to act, in short to live, in the light of 
their belief in the oneness of their life with the life of God. 
67Ibid.' p. 85. 
68Ibid., p. 87. 
69ill£.' p. 92. 
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rt bids them to ignore evil and generally to turn their atten-
tion away from weakness, disease, pain, and suffering and to 
think thoughts of strength, health, success and well-being. 
It bids them keep in.mind that just as nothing can be wrong 
with God, nothing can be wrong with them since their lives 
are one with God's life. As one 'Mind-Cure' disciple wrote 
to William James, "• •• how can a conscious part of Deity 
be sick?--since 'Greater is he that is with us than all that 
can strive against us.'"70 
"The leaders in this faith," James wrote, "have had an 
intuitive belief in the all-saving power of healthy-minded 
attitudes as such, in the conquering efficacy of courage, hope, 
and trust, and a correlative contempt for doubt, fear, worry, 
and all nervously precautionary states of mind. 11 71 Accordingly, 
they try to foster in their disciples wholesome, optimistic 
mental attitudes and have developed a system of mental hygiene 
which "is wholly and exclusively compacted of optimism. 1172 
However the various 'Mind-Cure' sects may differ from one 
another, as indicated above, they generally agree in the doc-
trine that human life is one with the life of God and that 
since all is well with God, all must be well with man. Their 
common attitude toward evil is to ignore it, to act as though 
it were not there. James felt that of all the 'Mind-Cure' 
70ibid., p. 93. 
7libid., p. 88. 
72Ibid., p. 97. 
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religions, Christian Science is the most radical in its atti-
tude toward evil. "For it evil is simply a lie, and any one 
who mentions it is a liar. The optimistic ideal of duty for-
bids us to pay it the compliment even of explicit attention."?3 
Although a good many people were attracted to 'Mind-Cure' 
religion in James's day and still are, as the rosters of 
Christian Science and similar sects testify, the saving reli-
gion which offers itself to morbid-minded persons as the means 
of deliverance from their wrongness is much more prevalent. 
While James pointed out that 'Mind-Cure' must be considered 
a genuine religious power and devoted almost two complete lec-
tures to a discussion of it in The Varieties of Religious Ex-
perience, he apparently considered the experiences of morbid-
minded individuals as much more typical of religious persons 
than the experiences of the. healthy-minded. For, once he com-
pleted his discussion of healthy-minded religion, he proceeded 
to describe religious experience almost exclusively in terms 
of the experience of the morbid-minded man. 
James did not presume to judge the truth or falsity of 
'Mind-Cure' religion. In fact, he pointed out that for some 
people it has verified itself, at least to the extent that 
they have experienced improved health and increased happiness 
after espousing it. James did indicate, however, that 'Mind-
Cure' religion is less consonant with human experience than the 
'saving' religion which attracts the morbid-minded, because 
?3Ibid., p. 96. 
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•Mind-Cure' religion tends to disregard a major aspect of 
buman life--the experience of evil. After all, evil is, in 
some way, a part of every man's existence. As James pointed 
out, the healthiest and most prosperous life contains moments 
of disappointment, illness, and danger; "take the happiest man, 
the one most envied by the world, and in nine cases out of ten 
bis inmost consciousness is one of failure."?4 In bidding man 
to ignore evil, then, 'Mind-Cure' religion is advising him to 
ignore, or at least to treat as unimportant, an inescapable 
portion of human experience--a portion of ·human experience 
which the greater number of men cannot so easily overlook. 
To return to our discussion of the religion of salvation, 
the kind of religion with which most of us are more familiar, 
let us look more closely at the morbid-minded personality to 
whom it appeals. Morbid-minded people, whom James also called 
'sick souls,' are people who, rather than closing their eyes 
to evil or minimizing its importance as healthy-minded people 
do, recognize evil as a significant aspect of hum.an life and 
are, to a greater or less degree, disturbed by its presence. 
James spoke of two levels of morbid-mindedness--a shal-
lower level and a level more profound and formidable. On a 
> 
superficial plane, there are individuals who recognize evil 
as real but who do not see it as demanding any religious or 
supernatural remedy. They see evil as merely a maladjustment 
between man and things, between man and his environment. "Such 
?4 Ib'd 
____!_·' p. 119. 
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evil as this is curable, in principle at least, upon the natural 
plane, for merely by modifying either the self or· the things, 
or both at once, the two terms may be made to fit, and all go 
JllerI'Y as a marriage bell again."75 On a deeper level, however, 
one finds individuals "for whom evil is no mere rel a ti·on of the 
subject to particular outer things, but something more radical 
and general, a wrongness or vice in his essential nature, which 
no alteration of the environment, or any superficial rearrange-
J11ent of the inner self, can cure, and which requires a super-
natural remedy. 1176 Since it is to people at this deeper level 
of morbid-mindedness that religion with its offer of salvation 
is most appealing, we will, in the pages that follow, use the 
terms 'sick soul' and 'morbid-minded' to refer only to people 
who suffer from morbid-mindedness of this more profound type. 
It must be noted, however, that this more radically morbid 
outlook on life also admits of degrees; and, accordingly, James 
divided sick souls roughly into two groups. In the first group 
are individuals who experience both good and evil in life, both 
success and failure, joy and sorrow, satisfaction and remorse. 
However, their joy and _satisfaction in the happy and success-
ful moments of life are to a greater or less degree "spoiled 
and vitiated"?? by their awareness that all natural goods per-
ish, that their successes and triumphs are only momentary, 
?5Ibid., p. 117. 
76Ibid. 
??Ibid., p. 120. 
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and that death is inevitable. "Back of everything is the great 
spectre of universal death, the all-encompassing blackness •• 
,,78 
• • 
In the second group, we find people whom James described 
as pathologically melancholy. The morbid-mindedness of these 
individuals is deeper still than that of the first group of 
sick souls, for whom the lustre of natural goods_ is simply 
dulled by their transience. Pathologically melancholy people 
are the victims of "a pitch of unhappiness so great that the 
goods of nature may be entirely forgotten, and all sentiment 
of their existence vanish from the mental .field."79 James 
pointed out an interesting similarity between the devotee of 
healthy-mindedness and the pathologically melancholy person: 
"As the healthy-minded enthusiast succeeds in ignoring evil's 
very existence, so the subject of melancholy is forced in spite 
of himself to ignore that of all good whatever: for him it may 
no longer have the least reality. "~O 
Whatever the degree of his morbid-mindedness, the sick 
soul is, at the time of his disillusionment and unhappiness, 
a divided personality, a personality characterized by some 
kind of discordancy. James spoke of him as having "an incom-
pletely unified moral and intellectual constitution. 1181 James 
described the sick soul's personality as heterogeneous and 
pointed out that the heterogeneity is most evident in the 
7Sibid. 
79Ibid., p. 124. 
SOibid. 
81Ibid., p. 141. 
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individual whose morbid condition has reached the pathological 
ievei. 82 The sick soul's cure demands the integration of his 
personality. As we saw earlier, however, the unification of 
a man's personality can be achieved in a variety of ways, the 
most effective of which are morality and religion. And of the 
two, religion produces the most startling results. Morality, 
as we have seen, can enable a man to face life, its trials, 
and vicissitudes with stoical resignation; it even adds a kind 
of zest to life and enables a man to enjoy a moderate amount 
of happiness, at least for a time. But religious unification 
does much more than this. When it is complete, it enables man 
to accept life and all of its sufferings, pains, and uncer-
tainties with joy and enthusiasm. It adds a degree of zest and 
happiness to life which no other kind of unification can pro-
duce. As James put it, 
However it come, it [unification] brilnlgs a character-
istic sort of relief; and never such extreme relief as 
when it is cast into the religious mould •••• Easily, 
82No doubt James's knowledge of hetercgeneous personality 
can be traced in large measure to his work as a psychologist 
and in particular to his work in abnormal J1SYChology. However, 
there can be no doubt that James owed much of his knowledge on 
this subject to his own Calvinistically religious background. 
James was aware that the story of man's reJligious development 
is largely the story of his struggle to br.img his own natural 
impulses and tendencies in line with the ideals of one reli-
gious creed or another. The records of the early life of 
James's father indicate that Henry James, Sr., experienced such 
a painful inner struggle resulting from the conflict between 
his own natural love of life and the restri<ttions imposed upon 
him by his family's Calvinistic faith. Willliam James, himself, 
who experienced a good deal of mental confJLtct in his own life, 
was no stranger to inner discord of a relif;Lous nature. As we 
saw in Chapter I, for example, he possessed a strong natural 
desire to believe in God and yet was greatly disturbed by reli-
gious doubts in his youth. 
I,', 
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permanently, and successfully, it often transforms 
the most intolerable misgry into the profoundest and 
most enduring happiness. 3 
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1rhe process, be it sudden or gradual, by which the sick 
soul is cured through the religious unification of his person-
ality is called conversion. "'l'o be converted, to be regener-
ated, to receive grace, to experience religion, to gain an 
assurance, are so many phrases which denote the process, gradu-
al or sudden, by which a self hitherto divided, and consciously 
wrong inferior and unhappy, becomes unified and consciously 
right superior and happy, in consequence of its firmer hold 
upon religious realities. 1184 The group of ideas to which a 
man devotes himself and from which he works James called the 
habitual center of his personal energy. When a man is con-
verted, religious ideals, previously peripheral in his conscious-
ness, assume a central place; religious aims absorb his atten-
tion and become his habitual cente~ of energy. The divine be-
comes the focal point of his interest. 
The process of conversion may be either voluntary or in-
voluntary. Voluntary conversion is a gradual regenerative pro-
cess consisting in the deliberate building up, piece by piece, 
of a new set of moral and spi~itual habits. Involuntary con-
version, on the other hand, occurs suddenly; and the man con-
verted, because of the lack of conscious effort on his part, 
often has a sense of being influenced by powers, other than 
83James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 146. 
84Ibid., p. 15?. 
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himself, to which he surrenders. Because of this experience 
of being acted upon by something other than oneself, the sur-
render of self to higher powers is often spoken of as though 
it were the distinguishing characteristic of sudden and invol-
untary conversion as opposed to gradual and voluntary conver-
sion. Accordingly Prof. E. D. Starbuck in his Psychology of 
Religion spoke of the two modes of conversion as the volitional 
-
type and the type by self-surrender. Such a classification is 
misleading, however, because, as James pointed out, self-sur-
render is an indispensable factor in all conversion. Even in 
the most voluntary regenerative process, the personal will 
seems unable to bring about the complete and perfect unifica-
tion of the personality by itself. In James's words, 
Even in the most voluntarily built-up sort of regenera-
tion there are passages of partial self-surrender inter-
posed; and in the great majority of all cases, when the 
will has done its uttermost towards bringing one close 
to that complete unification aspired after, it seems 
that the very last step must be left to other forces 
and performed without the help of its activity. In 85 other words, self-surrender becomes then indispensable. 
No matter how experiences of religious conversion may dif-
fer, whether they be voluntary or involuntary, gradual or sud-
den, it seems accurate to say that, in every case, the person 
involved becqmes aware that while there is something wrong 
about him, his wrongness is no_t irremediable, that there is at 
least a germ of something better in him. The fact that a man 
can criticize himself and be unhappy about his wrongness, James 
said, is evidence that there is something higher and better in 
B5Ibid., p. l?O. 
The individual, so far as he suffers from his 
wrongness and criticises it, is to that extent con-
sciously beyond it, and in at least possible touch 
with something higher, if anything higher exist. 
Along with the wrong part there is thus a better part 
of him) even though it may be but a most helpless 
germ.Bo 
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In the process of conversion, the individual becomes aware 
that this higher and better 'part' of him, as James loosely 
put it, is "conterminous and continuous with a MORE of the 
same guality, 1187 i.e., with a personal consciousness, higher 
than, but not unlike, his own. This 'More' is operative in 
the universe outside of him, i.e., it is experienced as a power 
other than himself; and the man converted becomes aware that 
by keeping in working touch with it and by getting "on board 
of 1188 it, he can save himself when his own lower being goes 
to pieces. The individual is moved to trust this Power, to 
give himself up to it, to abandon himself to its care; and 
this self-surrender, an indispensable aspect of all conversion, 
brings with it a tranquillity and peace previously unknown. 
How the ''More' is conceived may vary from man to man; but 
generally, it is thought of as the highest, or deepest, power 
in the universe, as having a mental and moral personality 
similar to man's, as holding good and righteous things dear, 
as recognizing and caring about man, his needs, and his ideals. 
86Ibid., p. 383. 
87Ibid., p. 384. 
88Ibid. 
~etween the divine personality and the human personality 203 there 
I 
I 
is thought to be this similarity and relationship: no matter 
how they differ, they both have purposes for which they care 
(to some extent mutually) and "each can hear the other's 
call. 1189 
The more specific details of the nature of the deity are 
matters of individual creeds--creeds which are elaborated out 
of individual, communal, and even cultural experiences by men's 
intellects in line with their individual feelings and wants. 
But however the specific characteristics of the 'More' may be 
conceived, the realization in the conversion experience that 
one's destiny is linked up with such a Divine reality, ~hat 
"one's life as a whole is in the keeping of a power whom one 
can absolutely trust"90 is accompanied by a great sense of peace 
and inner security. "Fears and anxieties go, and blissful 
equanimity takes their place."9l This peace, which is born 
of the assurance that all is well with one and will be well in 
spite of any unfavorable external circumstances, is but one of 
the immediate effects of the conversion experience, however. 
In addition, there is o·ften the perception, by the subject, of 
truths hitherto unknown, although the newly acquired knowledge 
can seldom be clearly expressed in words. Frequently, too, the 
subject f'eels that the world itself has changed; the universe 
8~James, "Reflex Action and Theism, 11 .Essays on J::l'aith and 
Morals, p. 122. 
90James, The Varieties of Religious .Experience, pp. 225-26. 
91Ibid., p. 217. 
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takes on freshness and beauty that seemed not to be there be-
fore. But the effect which is most characteristic of the con-
version experience is the ecstasy of happiness which accompan-
ies it and the tranquillity which follows it. 
The happiness which comes with conversion is not a joy. 
that results from the elimination of all evils, nor is it a 
healthy-minded kind of happiness that ignores evil. It is a 
happiness in spite of evil--a joy in spiteof pain. The happi-
ness of the religious man is something much more complex than 
the simple contentment which one who has never suffered might 
experience; as a matter of fact, it includes suffering as one 
of its elements. To the converted man, natural evil is no 
longer a source of anguish and terror; rather it appears to 
be swallowed up in supernatural good. As the personal biogra-
phies of religious men revealed to William James, a person 
once possessed by such religious happiness no longer seeks to 
escape pain. Knowing all the while that in the hands of God 
he is safe and secure even in the most violent of storms, the 
religious man enthusiastically espouses personal hardships and 
misfortunes as forms of sacrifice. 
It is this complex sacrificial attitude, typical of all 
kinds of religious consciousness, which accounts for the fact 
that religion can perform an essential function in our lives 
Pointed out, no matter what our response to the universe may 
be, the constitution of the world is such that, whether we 
like it or not, we are to some degree helpless and dependent 
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various ways upon realities other than ourselves. The world 
is such that our very survival demands a certain amount of 
renunciation, great or small; and more than any other attitude 
toward life, the religious attitude can enable us to make these 
renunciations easily and even joyfully. 
For when all is said and done, we are in the end 
absolutely dependent on the universe; and into sacri-
fices and surrenders of some sort, deliberately looked 
at and accepted, we are drawn and pressed as into our 
only permanent positions of repose. Now in those states 
of mind which fall short of religion, the surrender is 
submitted to as an imposition of necessity and the sac-
rifice is undergone at the very best without complaint. 
In the religious life, on the contrary, surrender and 
sacrifice are positively espoused: even unnecessary 
givings-up are added in order that the happiness may 
increase. Religion thus makes easy and felicitous 
what in any case is necessary; and if it be the only 
agency that can accomplish this result, its vital 
importance as a human faculty stands vindicated beyond 
dispute. It becomes an essential organ of our life, 
performing a fU.nction which no othe~2portion of our nature can so successfully fulfill.~ 
Thus, of all the possible responses which man can make 
to the universe, the religious response not only promises the 
most happiness, but as James indicated, it makes "easy and 
felicitous" the adoption of those attitudes and the perfor-
mance of those actions which in every case are necessary for 
the individual's survival and the well-being of mankind as a 
whole. Indeed the feelings of peace and happiness caused by the 
conversion experience itself may fluctuate from time to time--
they may wax and wane alternately. But the one effect of conver-
sion which is fairly lasting and permanent and which best testifies 
WI 
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to 1ts genuineness is a changed attitude toward life--an atti-
tude which profoundly affects one's mode of living for the 
better. "the real witness of the spirit to the second birth 
18 to be found only in the disposition of the genuine child 
o! God, the permanently patient heart, the love of self eradi-
cated. "93 Conversion involves a radical change in character--
a radical change in one's way of living, in one's way of act-
1ng. As James pointed out, 
what is attained is often an altogether new level of 
spiritual vitality, a relatively heroic level, in which 
impossible things have become possible, and new ener-
gies and endurances are shown. The personality is 
changed, the man is born anew, ••• •sanctification' 
1S the techn1cal name Of this result. • • .Y4 
William James used the term 'saintliness' to describe the 
most striking qualities of character and action which the con-
version experience frequently causes to appear in its subjects. 
"1'he collective name for the ripe fruits of religion in a char-
acter," he wrote, "is ~aintliness. The saintly character is 
the character ror which spiritual emotions are the habitual 
centre of the personal energy ...... 95 This last statement 
of James requires some explanation. Two things must oe made 
clear: 1) the meaning of the term 'spiritual emotions,' and 
2) the sense in which emotions (in this case spiritual emotions) 
can De called the habitual center of a man's personal energy. 
James de£ined an emotion as the feeling of bodily changes 
Which immediately ro1low upon tn~ perception of some ~xciting 
Y3Ib1d., p. 1Y2. 
Y4 ~., p. 194. 
95Ibid., pp. 215-16. 
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thing in the environment or upon the advent of some exciting 
idea in the mind. Although he did not define the term 'spiri-
tual emotions' for us, the context in which we find it indi-
cates that by 'spiritual emotions,' he meant those emotions 
which are occasioned by religious experience or by religious 
ideas in the mind. The deeply religious man, the man who 
envisions himself and his world to be in the care of God, 
experiences an enthusiasm, an enchantment, a kind of solemn 
joy which the non-religious man does not experience. James 
referred to these feelings variously as religious feelings, 
spiritual enthusiasms, and, in the quotation with which we 
are here concerned, spiritual emotions. 
To speak of such spiritual emotions as the habitual cen-
ter of the saint's personal energy may seem to contradict 
James's earlier statement that the group of ideas to which a 
man devotes himself and from which he works is "the habitual 
centre of his personal energy."96 But in fact it does not. 
For the ability of an idea to capture our attention and to move 
us to act is due in large measure to the emotional excitement 
which it occasions in us. Thus we may speak of the emotions 
occasioned by certain ideas, as well as the ideas themselves, 
as a center of personal energy. As James pointed out, "where 
the character, as something distinguished from the intellect, 
is concerned, the causes of human diversity lie chiefly in our 
differing susceptibilities of emotional excitement, and in the 
96~., p. 162. 
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different impulses and inhibitions which these bring in their 
-
train."97 
To say that the saint's habitual center of personal 
energy is spiritual emotions is to say that the aspects of 
reality upon which his emotional interest habitually centers 
are the divine aspects. It is to say that the ideas which he 
finds most exciting are religious ideas. It is to .say that 
the beliefs which warm and quicken him, the beliefs by which 
he habitually lives and acts are religious beliefs. 
James felt that at any given time our moral posture is 
the result of two sets of forces operative within us--"im-
pulses pushing us one way and obstructions and inhibitions 
holding us back. 'Yes! yes!' say the impulses; 'No! no!' say 
the inhibitions. 0 98 The saintly man is one in whom the inhibi-
tions imposed by such mean affections as selfishness, cowardli-
ness, and hard-heartedness have been swept away by the "expulsive 
power of a higher affection"99 __ by the power of his spiritual 
or religious emotions. "There is a pitch of intensity, though, 
which, if any emotion reach it, enthrones that one as alone 
effective and sweeps its antagonists and all their inhibitions 
away."lOO The spiritual emotions of the man who is converted 
from his wrongness to a life of sanctity have reached that 
9?Ibid., p. 208. 
98Ibid. 
-
99Ibid., p. 209. 
lOOibid. 
-
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pitch, and the result is a new character decidedly different 
from the old. 
The man who lives in his religious centre of personal 
energy, and is actuated by spiritual enthusiasms, dif-
fers from his previous carnal self in perfectly defi-
nite ways. The new ardor which burns in his br~ast 
consumes in its glow the lower 'noes• which formerly 
beset him, and keeps him immune against infection from 
the entire groveling portion of his nature. Magnanim-
ities once impossible are now easy; paltry convention-
alities and mean incentives once tyrannical hold no 
sway. The stone wall inside of him has fallen, the 
hardness in his heart has broken down.101 
The features of saintliness are similar in all religions, 
no matter how different their creeds. The inner feelings of 
saintly men, for example, everywhere seem much the same. All 
such men seem to enjoy a sense of being involved in a life 
that is wider and fuller than that of this world's selfish 
interest. They experience a conviction of the existence of an 
Ideal Power--a conviction which is not merely intellectual 
but which seems to be almost sensible. Furthermore, the saintly 
man has a "sense of the friendly continuity of the ideal 
power"102 with his own life. According to James, this "sense 
of Presence of a higher and friendly Power seems to be the 
fundamental fea.ture in the spiritual life. ul03 The saintly 
man willingly surrenders himself to the control of this friendly 
Power and unites himself to it usually through some form of 
prayer. And as the limits of his own selfhood break down, as 
101~., pp. 212-13. 
102~., p. 217. 
l03Ibid., p. 218. 
\ 
I 
\ 
I 
I 
210 
}lis interests extend beyond himself to include those of the 
divine in reality (however he conceives it), the saint experi-
ences a tremendous sense of elation and freedom. There is, 
furthermore, a shifting of his emotional energy away from 
unfriendly, hostile affections toward loving and harmonious 
feelings--"towards 'yes, yes,' and away from 'no,• where the 
claims of the non-ego are concerned."l04 
These inner feelings reflect and express themselves out-
wardly in the saintly man's way of life--a way of life charac-
terized frequently by asceticism, strength, purity, and charity 
in heroic proportions. The saint's asceticism is a way of 
immolating himself. As James pointed out, 
The self-surrender may become so passionate as to turn 
into self-immolation. It may then so overrule the or-
dinary inhibitions of the !le.sh that the saint finds 
positive pleasure in sacrifice and asceticism, measur-
ing and expressing as they do the degree of his loyalty 
to the higher power.105 
Whether it takes the form of the poverty, chastity, and obedi-
ence practiced by persons in religious communities or indivi-
dual acts of ·mortification and sacrifice, truly religious 
asceticism seems to spring from one or the other of two motives. 
It may, on the one hand, be a form of expiation by which the 
religious man, acutely conscious of his wrongness, seeks to 
atone for his sins; on the other hand, ascetical practices may 
1 be pure acts of love. They "may appeal to the subject in the 
light of sacrifices which he is happy in making to the Deity 
l04Ibid., p. 217. 
l05Ibid. 
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whom he acknowledges."106 The saintly man's strength of soul 
manifests itself in equanimity under all circumstances--in 
resignation, fortitude, and patience. It is not difficult to 
understand his strength and tranquillity, for certainly one 
who is sensibly aware that, no matter what one's difficulties 
for the moment may be, "one's life as a whole is in the keeping 
of a power whom one can absolutely trust_,"lO? cannot help but 
be at peace. 
'A paradise of inward tranquillity• seems to be 
faith's usual result; and it is easy; even without 
being religious one's self, to understand this •••• 
indeed, how can it possibly fail to steady the nerves, 
to cool the fever, and appease the fret, if one be 
sensibly conscious that no matter what one's difficul-
ties for the moment may appear to be, one's life as a 
whole is in the keeping of a power whom one can abso-
lutely trust? In deeply religious men the abandonment 
of self to this power is passionate. Whoever not only 
says, but feels, 'God's will be done,' is mailed against 
every weakriess; and the whole historic array of martyrs, 
missionaries, and religious reformers is there to prove 
the tranquil-mindedness, under naturally agitating or 108 distressing circumstances, which self-surrender brings. 
While the saint is always tranquil and at peace, however, 
he is nevert~eless so sensitive to spiritual discords that he 
works tirelessly to purify his life; "the cleansing of existence 
from brutal and sensual elements becomes imperative."l09 But, 
although he may be hard upon himself, purifying his own life 
by mortification and asceticism, the saint is never hard on 
l06Ibid., p. 234. 
10?~., pp. 225-26. 
108Ibid. 
-
l09Ibid., p. 21?. 
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others; rather he exhibits an extraordinary tenderness and 
charity for all of his fellow-men--even for his enemies and 
tor the most personally loathsome o! creatures. Such are the 
inner dispositions and the outward qualities of character and 
conduct most typical of the man who sees this visible world as 
pregnant with the divine. Such is the religious response to 
the universe in its highest form. 
In summary, we can say that religion involves thought 
(creed), feelings and action. And in almost every religious 
creed we can !ind the general vision of the world described 
earlier in the chapter--the view that this world is but an 
aspect of a more spiritual world, that in this more spiritual 
world there exist divine powers who care for us and for our 
ideals, that these powers are powers with whom we can communi-
cate and keep in touch and from whom we can get help through 
prayer and self-surrender. Almost all religions agree in this 
general view of reality. Whatever the doctrinal differences 
which distinguish one creed from another, they are but secon-
dary accretions ··to this central belief.. Such secondary be-
liefs, James held, are elaborations by the intellect along lines 
suggested by a man's feelings, needs, and desires. It is the 
feelings which are primary and essential, James said; for it 
is the feelings which are relatively permanent and basically 
the same in all religions. 
Among the religious feelings examined, one can distin-I guish between those from which the religious vision springs l 9.nd those which accompany it and often remain as its more or 
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iess permanent effects. The feelings which give rise to reli-
gion, as already indicated, are the feelings or wrongness, need, 
and want. The feelings, on the other hand, which result from 
the religious conversion and which accompany the religious 
vision have been characterized by James as "an excitement of 
the cheerful, expansive, 'dynamogenic' order which, like any 
tonic, freshens our vital powers. 11110 Adopting the· phrase 
used by Professor Leuba, James called this kind of excitement 
the 'faith state.' As James put it, religion adds to life, 
in spite of life's hardships and sufferings, a certain "en-
chantment which is not rationally or logically deducible from 
a?JYthing else.n111 As indicated above, James felt that if 
religion means anything definite for us, it ought to mean 
"this added dimension of emotion, this enthusiastic temper of 
espousal, in regions where morality strictly so called can at 
best but bow its head and acquiesce. 11112 
There is much more to religion than thought and feeling, 
however, for these inevitably resolve themselves into action--
into a mode of living more or less saintly--a mode of living 
involving devotion, asceticism, purity, patience, fortitude, 
courage, charity, sacrifice, generosity, mercy, and all the 
qualities which mankind has always considered most admirable. 
In The Varieties of Religious .Experience, James gave us a 
llOibid., p. 381. 
lllfil£., p. 54. 
112Ibid. See above, pp. 180-81. 
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aescr1ption o! the man who possesses a sense of the divine--
a vivid awareness o! the presence of God. 
Whoever possesses strongly this sense comes naturally 
to think that the smallest details of this world derive 
infinite significance from their relation to an unseen 
divine order. The thought of this order yields him a 
superior denomination of happiness, and a steadfast-
ness of soul with which no other can compare. In social 
relations his serviceability is exemplary; he abounds 
in impulses to help. His help is inward as well as 
outward, for his sympathy reaches souls as well as bod-
ies, and kindles unsuspected faculties therein. Instead 
ot placing happiness where common men place it, in 
comfort, he places it in a higher kind of inner excite-
ment, which converts discomforts into sources of cheer 
and annuls unhappiness. So he turns his back upon no 
duty, however thankless; and when we are in need of 
assistance, we can count upon the saint lending his 
hand with more certainty than we can count upon any 
other person. Finally, his humble-mindedness and his 
ascetic tendencies save him from the petty personal 
pretensions which so obstruct our ordinary social 
intercourse, and his purity gi~es us in him a clean 
man for a companion. Felicity, purity, charity, patience, 
self-severity,--these are splendid excellencies, and 
the saint of all men shows them in the completest pos-
sible measure.113 
Such excellencies are indispensable to the world's welfare. 
If all men possessed such virtues, we would have an ideal so-
ciety. Obviously all men do not possess such virtues, ·how-
ever, and our society is tar from ideal. Nevertheless, because 
some men of this calibre do exist, the world is better off than 
it would otherwise be. Not only do these men sacrifice them-
selves daily for God and their fellow-men--trying to alleviate 
pain and to bring peace and harmony to the world--but by their 
example, they often inspire others to live more humanJ.y and 
thus contribute to the perfection of mankind as a whole. Men 
ll3Ibid., PP• 285-86 • 
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o! saintly character, by their example, function as "a leaven 
o! righteousness in the world"114 and draw it in "the direction 
ot more prevalent habits of saintliness."ll5 William James 
believed that because religion thus enables the individual 
himself to live more happily and fruitfully (whatever personal 
misfortunes befall him) and at the same time benefits the 
world at large insofar as the world is made what it is by the 
lives of men, the religious response to the universe is the 
best response that men can make. In James's opinion, since the 
consequences for the individual and !or the world as a whole 
are good, religion itself is good. 
Whatever salutary effects religion may have upon indivi-
duals and upon the world at large, however, the Intellectualists 
of James's day insisted that unless the truth of the religious 
vision can be established beyond the shadow of a doubt by 
empirical proof or rational demonstration, religious belief 
cannot be justified. For the positivists and rationalists of 
James's time, the good or bad consequences of religion were 
irrelevant. The real issue was the truth or falsity of its 
view of the world. And if the truth of that view could not be 
established, they said, one ought not accept it however useful 
its consequences might be. 
In championing religious belie!, however, William James 
himself was not indifferent to the truth or falsity of reli-
114Ibid., p. 290. 
115Ibid. 
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gion's claims; James was as much concerned with discovering 
the truth as the next man--perhaps even more so. He certainly 
did not give his approval to a:n.y view of life which was patently 
false simply because it had salutary effects upon society. 
For James, the religious interpretation of the world is clearly 
indicated by human experience. Furthermore, as the reader 
will discover in Chapter VI, the religious interpretation of 
the world is, from James's point of view, the most rational 
interpretation possible. 
l 
CHAPrER VI 
THE RATIONAL AND EMPIRICAL GROUNDS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF 
The Intellectualists, as James called those thinkers of 
his time who made sense and reason the sole arbiters of truth, 
insisted that man can lawfully believe only propositions which 
have been empirically verified or logically demonstrated. For-
bidding man to accept any hypothesis about which doubt is at 
all possible, they enjoined him to suspend judgment until proof 
can be had. James agreed that in some areas of discourse, 
such an attitude may be the wisest one to adopt. But in others, 
he felt that to wait for proof may be to wait for the impos-
sible; for there a~e some hy-potheses which empirical science 
and logic are powerless to prove. Moreover, these disciplines 
provide no solution to the problem a man faces when immediate 
action is demanded but evidence as to the right course· of ac-
tion is not forthcoming. 
Our purpose. in this chapter will be to consider in detail 
James's reflections upon the question of the truth of religion 
and his efforts to defend and justify religious faith in the 
face of the Intellectualists' prohibitions. Special attention 
will be given to James's position that the foundations of 
religious belief are both rational and empirical. James main-
tained that the religious view of the universe, although not 
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susceptible to logical demonstration, is nevertheless the most 
rational view of the universe possible. Moreover, he held that 
religion is solidly grounded in experience--not in the sense 
that experience can prove the truth of religion for everyone, 
but in the sense that it clearly points in that direction. 
William James was well aware of the fact that neither 
science nor philosophy has thus far succeeded in es~ablishing 
the truth of any religious creed. However, he believed that 
religious hypotheses are of the sort for which science and 
logic do not provide adequate criteria. In fact, in his view, 
religious questions in the strict sense fall outside the scope 
of their methods. 
Science, for example, operates only in the sensible world 
and recognizes only data accessible to the senses, either 
directly or through the intermediary of a screening device, 
as valid evidence in any issue. It seeks to verify its hypo-
theses by experiments performed on the empirical world and 
looks for corroboration in facts equally sensible. The unseen 
world of religious belief, James said, of its very nature 
simply does not lend itsel£ to this kind of experimentation 
or verification. Although science operates by postulation and 
guesswork, even these must be either directly verified or 
indirectly so, i.e., there must be some kind of agreement 
between them and other verified facts. 
Similarly, James pointed out, philosophy, using logical 
demonstration as its tool, can expect no more success in the 
area 0£ religious belief than science. For centuries, most 
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philosophers have attempted to ground religious belief in 
reason. Some have tried to deduce religion's hypotheses from 
seemingly indubitable self-evident principles in an effort to 
make religion the creation of pure reason totally independent 
of experience. Others have tried to show that religion is the 
product of reason drawing rigorous inference from objective 
tacts. William James, however, believed that all such attempts 
have failed; for if religion's propositions were the genuine 
products of pure reason, or logical reason operating upon 
objective facts, then philosophy ought be able to convince 
men universally of religion's truth. But as a matter of his-
tory, it has been notoriously unsuccessful in this regard. 
Furthermore, James felt that the content of the religious 
hypothesis is such that logic alone is not capable of estab-
lishing its reality and ought not be expected to do so. The 
facts postulated by religion are put forth 2S particular and 
concrete; the divine is described as a reality which is con~ 
crete, individual, and indeed unique. Conceptual processes, 
however, deal with things abstractly; they classify, define, 
and interpret facts already given. But theJ'"cannot produce 
the concrete facts themselves or reveal them to us in the first 
place, because in the concrete there is al'W'.!Gs a 'plus,' a 
'thisness' which conceptual processes cannox capture or repre-
. 1 
sent--"a plus, a thisness, which feeling alm.e can answer for." 
For this reason, it is futile to try to dem:m:strate logically, 
1James, The Varieties of Religious Expsrience, p. 346. 
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i.e., by a purely intellectual process, any particular con-
crete fact, let alone the concrete facts posited by religious 
belief. Deductive logic seems to be impotent in this area • 
For in any strictly valid syllogism of a categorical type, the 
terms of the premises must be abstract, and consequently the 
conclusion must be abstract also. Indeed, in certain cases it 
may be foolish not to proceed from the abstract conclusion to 
a judgment regarding the concrete; but the movement of the mind 
from an abstract conclusion to a concrete judgment is a move-
ment made under the influence of man's volitional power. The 
judgment of fact is not forced upon one by the logic of the 
abstract argument, however persuasive it may be. Logic alone, 
in the sense of purely intellectual processes dealing with 
abstract concepts, cannot prove any concrete fact, religious 
or otherwise, and should not attempt to do so. 
However, while science and lo~ic cannot prove the reli-
gious hypothesis, neither can they disprove it. Neither one 
nor the other can tell us that the unseen world of religious 
belief is not real; for except in the case of an idea which 
is intrinsically contradictory, neither science nor logic can 
tell us what does not exist. Thus, the religious vision of 
the world is not susceptible to proof or disproof at the hands 
of either science or philosophy. 
Nevertheless, the theistic, or religious, interpretation 
of the universe is, in the opinion of William James, the most 
rational interpretation possible. Of all the ways of inter-
preting the world, James believed that theism is the most 
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rational in the sense that it, above all others, is most con-
gruous with man's nature. It alone, he claimed, satisfies 
every mental need in strictly proper measure. 2 
James said that only a being defined as God is usually 
defined can satisfy the mental needs of a man who is looking 
for something in which to ground reality. A God is the only 
kind of being which "would form the most adequate possible 
object for minds framed like our own to conceive as lying at 
the root of the universe."3 Stating his position in more 
emphatic terms, James wrote: 
My thesis, in other words, is this: that some outward 
reality of a nature defined as God's nature-niust be 
defined, is the only ultimate object that is at the 
same time rational and possible for the human mind's 
contemplation. Anythin5 short of God is not rational, 
an.ything more than God is not possible •••• 4 
To understand this last statement, one must consider what 
James meant by God--how he defined the nature of the only 
object that a man can rationally conceive to lie at the root 
of things. In the essay, "Reflex Action and Theism," he 
described its essential features for us: 
First, it is essential that God be conceived as the 
deepest power in the universe; and, second, he must be 
conceived under the form of a mental personality. The 
personality need not be determined intrinsically any 
2An idea or theory is rational if it satisfies the require-
ments of man's three-fold mental powers--receptive, theoretic, 
and volitional--and thus facilitates unimpeded mental function-
ing. See above, pp. 98-105. 
3James, "Reflex Action and Theism," Essays on Faith and 
Morals, p. 115. 
4Ibid., pp. 115-16. 
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turther than is involved in the holding of certain 
things dear, and in the recognition of our dispositions 
toward those things, the things themselves being all 
good and righteous things. But, extrinsically consi-
dered, so to speak, God's personality is to be regarded, 
like any other personality, as something lying outside 
of my own and other than me, and whose existence I 
simply come upon and find. A power not ourselves, 
then, which not only makes for righteousness, but means 
it, and which recognizes us,--such is the definition 
which I think nobody will be inclined to dispute. • • • 
In whatever other respects the divine personality may 
differ from ours or may resemble it, the two are con-
sanguineous at least in this,--that both have purposes 
for which they care, and each can hear the other's 
call.5 
Such are the features of the God, which, James said, is "the 
normal object of the mind's belief."6 Given· the triadic struc-
ture of the human mind, anything less than this is not rational 
and anything more than this is not possible. We shall con-
sider first, and in some detail, the inadequacy and consequent 
irrationality of a theory in which anything less than God is 
considered to be the ultimate reality.at the root of the uni-
verse; secondly, we shall consider the impossibility of con-
ceiving anything more than God as the ground of all things. 
As noted in Chapter III, William James held that the 
powers of the human mind are three-fold. They consist of 
1) a receptive faculty by which impressions are received from 
without, 2) a theoretic or speculative faculty which defines 
and interprets the nature of the impressing objects, and 3) 
a volitional power, by which we actively. respond to the real-
ity received by the senses and interpreted by the theoretic 
5Ibid., p. 122. 
6 Ibid., p. 116. 
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faculty. This latter faculty, i.e., the conceptual and rea-
soning power, has as its purpose to define the direction which 
our activity, immediate and remote, shall take. But the re-
sponse of the active or volitional part of our nature is not 
simply a spontaneous reaction following automatically upon 
thought. On the contrary, our volitional faculty exercises a 
certain rule over thought; it has a critical funct~on. It can 
accept or reject the formulas proposed by our theoretical power, 
and whether it accepts or rejects them depends upon whether it 
finds thought's formulas consonant with itself or not. A theory 
may be in harmony with the deliverances of sense (including the 
data provided by past experience) and the requirements of 
reason, but it will be accepted by us only if it is also con-
gruous with our active powers--with our desires, aspirations, 
and propensities--and provides them with objects upon which to 
react in the most felicitous manner. A theory can be said to 
be rational only if it satisfies all three 'departments' of the 
human mind, and the final word, in James's opinion, comes from 
the active or willing 'department' of man's nature. Any theory 
which disappoints our active powers and gives them nothing for 
which to care and act will be rejected even though it is 
logically consistent and harmonizes with perceptual facts. 
'When the speculative department of the human mind under-
takes to interpret the character, not just of one or two sen-
sibly perceived objects, but of the totality of such objects, 
when, in other words, it undertakes to interpret the character 
of the universe as a whole, various philosophical views emerge 
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as possible explanations and offer themselves to man's active 
nature for espousal or rejection. Theism, atheistic material-
ism, and agnosticism are but some of the results of' reason's 
efforts to interpret experience. Materialism and agnosticism, 
James believed, are the least acceptable of' the three because 
they disappoint man's active powers. Even though they are 
accepted by many, these philosophical theories cannot univer-
sally prevail because they provide inadequate stimuli for man's 
practical nature. Man cannot feel volitionally at home in them. 
As James pointed out, every man desires to be adequate 
to the demands of the universe, to contribute actively to its 
development, to play his part in the drama of life. But man's 
nature is such that his ability to perform is sustai.ned and 
inhibited to a great extent by his emotional states. Feel-
ings and emotions of a posi.tive and expansive nature, such as 
courage, admiration, enthusiasm, hope, rapture, and the like, 
have a stimulating effect upon man and enable him to act with 
vigor and zest. On the other hand, negative attitudes.and 
feelings--fear, doubt, despair, sadness, and frustration, for 
example--have a deadening effect upon man's active powers and 
leave him apathetic, indifferent, and often powerless to do 
what life demands of him. The philosophies of materialism 
and agnosticism occasion only such negative feelings in man. 
In opposing philosophical materialism, James was careful 
to point out that it does not necessarily involve a belief' in_ 
'matter' as a metaphysical principle. "One may deny matter in 
that sense, as strongly as Berkeley did, one may be a phenomen-
,, 
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a.list like Huxley, and yet one may still be a materialist in 
the wider sense, of explaining higher phenomena by lower ones, 
and leaving the destinies of the world at the mercy of its 
blinder parts and forces."7 It is materialism in this wider 
sense that is opposed to spiritualism, or theism. Spiritual-
ism, or theism, claims that mental and moral powers, rather 
than blind physio-chemical forces, run the universe and that, 
ultimately, mental and moral powers superior to man's are in 
control. Materialism, on the other hand, claims that it is 
the laws of physical nature which run things. In a material-
istic world, then, all of man's efforts to fashion the world 
for the better by his actions, all of his efforts to develop 
it along lines suggested by his ideals, hopes, and aspirations 
• are pointless. For no matter what man tries to accomplish, 
the blind forces of physica~ nature will finally determine 
the result. Indeed in the world of materialism, man's voli-
tional powers have no relevant function. His active propensi-
1
1
1 
ties--his desire to have an active part in the world's .develop-
ment--his desire to contribute creatively to its perfection--
these are all without meaning. 
In his work, Pragmatism, William James was critical of the 
materialism of Herbert Spencer in particular. According to 
Spencer's theory of mechanical evolution, every state of being, 
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both mental and physical' is subject to the same laws of evolu- !"11. 
tion and dissolution. ~verything develops from a relatively 
?James, Pragmatism and Four ~ssays rrom The Meaning of 
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primitive stage, in which only elementary !unctions are per-
formed, to a state in which more complicated !unctions arise. 
But this evolutionary process of development does not result 
1n any permanent state of maturity and perfection. On the 
contrary, everything that evolves, without exception, is des-
tined to dissolve again, so that the end of everything is 
destruction. Man is born, matures, and dies. A society be-
gins, develops, and 1s finally destroyed. Whatever good and 
beautifUl things evolve will one and all be dissolved again. 
As James put it, "according to the theory.of mechanical evolu-
tion, the laws of redistribution of matter and motion, though 
they are certainly to thank ror all the good hours which our 
organisms have ever yielded us and for all the ideals which 
our minds now frame, are yet fatally certain to undo their 
work again, and to redissolve everything that they have once 
evolved."ts Thus the theory of mec~anical evolution promises 
man nothing but destruction--not only his own destruction but 
also the eventual dissolution of all the things he cherishes 
and the complete annihilation of all the ideals which he loves 
and strives for. Such a theory renders all of man's expansive 
emotions of love, hope, joy, and courage totally subjective 
and without any real objects and thus leaves him little about 
which to care and nothing for which to live and act. 
A nameless unheimlichkeit comes over us at the thought 
of there being nothing eternal in our final purposes, 
in the objects of those loves and aspirations which 
8 ~., pp. 75-76. 
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are our deepest energies •••• Small as we are, minute 
as is the·point by which the cosmos impinges upon each 
one o:f us, each one desires to :feel that his reaction 
at that point is congruous with the demands of the 
vast whole,--that he balances the latter, so to speak, 
and is able to do what it expects of him. But as his 
abilities to do lie wholly in the line o:f his natural 
propensities; as he enjoys reacting with such emotions 
as fortitude, hope, rapture, admiration, earnestness, 
and the like; and he very unwillingly reacts with fear, 
disgust, despair, or doubt,--a philosophy which should 
only legitimate emotions of the latter sort would be 
sure to leave the mind a prey to discontent and crav-
ing. 9 
Agnosticism, too, although it does not issue the same dog-
matic denials that materialism does, inflicts man with a kind 
of apathy. Agnosticism claims that man cannot know what the 
universe ultimately is or what li:fe is ultimately all about. 
The agnostic claims that man cannot know whether or not there 
is more at work in the world than blind physical forces, that 
man cannot know whether or not there is a God who cares for 
him and his ideals. From the agnostic point o:f view, it is 
not possible to know whether there· are any values which are 
everlasting or whether all are subject to dissolution as the 
mechanical evolutionists claim. But to be in doubt about these 
things is to be in doubt about how to act. Action, after all, 
presupposes conviction. Not knowing what li:fe is all about 
leaves one not knowing how to· live. Not knowing what the uni-
verse is leaves one not knowing how to react to it. Not know-
ing whether or not one's active e:f:forts can ever produce a:ny 
lasting results in the way of goodness and beauty leaves one 
9James, "The Sentiment of Rationality," Essays on Faith 
and Morals, pp. 83-84. 
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with no inspiration to act constructively and creatively at 
all and permits one to make mere escape from suffering his 
rule of life. From James's point of view, agnosticism, as 
such, offers man no motives for the fruitful exercise of his 
active powers; and, like materialism, it leaves him restless 
and unsatisfied. 
Obviously, then, however logically consistent philosophies 
like materialism and agnosticism may prove to be, however they 
may harmonize with perceived facts, they are, from the point 
of view of William Jam.es, not rational; for they do not satisfy 
the practical side of human nature. They may indeed appeal at 
certain times to certain people; but, Jam.es pointed out, no 
philosophy which does not make "a direct appeal to all those 
powers of our nature which we hold in highest esteem"lO will 
be deemed rational by all men at all times. 
Materialism and agnosticism, even were they true, could 
never gain universal and popular acceptance; for they 
both, alike, give a solution of things which is irra-
tional to the practical third of our nature, and in 
which we can never volitionally feel at home. Each 
comes out of the second or theoretic stage of mental 
functioning, with its definition of the essential na-
ture of things, its formula of formulas prepared. The 
whole array of active forces of our nature stands wait-
ing, impatient for the word which shall tell them how 
to discharge themselves most deeply and worthily upon 
life. "Well!" cry they, "what shall we do?" "Ignor-
amus, ignorabimus!" says agnosticism. "React upon 
atoms and their concussions!" says materialism. What 
a collapse! The mental train misses fire, the middle 
fails to ignite the end, the cycle breaks down half-
way to its conclusion; and the active powers left alone, 
with no proper object on which to vent their energy, 
must either atrophy, sicken, and die, or else by their 
10 Ibid., p. 110. 
I 
' I 
I 
I 
t 
I 
I 
I 
I 
t 
l 
l 
I 
t 
229 
pent-up convulsions and excitement keep the whole ma-
chinery in a fever until some less incommensurable 
solution, some more practically rational formula, shall 
provide a normal issue for the currents of the soul.11 
It was James's conviction that the only interpretation of 
reality that can satisfy all three departments of the human 
mind is theism. Theism, he felt, is the most practically 
rational of all world views; it offers the most reasonable 
solution to the problem of how to interpret the universe. 
Now, theism always stands ready with the most 
practically rational solution it is possible to con-
ceive. Not an energy of our active nature to which 
it does not authoritatively appeal, no~ an emotion 
of which it does not normally and naturally release 
the springs.12 
Theism legitimizes our higher emotions of admiration, courage, 
hope, and rapture by giving us a God who cares for and works 
for the same values as we--a God with whom we can cooperate in 
making the world better--a God who will guarantee that the 
cherished ideals for which we work and suffer will somehow be 
preserved. Thus theism makes our moral life more than a. mere 
day to day struggle with evil; it makes it a glorious adven-
ture; a kind of holy war fought for divine stakes. James felt 
that a theistic interpretation of life is incompatible with 
pessimism. And indeed if divine powers are working with us to 
realize that which is good and beautiful, we cannot help but 
be optimistic about the ultimate outcome of life. Whatever 
evils may exist now, however bad things may appear to be at 
11James, "Reflex Action and Theism," Essays on Faith and 
Morals, pp. 126-27. 
12Ibid., p. 127. 
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present, we have hope that the future will be better. Certainly, 
knowing that however adverse our lives may be here and now, our 
efforts will someday bear fruit, if not in this visible world 
then in some unseen spiritual realm, cannot fail to make even 
the most difficult and painful life seem worth living in an 
unqualified sense. 
By the standards of William James, then, the theistic 
interpretation of reality is indeed the most rational view 
possible, satisfying the requirements of all three departments 
of man's mind. It satisfies the demands of our receptive 
faculty insofar as it does not contradict, and is therefore 
in harmony with, the data of sense experience even though it 
may not be experimentally verified. Furthermore, while it 
may not be logically demonstrable, it is nevertheless logically 
consistent and to this extent satisfi~s the requirements of our 
theoretic power. But most important of all, theism, more than 
any other theory advanced to explain reality, is, as we have 
seen, congruent with the active part of our nature. On the 
other hand, any theory which posits anything ~ than God as 
"lying at the root of the universe"l3 stifles our active powers 
and is for this reason irrational from a practical point of 
view. 
'While grounding reality in anything less than God is not 
rational, to explain the universe in terms of anything more 
-
than God is not possible, James said. What James meant by a 
13 ills!·' p. 115. 
231 
ground for reality which would be ~ than God is not immedi-
ately evident. However, he seems to have had in mind the 
monistic Absolute of the Idealists. In his essay, "Reflex Ac-
tion and Theism,'' he used the term gnosticism to refer to the 
theory that intellect is somehow the supreme reality. Not 
only is it the supreme reality in the theory of gnosticism, 
but ultimately it is the only reality; for appearances not-
withstanding, it is in the last analysis identical with its 
objects which include all things. For the gnostic, or the 
Absolute Idealist, there is but one reality, i.e., an absolute 
Mind, which is ultimately identical with all the things which 
appear to be other than it--with all finite minds, for exam-
ple, and with !!1 merely human powers, sensory, intellectual, 
and volitional. In Chapter II, we saw several of the objec-
tions which James raised against gnos.ticism, there referred 
to as Monism or Absolute Idealism. But here we shall consider 
an argument to which James gave special attention in "Reflex 
Action and Theism"--an argument which is in some sense.related 
to his argument that materialism and agnosticism are not rational. 
Materialism and agnosticism are not rational, James said, be-
cause they do not satisfy all three 'departments' of man's 
nature--receptive, cognitive (theoretical), and volitional; 
they are not congruent with the triadic structure of man's 
mind. Gnosticism, on the other hand, in effect denies the 
triadic structure of the human mind. Gnosticism is not possi-
ble, James held, because it presupposes the identification of 
powers which are obviously distinct. By making intellect, or 
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cognitive power, the supreme reality and identifying it with 
all that it knows, gnosticism does away with the experienced 
distinctions between the sensory, speculative, and volitional 
powers in man. Such an identification and such a deification 
of cognition, James pointed out, is contrary to the whole 
drift of ordinary human experience as well as to the findings 
of physiology and psychology. 14 
From its first dawn to its highest actual attainment, 
we find that the cognitive faculty, where it appears 
to exist at all, appears but as one element in an 
organic mental whole, and as a minister to higher men-
tal powers,--the powers of will. Such a thing as its 
emancipation and absolution from these organic relations 
receives no faintest color of plausibility from any fact 
we can discern. Arising as a part, in a mental and 
objective world which are both larger than itself, it 
must, whatever its powers of growth may be (and I am 
far from wishing to disparage them), remain a part to 
the end. This is the character of the cognitive ele-
ment in all the mental life we know, and we have no 
reason to suppose that that character will ever change. 
On the contrary, it is more than probable that to the 
end of time our power of moral and volitional response 
to the nature of things will be the deepest organ of 
communication therewith we shall ever possess.15 
In the thought of William James, therefore, the only inter-
pretation of reality which is at the same time both rational 
and possible is theism. And by theism, James meant that view 
of life and reality which posits as the deepest power in the 
universe, a mental personality distinct from, though not 
14James felt that his doctrine of the triadic structure 
of the mind was in perfect harmony with the physiologists' 
generalization that all action is somehow reflex action, i.e., 
that every action has its origin in some impression of sense 
which, after some intermediary cerebral activity, expresses 
itself in action of one kind or another. 
l5Ja.mes, "Reflex Action and Theism," .Essa;ys on Faith and 
Morals, pp. 140-41. 
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totally unlike, our own--a personality with whom we can enter 
into friendly communication and with whom we can cooperate in 
the attainment of mutually cherished ideals of righteousness 
and beauty. 
The theistic view of the world, however, is not 'only the 
most practically rational interpretation of reality in the 
view of William James; it is moreover firmly rooted in human 
experience. This does not mean that it can be verified by 
any kind of controlled experiment which will render it evident 
to all men. But history reveals that there have been human 
. 
experiences which, while they do not prove God's existence to 
all people, nevertheless point to theism's truth and vitiate 
the prohibitions which rationalists and positivists alike have 
laid upon religious belief. 
Indeed, there are no objective data accessible to all 
men which will make the unseen world of religion evident to 
everyone; there are no sensible facts which will render it an 
object available for scientific testing. But throughout the 
history of man there have been a great many private facts, 
private personal experiences which, for those who have had 
them, have made God's existence, or the existence of unseen 
powers, as unquestioned a fact as their own being. Such exper-
iences can generally be called Iilystical. Although we are 
inclined to think of only a few renowned saints and celebrated 
spiritual writers as mystics, there is evidence that there 
have been many persons who have had a kind of direct aware-
ness of the reality of the divine--an awareness which, however 
r vague, 234 can be called a mystical awareness. For these people, 
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belief in the unseen world is as spontaneous and unquestion-
ing as any man's immediate belief in an object sensibly pres-
ent to him. 
The fact of such experiences inclined James to believe 
that man possesses, in addition to the external senses, a 
special sense whose proper object is present reality whether 
that reality is accessible to the external senses or not. 
This special sense, James said, must somehow be stimulated if 
man is to accept anything as presently re~l. James felt that 
the fact that many-people possess non-sensible 11 objects of 
their belier, not in the form of mere conceptions which their 
intellect accepts as true, but rather in the form of quasi-
sensible realities directly apprehended 1110 points to the real-
ity of this power. Such phenomena, he said, suggest that the 
awareness of present realities is the work not of the external 
senses (although these are certainly involved when the reali-
ties perceived are sensible realities) but of a special reality-
discerning sense which can be stimulated obviously by sensible 
objects but also by non-sensible objects, including ideas and, 
for all we know, realities which are neither sensible nor the 
ideal products of our minds. 
It is as if there were in the human consciousness a 
sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a 
perceation of what we may call 1 somethin~ there, 1 
more eep and more general than any of t e special and 
particular 'senses' by which the current psychology 
16James, The Varieties of Religious .Experience, p. 65. 
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supposes existent realities to be originally revealed. 
If this were so, we might suppose the senses to waken 
our attitudes and conduct as they so habitually do, by 
first exciting this sense of reality; but anything else, 
any idea, for example, that might similarly excite it, 
would have that same prerogative of appearing real 
which objects of sense normally possess. So f~r as 
religious conceptions were able to touch this reality-
feeling, they would be believed in in spite of criti-
cism, even though they might be SQ vague and remote as 
to be almost unimaginable, •• • lr . 
Documented cases of persons who at one time or another have 
vividly experienced the reality of non-sensible objects, reli-
gious and otherwise, James said, seem to prove the existence 
of this reality-discerning power. In .James's own words, "Such 
cases, ••• seem sufficiently to prove the existence in our 
mental machinery of a sense of present reality more diffused 
and general than that which our special senses yield."18 
James's theory that man possesses a special faculty of 
this type raises the obvious question of how such a sense 
fits into his theory of the human mind as triadic in struc-
ture. Since James referred to this special reality-discerning 
power as a sense, i.e., a receptive power, one is inclined to 
think that he considered it an aspect of what he called the 
'feeling department' of the mind. But while it seems to be 
in the same .'department' with the other senses and while it 
can be stimulated by the things which stimulate the other 
senses, it can apparently be activated also by ideas, which 
are products of the 'conceiving department' of the mind, as 
l7Ibid., pp. 61-62. 
18~., p. 65. 
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well as by realities which are neither sensible nor purely 
ideal. James's position on this question is not entirely 
clear, however; and therefore the precise relationship of the 
reality-discerning sense to the three 'departments• of the 
human mind in his theory remains a matter of speculation. 
Whatever the precise character of man's sense of reality 
may be, any direct, quasi-sensible awareness of God's reality, 
any feeling of his presence, can be called a mystical experi-
ence at least in the broad sense of the term. It is mystical 
in contrast with what psychologists would c~nsider the natural 
ways of knowing a thing's reality--i.e., direct intuition by 
the external senses and logical inference from intuited facts. 
Mystical experience in the strictest sense of the term, however, 
is generally thought to have certain distinguishing character-
istics. Four of them, viz., ineffability, the quality of 
being noetic, transiency, and passivity, James called to our 
attention in The Varieties of Religious :Experience. 
' 
A mystical experience is ineffable in the sense that it 
defies expression; it is incommunicable. Its quality, or its 
object, so to speak, must be directly intuited just as a sen-
sible object is intuited, for it can no more be communicated 
to another person than a sensation can. 
In this peculiarity mystical states are more like 
states of feeling than like states· of intellect. · No 
one can make clear to another who has never had a 
certain feeling, in what the quality or worth of it 
consists. One must have musical ears to know the 
value of a symphony; one must have been in love one's 
self to understand a lover's state of mind. Lacking 
the heart or ear, we cannot interpret the musician 
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or the lover justly, and are even likely to consider 
him weak-minded or absurd. The mystic finds that most 
of us accord to his experiences an equally incompetent 
treatment.19 
On the other hand, although a mystical experience may re-
semble a state of feeling, it is experienced as a kind of know-
ing. Genuine mystical states 
are states of insight into depths of truth unplumbed 
by the discursive intellect. They are illuminations, 
revelations, full of significance and importance, all 
inarticulate though they remain; and as a rule they 
carry with them a curious sense of authority for after-
time.20 
Thus a mystical experience is a cognitive experience, but the 
knowledge acquired is such that it cannot be expressed in 
words. 21 
l9Ibid., p. 293. 
20Ibid. 
21James cited.the testimony of St. John of the Cross on 
this point. St. John said that God compenetrates the soul, but 
in such a way that the soul "finds no terms, no means, no com-
parison whereby to render the sublimity of the wisdom and the 
delicacy of the spiritual feeling with which she is filled •••• 
'We receive this mystical knowledge of God clothed in none of 
the kinds of images, in none of the sensible representations, 
which our mind makes use of in other circumstances. According-
ly in this knowledge, since the senses and the imagination are 
not employed, we get neither form nor impression, nor can we 
give any account or furnish any likeness, although the myster-
ious and sweet-tasting wisdom comes home so clearly to the in-
most parts of our soul. Fancy a man seeing a certain kind of 
thing for the first time in his life. He can understand it, 
use and enjoy it, but he cannot apply a name to it, nor communi-
cate any idea of it, even though all the while it be a mere 
thing of sense. How much greater will be his powerlessness 
when it goes beyond the senses! This is the peculiarity of the 
divine language. The more infused, intimate, spiritual, and 
supersensible it is, the more does it exceed the senses, both 
inner and outer, and impose silence upon them." (The Dark Night 
of the Soul, book ii, ch. xvii, quoted in James, The Varieties 
of Religious Experience, pp. 312-13.) 
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In addition to being ineffable and noetic, mystical states 
are usually relatively transient; they cannot as a rule be sus-
tained for long periods of time. However, there have been 
individuals who have testified to having an enduring sense, a 
comparatively permanent feeling, of the divine presence--a 
feeling which, since it could not be accounted for as an 
instance of external sensation, would have to be considered 
mystical, at least in the broad sense of the term. 
Finally, the subject of a mystical transport seems to be 
relatively passive especially in states which are mystical in 
the more technical sense of the word. James conceded that the 
oncoming of the experience may be facilitated by preliminary 
actions which may be deliberate--actions such as fixing one's 
attention, assuming a certain bodily posture, and ascetical 
practices of one kind or another. But "when the characteris-
tic sort of consciousness once has set in, the mystic feels 
as if his own will were in abeyance, and indeed sometimes as 
if he were grasped and held by a superior power."22 Such a 
suspension of one's own powers may be absent in those experi-
ences which are called mystical only in the broad sense. But 
that it is typical of the experience of mystics in the narrow 
sense of the term is apparent from their own testimony. James 
quoted Saint Teresa of Avila on this point: "Thus does God, 
when he raises a soul to union with himself, suspend the natural 
action of all her faculties. She neither sees, hears, nor 
22James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 293. 
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understands, so long as she is united with God."23 
Of all the qualities thought to be typical of mystical 
transports, however, the most characteristic is its incommuni-
cableness. Mystical truth exists only for the person who has 
the experience, not for anyone else. And for the individuals 
who have them, mystical states, "when well developed, usually 
are, and have the right to be, absolutely authoritative."24 
On the other hand, mystical states have !!2 authority over 
those who do not experience them. They do not impose upon the 
non-mystic any obligation to accept their revelations uncriti-
cally. Nevertheless, James pointed out~ the experiences of the 
mystics serve to break down the absolute authority which 
positivists and rationalists claim for sense and reason. Mys-
tical insight shows that consciousness based upon the senses 
and natural understanding alone is not the only kind of con-
sciousness. It indicates the possibility of other realms of· 
truth "in which, so far as anything in us vitally responds to 
them, we may freely continue to have faith."25 As James aptly 
put it, "the existence of mystical states absolutely overthrows 
the pretension of non-mystical states to be the sole and ulti-
mate dictators of what we may believe."26 
23The Interior Castle, Fifth Abode, ch. i, quoted in 
James, The Varieties of Religi·ous Experience, p. 314. 
24James, The Varieties of Religious E.Xperience, p. 323. 
25Ibid., p. 324. 
26Ibid., p. 327. 
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The mystic's experience is invulnerable as far as the at-
tacks of the Intellectualists are concerned, for no one can 
question another man's experience. If a man claims to exper-
ience God's presence, who can say that he does not? Further-
more, it is useless to argue him out of his conviction, for 
mystical experiences are as much direct perceptions of fact 
for the religious mystic as our sensations are for us. They 
are face to face presentations of what seems immediately to 
exist. 27 
James concluded that while the experiences of religious 
mystics do not prove God's existence or the reality of an 
unseen spiritual world for all men, they nevertheless vitiate 
the denials of rationalists and positivists and permanently 
undermine their pretensions to any exclusive franchise on truth. 
James felt that mystical experience opens the way for those of 
us not gifted with mystical revelat·ions to accept God on faith 
alone if such belief presents itself to us as salutary and 
advantageous.and if it is in agreement with the triadic struc-
ture of our minds. 
However, it is not only the mystic's religious belief 
which is empirically grounded.. On the contrary, even in the 
27From the point of view of the mystic, what is immedi-
ately revealed to him, while unutterable, is nevertheless a 
directly perceived and unquestionable fact. And from his 
point of view, his belief in it cannot be called faith because 
his mind is coerced by the apparent evidence. Furthermore, 
although in regard to ordinary perceptual data, which at the 
moment experienced is indubitable, doubt is possible later 
when one reflects upon his own fallibility, mystical experience 
carries with it a certain authority which uniquely leaves it 
unquestioned even when it is reflected upon at a later date. 
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religious creed of the non-mystic, there is, James said, a 
minimum content known by experience. This minimtim content 
may be nothing more than the awareness of being wrong, of 
being in need, of longing for deliverance; or it may be the 
experience of help or consolation flowing in from without 
following prayer or communion with some power thought to be 
external. 
In the view of William James, all religious belief is 
grounded in experience of some kind--either in mystical trans-
ports or in the non-mystic's experience of need and desire. 
And the objects which a religious person, m;istic or non-mystic, 
experiences directly and thus believes are not technically mat-
ters of faith for hi~. The presence of God directly experi-
enced by the mystic, for example, the need for help and the 
· reception of help on the part of the non-mystic--these are 
empirical facts for them. And their belief insofar as it 
extends only to these items is not faith in the technical 
sense of the term. 
Religious belief, however, does not stop at such minimum 
content. The intellect speculates upon the nature of the divine 
presence which may be directly perceived in a mystical trans-
port or upon the nature of the power from which help comes in 
the case of the non-mystic in need of deliverance. While 
experience points to the nature of the reality in question in 
both cases, the nature of the divine reality is not clearly 
and fully revealed by any experience, mystical or otherwise. 
And thus, beliefs concerning the divine nature take on the 
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aspect of faith. James calls them over-beliefs. They are 
beliefs which outstrip the empirical data; they go beyond the 
evidence provided by experience but always in the direction 
indicated by experience. Their objects are the objects of 
religious faith in its more technical sense. 
But while these non-empirical details of one's religious 
creed, these theological formulations, are not matters of 
direct experience, they are somehow rooted in experienced human 
needs. For the intellect develops its theological formulas 
along lines suggested by its own propensities. Each man 
tashions his God and builds out his religion in directions 
prescribed by his own temperament and by his emotional, voli-
tional, and intellectual wants. Experience, as it were, pro-
vides the fundamental, but bare, outline; but the intellect 
fills in the empty spaces and completes the picture along 
lines suggested by the individual's needs and personal sensi-
bilities. Thus, the intellect produces a creed consisting of 
experienced facts and over-beliefs--a creed that is consonant 
with the individual's life-style. 28 
It is with the religious man's over-beliefs that Intel-
lectualists are most likely to quarrel. If a man feels in 
need of help, if he feels that there is something wrong about 
him and that he needs to be delivered from his wrongness, they 
28of course, not every individual religious believer con-
structs the creed to which he subscribes all by himself. In-
deed, it may have been handed down to him by others. But his 
acceptance of that particular creed with its specific over-
beliefs in preference to another is determined by that creed's 
harmony with his own intellectual, emotional, and volitional 
constitution. 
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cannot deny his feelings. If a man experiences help, relief 
or consolation, they cannot question the fact although they 
may argue about the source of the consolation or about its 
significance. As James pointed out, the fact that a religious 
person is conscious of being continuous with a 'More' of the 
same quality through which saving experiences come is "a posi-
tive content of religious experience which ••• is literally 
and objectively true."29 But the exact nature of the 'More' 
and the nature of a man's relationship to it are the questions 
which, when answered by various theologians, result in the 
diversified creeds with which we are familiar. 
James suggested that the 'More' with which the religious 
man expe~iences himself to be in touch is the subconscious 
continuation of himself, the subliminal or 'transmarginal' 
area of his own consciousness; but he also suggested that 
this subliminal self is in contact with still another 'More' 
that is supernatural in character. "Let me then propose, as 
an hypothesis, that whatever it may be on its farther side, 
the 'more' with which in religious experience we feel ourselves 
connected is on its hither side the subconscious continuation 
.J of our conscious life. rr30 Indeed, whether the help we receive 
following prayer comes from a superhuman being or not, James 
said, it enters into our consciousness through the door of our 
subconscious. Atheists and naturalists, of course, would say 
29James, The Varieties of Religious Ex:perience, p. 388. 
3o~., P• 386. 
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that the subconscious is the highest source of this help and 
that beyond the subconscious there is nothing, i.e., nothing 
supernatural. The religious believer, on the other hand, would 
say that beyond himself, beyond his conscious and subconscious 
self, there is till a 'More'~a superhuman kind of conscious 
reality with which at the outermost limits of his being he is 
in contact and from which help comes. 
James felt that ~hen we ask what the 'More' is on its 
remoter side, when we ask just how far our transmarginal con-
sciousness carries us, where it terminates and what is beyond 
it, we are in the area of over-beliefs. We are asking ques-
tions which experience and logical reason cannot definitively 
answer. And whatever beliefs we accept regarding this 'More' 
on its remoter side, "we do so," James said, "in the exercise 
of our individual freedom, and build out our religion in the 
way most congruous with our personal susceptibilities."3l 
It is this deference to our personal susceptibilities, 
needs and desires which Intellectualists find most offensive. 
To interpret the 'More' on its farther side to be anything 
for which science and logic cannot account, simply because one 
desires or needs it to be such, indicates, from their point of 
view, a grossly irresponsible attitude toward the truth. 
As we saw earlier, desire and need, in the Intellectualists' 
opinion, should never influence belief. Belief should be deter-
mined only by evidence; and if evidence is lacking, judgment 
3libid., p. 388. 
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should be suspended, however strong be the desire or need for 
the object in question. Judgment should be suspended until 
evidence is forthcoming. Over-belief, i.e., belief that out-
strips the evidence, is, in the view of the Intellectualists, 
a vice to be avoided at all cost. 
William James, on the other hand, defended the right of 
individuals to their over-beliefs, whatever they might be. 
He went so far as to say that "the most interesting and valu-
able things about a man are usually his over-beliefs."32 
From the point of view of James, wha~ever enables us to 
assume the burdens of life enthusiastically; to devote our-
selves to life's task of opposing evil and promoting good with 
courage, generosity, and zest, is itself good and beneficial 
to us and to the world as a whole. And he felt that nothing 
does this quite so effectively as religious emotion, the reli-
gious excitement attendant upon the belief that one is part of 
a wider more spiritual world in which his ideals have ever-
lasting value. But, as James pointed out, very often this 
excitement, so salutary to man, will be aroused in an indivi-
dual only by certain intellectual ideas to which he, because 
of his personal mental constitution, is particularly suscep-
tible. These ideas, which may indeed be over-beliefs in the 
strict sense, i.e., beliefs which outstrip the evidence pro-
vided by experience and reason, will thus be essential to 
that person's religion and, in James's opinion, pragmatically 
32Ibid. 
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justified. Over-beliefs "in various directions are absolutely 
indispensable,"33 James said. They should be treated "with 
tenderness and tolerance so long as they are not intolerant 
themselves,"34 not only because no one is in possession of an 
absolute point of view from which he can criticize with author-
ity the faith of someone else, but more importantly because of 
their value for human life. As indicated above, it is a man's 
over-beliefs that generate in him the kind of religious excite-
ment which enables him to shoulder the responsibilities of 
life with courage, generosity, and even joy. Moreover, it is 
. 
often the enthusias~ which is sparked by his religious faith 
that makes a man a hero. Certainly faith which can produce 
such salutary effects deserves respect. 
Leaving pragmatic considerations aside, however, and con-
sidering only the possibility of verifying the truth or falsity 
of religious faith, James concluded that the verification of 
religious over-beliefs may indeed be possible only by means of 
an antecedent belief in them--an antecedent trust in the reve-
latory power of our needs and desires, the very presence of 
which may be an indication of the reality of their objects. 
James pointed out that Intellectualists do not object to our 
-
trusting our wants in other areas of human endeavor--in busi-
ness, art, and science, for example. Men of science, whom the 
Intellectualists revere, need and desire a uniform law of 
nature, for instance; they postulate it and act upon it; and 
33Ibid. 
-
34Ibid. 
-
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nature corroborates their faith. Who is to say, James asked, 
that the religious man, indulging his faith in the spiritual 
world which he desires, will not meet with similar success? 
In other cases divinations based on inner interests 
have proved prophetic enough. Take science itself! 
Without an imperious inner demand on our part for ideal 
logical and mathematical harmonies, we should never 
have attained to proving that such harmonies lie hidden 
between all the chinks and interstices of the crude 
natural world. Hardly a law has been established in 
science, hardly a fact ascertained, which was not first 
sought after, often with sweat and blood, to gratify 
an inner need. Whence such needs come from we do not 
know: we find them in us, and biological psychology 
so far only classes them with Darwin's 'accidental 
variations.• But the inner need of believing that 
this world of nature is a sign of something more spir-
itual and eternal than itself is just as strong and 
authoritative in those who feel it, as the inner need 
of uniform laws of causation ever can be in a profes-
sionally scientific head. The toil of many generations 
has proved the latter need prophetic. Why may not the 
former one be prophetic, too? And if needs of ours 
outrun the visible universe, why ma~ not that be a sign 
that an invisible universe is there.35 
James pointed-out that the animal, like man, also has 
needs and desires and that the animal's wants, which can all 
be satisfied in this sensible world, lead it to seek and to 
find satisfaction. Man's desires, however, cannot all be sat-
isfied in the visible world; indeed, many of them can find 
fulfillment only· in a world that is more spiritual. But if 
the brute, seeking the satisfaction of its needs, is ulti-
mately led to their fulfillment, may not man's other-worldly 
desires also.be fulfilled, if he but trust them enough to 
look for their objects? 
35James, "Is Life Worth Living?," Essays on Faith and 
Morals, pp. 24-25. 
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sires. This does not necessarily mean defining the unseen 
world in detail, and it certainly does not mean condemning 
beliefs different from one's own. Trusting one's religious 
demands, however, does mean living in the light of them; it 
means acting as though the unseen world is real. Religious 
belief in this sense is not much different from the working 
hypothesis of the man of science. In attempting to verify 
his theory, the scientist ;I 
acts as if it were true, and expects.the result to 
disappoint him if his assumption is fal·se. The longer 
disappointment is delayed, the stronger grows his faith 
in his theory. 
Now, in such questions as God, immortality, abso-
lute morality, and free-will, no non-papal believer 
at the present day pretends his faith to be of an 
essentially different complexion; he can always doubt 
his creed. But his intimate persuasion is that the 
odds in its favor are strong enough to warrant h~w in 
acting all along on the assumption of its truth.~6 
Indeed, it may be that only by such antecedent faith, i.e., 
by our acting as if the religious hypothesis is true, will 
verification of it ever come at all. After all, the religious 
hypothesis represents the divine part of reality as having 
personal form. It may very well be that telling evidence that 
there is such a God whose attitude toward us is friendly may 
be withheld until we make the first move, until we meet the 
hypothesis half-way, until we extend our hand to God as it were; 
for we may be dealing with the type of reality that will appear 
only to the believer. In human relations, it is very often 
36James, "The Sentiment of Rationality," Essays on Faith 
and Morals, p. 95. 
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one person's trust that another will like him and his conse-
quent willingness to be the first to offer friendship that 
makes the second person's liking actually come at all. The 
situation may be analogously similar in the case of relations 
between divine and human personalities. Perhaps telling evi-
dence of divine good will in our behalf may be forever with-
held from us unless we are willing to believe the religious 
hypothesis in advance of such evidence. In James's words, 
just as a man who in a company of gentlemen made no 
advances, asked a warrant for every concession, and be-
lieved no one's word without proof, would cut himself 
off by such churlishness from all the social rewards 
that a more trusting spirit would earn,--so here, one 
who should shut himself up in snarling logicality and 
try to make the gods extort his recognition willy-
nilly, or not get it at all, might cut himself off 
forever from his only opportunity of making the gods' 
acquaintance.37 ' 
Certainly, that evidence for God's reality which comes 
under the aspect of· responses to our prayers--help in the form 
of inspiration, for example, new spiritual energy, strength 
in the face of formidable difficulties--will not come until 
we pray. But to pray presupposes belief in the reality of the 
one to whom we pray; it presupposes faith in his love and con-
cern for us, in his power to help, in his willingness to come 
to our aid. Furthermore, to pray presupposes ~willingness 
to put our fate in his hands; and this is faith in the fullest 
sense of the term. For religious faith is more than mere 
acceptance of God as real •. It involves giving ourselves up 
to his will. All belief, of course, involves some active 
~~~P-·~5~9-~-7_J_am~e-s~,~"-T_h_e~W-i~l-l~t-o~B•e•l•i•e•v•e•,•'•'•E•s•s•a~ys nn Faith a~ Morals, 
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response to the object accepted as a reality; but the nature 
0£ the divine is such that self-surrender is the only appropri-
ate response that we can make to it. 
Thus, James pointed out, the very evidence which the 
Intellectualists said must antedate belie£ will not come un-
less it itself is antedated by belief. We are dealing with a 
reality, the very access to which requires faith; and obedi-
ence to the admonition of the Intellectualists would put 
entirely out of our reach in this life a whole realm of truth 
which is indispensable for life's happy and fruitful fulfill-
ment. 
Indeed, if there is a God and if the successful outcome 
of this world depends, not only upon what we as human beings 
do, but also upon God's work--upon God's helping us and others 
in answer to our prayers, for example,--then certainly our 
prayers and the faith they presuppose are indispensable to 
the world's well-being. Indeed, if such is the case, religion, 
as William James said, is man's most important function in the 
universe. But that such is the case can only be empirically 
verified by our acting in advance as though it is true. Veri-
fication will come, if it comes at all, only if we first 
espouse the religious hypothesis by faith and live by it. 
Certainly, then, the Intellectualists' admonition, to 
suspend judgment until the evidence is all in, is an unreason-
able one; for to suspend judgment in regard to the religious 
hypothesis is in effect to act as though it were false. And 
in so doing, we lose the bounty to be gained by believing it 
r 251 just as surely as if we positively denied it. As James indi-
cated, in an issue of such magnitude, we cannot afford to wait 
for verification; to be on the winning side at the end, we 
must get on it now. Surely science and philosophy, which can 
neither prove nor disprove religion's truth, can issue no pro-
hibitions to us here. 
Furthermore, from James's point of view, absolute certi-
tude about the truth of any factual proposition is not possible 
in this life, as we saw above.38 For although the human mind 
can possess the truth about reality, it cannot be infallibly 
certain that it has that truth even when it does in fact pos-
sess it. Thus, except for the data of the present moment of 
consciousness, doubt is always possible. And for this reason, 
the prescription of the Intellectualists, to wait for conclu-
sive evidence before believ~ng anything, is unrealistic and 
impractical. 
'When I look at the religious question as it really puts 
itself to concrete men, and when I think of all the 
possibilities which both practically and theoretically 
it involves, then this command that we shall put a 
stopper on our heart, instincts, and courage, and wait--
acting of course meanwhile more or less as if religiOI:i 
were not true--till doomsday, or till such time as our 
intellect and senses working together may have raked 
in evidence enough,--this comm.and, I say, seems to me 
the queerest idol ever manufactured in the philosophic 
cave. Were we scholastic absolutists, there might be 
more excuse. If we had an infallible intellect with 
its objective certitudes, we might feel ourselves dis-
loyal to. such a perfect organ of knowledge in not· 
trusting to it exclusively, in not waiting for its 
releasing word. But if we are empiricists, if we 
believe that no bell in us tolls to let us know for 
38see above, Chapter II, pp. 57-63; Chapter III, pp. 111-
113. 
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certain when truth is in our grasp, then it seems a 
piece of idle fantasticality to preach so solemnly our 
duty of waiting for the bell. Indeed we may wait if 
we will,--I hope you do not think that I am denying 
that,--but if we do so, we do so at our peril as much 
as if we believed. In either case we act, taking our 
life in our hands.39 
In the question of God, then, as in all questions which 
cannot be definitively answered by sense and reason, James 
defended each man's right to believe or not to believe as he 
wills. "No one of us ought to issue vetoes to the other, nor 
should we bandy words of abuse. We ought, on the contrary, 
delicately and profoundly to respect one another's mental 
freedom •• • • 
In James's opinion, however, although it is a man's right 
to believe or disbelieve as he chooses, believing is to his 
advantage and that of the world at large. As far as the indi-
vidual man is concerned, the belief that he and the things he 
cherishes are in the care of a loving God enables him to bear 
the sufferings and hardships of life with fortitude, equanimity, 
and a happiness that transcends all merely natural joy. More-
over, religious belief sparks him to vigorous moral action. 
Believing that he and God are working together for ideals 
which they both hold dear, the religious man eagerly under-
takes the task of promoting good and eliminating evil and is 
able to do what life demands of him with ease and enthusiasm. 
39James, "The Will to Believe," Essays on Faith and Morals, 
pp. 60-61. 
4oibid., p. 61. 
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The benefits of religious belief for the world are not 
1 unrelated to its benefits for the individual. Since the world 
is what people by their living make it, whatever salutary 
effects religion may have on individual lives also benefit the· 
world as a whole. In making a man a better person, religious 
belief makes him also a better citizen of the community and of 
the world. His moral action, for example, is directed not 
only toward his own good and that of his family but also toward 
the good o! his neighbors, the community, and the world at 
large. And the evils which he seeks to eliminate are not 
. 
merely his own private ills but those that afflict others as 
well. As Jam.es pointed out, saintly men sacrifice themselves 
every day for God and their fellow-men. Moreover, the example 
of the saintly man inspires others to live lives of faith also 
and to emulate the saint's virtues. Indeed religious men, act-
ing as "a leaven of righteousness in the world, 1141 help to 
bring mankind as a whole to a higher level of perfection. 
As far as the objective truth or falsity of religion's 
claims is concerned, William James himself looked at the ques-
tion pragmatically; and from his pragmatistic point of view, 
the beneficial character of religion cannot be separated from 
the question of its truth. According to his pragmatistic 
principles, if an hypothesis works satisfactorily in the widest 
sense, it is true. James concluded that because of the uses 
of religion to man and to the world at large there must be 
41James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 290. 
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hypothesis of God works and works well. Not only does it 
work, but more than any other hypothesis proposed to man's 
belief, it makes human life worth living and the world itself 
a good place in which to live it. 
111 :1,~ 
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CHAprER VII 
A MAN OF FAITH 
No era in recorded human history has been free of pain 
and suffering. The human situation as described by-men through 
the centuries has always been less than paradisiacal. Man 
has suffered a variety of indignities at the hands of the 
world; in every age he has known poverty and want, disease, 
. 
loneliness, and oppression, not to mention the horrors of war 
which in every era has raged in one corner of the world or 
another. History has indeed been a "bath of blood,"1 as 
William James pointed out. 
The world with its ever-present phenomena of human suffer-
ing has provided reflective men through the ages with inex-
haustible material for speculation. Few philosophers have 
failed to be troubled by the presence of evil in the world; 
and their attempts to reconcile it with some kind of reasonable 
account of reality have·ranged anywhere from ushering it out 
of existence under the cloak of illusion to considering it as 
real but somehow a blessing in disguise. What particular role 
evil plays in the drama of life depends upon which philosopher 
is describing the action. Among the various attitudes which 
1James, "The Moral Equivalent of War," Essays on Faith and 
Morals, p. 312. 
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men professing wisdom had adopted toward evil, two extremes 
can be found--that of extreme optimism and that of radical 
pessimism. Unmitigated optimism is inclined to see evil as 
somehow less than real. The monistic Idealists, whom William 
James opposed so vigorously in his day, were of this frame of 
mind. They asserted that reality is completely one, unchang-
ing, and good--an Absolute of which experienced multiplicity, 
change and evil are but appearances.2 Their gospel was that 
experienced phenomena are but manifestations of this Absolute, 
which in itself is perfect in every way; thus they bade man to 
rejoice because evil is not real at all. 
At the opposite pole, the radically pessimistic philosopher 
finds evil so all-pervasive that good seems almost non-exis-
tent.3 Evil in one form or another appears to be the only real 
2The Idealist, F. H. Bradley, wrote the following in regard 
to evil: "Evil and good are not illusions, but they are most 
certainly appearances. They are one-sided aspects, each over-
ruled and transmuted in the Whole •••• As with truth and error, 
so with good and bad, the opposition is not absolute. For, to 
some extent and in some manner, perfection is everywhere real-
ized •••• The Absolute is perfect in all its detail, it is 
equally true and good throughout.n (Appearance and Reality, 
p. 401.) See above, Chapter I, p. l?. . . 
3In the pessimistic philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, 
every individual thing, which is but an appearance of the one 
noumenal reality, the Will to·live, tries to assert its own 
existence at the expense of other things. Hence, the phenomenal 
world is one of conflict. Schopenhauer's pessimistic attitude 
toward life is especially evident in the following passage: "If 
life were in itself a blessing to be prized, and decidedly to 
be preferred to non-existence, the exit from it would not need 
to be guarded by such fearful sentinels as death and its ter-
rors. But who would continue in life as it is if death were 
less terrible? And again, who could even endure the thought 
of death if life were a pleasure! But thus the former has still 
always this good, that it is the end of life, and we console 
ourselves with regard to the suffering of life with death, and 
I 
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force in the world, or at least the force which is destined 
ultimately to triumph. At first glance, despair seems to be 
the only appropriate response to a world so conceived. And yet 
thinkers of a pessimistic frame of mind never cease to look 
for some way in which to live with the inexorable gloom of 
their philosophy. They all seek some compensating factors in 
life in spite of its impending doom. Some exhort man to grasp 
as much pleasure as he can, since no matter how he lives, in 
their view, death is the final end of everything. Others advo-
cate a stoical resignation in the face of pain; and still 
others suggest a militant struggle against evil, the hopeless-
ness of' the fight notwithstanding. 
Although contemporary existentialism is not necessarily 
pessimistic, it does give us some examples of modern man's 
efforts to cope with life viewed pessimistically. For instance, 
Jean-Paul Sartre, seeing death as man's ultimate destin.y, 4 
counsels man to achieve authentic existence in this life by 
facing the truth of his situation and by accepting the respon-
sibility of his freedom in the alien world in which he is aban-
doned.5 To fail to admit one's freedom and total responsibility, 
j. with regard to death with the suffering of' life." (The World as 
Will and Idea, III, trans. by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp [London: 
Trtlbner & Co., Ludgate Hill, 1886], p. 389.) 
411 
••• death haunts me at the very heart of each of my 
projects as their inevitable reverse side." (Jean-Paul Sartre, 
Bein~ and Nothin~ess, trans. by Hazel E. Barnes [New York: 
bita el Press, 1 6], p. 523.) 
5nr am responsible for everything, in fact, except for my 
very responsibility, for I am not the foundation of my being. 
Therefore everything takes place as if I were compelled to be 
' t 
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Sartre claims, is to live inauthentically. To expect help from 
heaven or to lay the responsibility for what happens in the 
world upon God is to hide the truth from oneself and to flee 
the anguish of one's situation in bad faith. 
Somewhat mo.re appealing, perhaps, is the prescription of 
Albert Camus. Although he, too, suggested a rather stoical 
approach to life and advocated living in the truth of the 
situation, he did feel that some kind of joy is possible for 
1, 
11 
11,· men in this world in spite of the fact that death may indeed 
be the ultimate end of everything.6 Camus !elt that men can 
find at least a limited kind of happiness in loving solidarity 
with each other and in their common rebellion against suffering 
and evil. He did not believe that rebelling against evil will 
eliminate it altogether, however.? But he did feel that the 
responsible. I am abandoned in the world, not in the sense that 
I might remain abandoned and passive in a hostile universe like 
a board floating on the water, but rather in the sense that I 
find myself suddenly alone and without help, engaged in a world 
for which I bear the whole responsibility without being able, 
whatever I do, to tear myself away from this responsibility for 
an instant." (Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 531-32.) 
6camus did not categorically deny.God and immortality, but 
he said that he could not believe in them. Speaking at the 
Dominican Monastery of Latour-Maubourg in 1948, Camus said, 
"• •• I wish to declare also that, not feeling that I possess 
any absolute truth or any message, I shall never start from 
the supposition that Christian truth is illusory, but merely 
from the fact that I could not. accept it." (Albert Camus, "The 
Unbeliever and Christians " Resistance Rebellion, and Death, 
trans. by Justin O'Brien LNew York: Moaern Library, 1966], p. 52.) 
?"Rebellion indefatigably confronts evil, from which it 
can only derive a new impetus. Man can master in himself every-
thing that should be mastered. He should rectify in creation 
everything that can be rectified. And after he has done so, 
children will still die unjustly even in a perfect society. 
Even by his greatest effort man can only propose to diminish 
I 
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man who revolts against suffering and oppression shares in the 
struggles and destiny of all men and, in this solidarity with 
all other human beings, finds a measure of joy. "Our brothers 
are breathing under the same sky as we; justice is a living 
thing. Now is born that strange joy which helps one live and 
die. • • • 
The loving revolt against human suffering which Camus 
advocated was not unlike the moralistic approach to life that 
suggested itself to William James in his youth. At that time, 
as we noted above,9 James sometimes found it difficult to be-
lieve in God and for a time seemed drawn toward a materialistic 
philosophy. Materialism, however, promised James nothing but 
the ultimate destruction of himself and all that he cherished. 
Struggling to live with the illness which plagued him in those 
years and the anticipated darkness of the future, James looked 
to moralism to give meaning to his life. He felt that in 
spite of materialism's promised annihilation of himself and 
all that he held dear,10 he could still tind some satisfaction 
in living by helping his fellow-men to suffer less and to 
arithmetically the sufferings of the world. But the injustice 
and the suffering of the world will remain and, no matter how 
limited they are, they will not cease to be an outrage." 
(Albert Camus, The Rebel, trans. by Anthony Bower, with a Fore-
word by Sir Herbert Read [New York: Vintage Books, 1959], p. 
303.) 
8~., p. 306. 
9see above, Chapter I, pp. 9-12. 
10see above, Chapter I, p. 11. 
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. 11 
enJOY more. 
However, just as the compensations of Sartre.' s. authentic 
existence and the consolations of Camus's fraternal solidarity 
with other men leave something to be desired when one consi-
ders that death is still one's ultimate destiny, so too the 
pure moralism which attracted the youthful William James was 
somewhat less than satisfying and indeed was incapaple of 
completely neutralizing the effects of the pessimism to which 
.his temporarily materialistic view of life was conducive. 
As James himself came to realize, while a purely moral-
istic approach to life may steel one to bear life's hardships 
and help him to survive in a world in which evil is destined 
to have the last word, it cannot enable a person to live with 
any genuine enthusiasm or real happiness. A world in which 
one's efforts can produce no lasting results, a world which 
11rn 1868, William James wrote the following in a letter 
to his friend, Tom Ward: "All I can tell you is the thought 
that with me outlasts all others, and onto which, like a rock, 
I find myself washed up when the waves of doubt are weltering 
over all the rest of the world; and that is the thought of my 
having a will, and of my belonging to a brotherhood of men pos-
sessed of a capacity for pleasure and pain of different kinds. 
For even at one's lowest ebb of belief, the fact remains empir-
ically certain (and by our will we can, if not absolutely re-
frain from looking beyond that empirical fact, at least :prac-
tically and on the whole accept it and let it suffice us)--
that men suffer and enjoy. And if we have to give up all hope 
of seeing into the purposes of_ God, or to give up theoretically 
the idea of final causes, and of God anyhow as vain and leading 
to nothing for us, we can, by our will, make the enjoyment of 
our brothers stand us in the stead of a final cause; and through 
a knowledge of the fact that that enjoyment on the whole depends 
on what individuals accomplish, lead a life so active, and so 
sustained by a clean conscience as not to need to fret much." 
(The Letters of William James, I, 130.) See above, Chapter I, 
p. 14. 
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promises nothing but the ultimate decay of all the ideals to 
which a man aspires seems not to be capable of calling forth 
his best efforts or of tapping the depths of his personal re-
sources. Indeed, a world viewed pessimistically is a world 
alien to man. It is a world in which man's hopes and ideal 
aspirations have no real objects. It is a world in which 
man's inclinations to create lasting goodness and beauty have 
no relevance--a world in which man with his natural propensity 
to fashion the universe for the better is somehow out of place. 
Even moralism, whatever form it takes, canno.t compensate for 
the foreignness of such a world. 
Consequently, however inclined James may have been to see 
life pessimistically in his youth, he could not rest content 
with such a dark view of things; and he later rejected pessi-
mism as an attitude that is useless, fruitless, and corrosive. 
It is corrosive because by negating man's ideal motives for 
action, pessimism tends to stifle man's active tendencies and 
to render him apathetic, indolent, and even cynical. However, 
while James would not approach the world pessimistically, 
neither could he look at it with unqualified optimism. A uni-
verse in which evil has no part--a world such as the one 
described by monistic Idealism, i.e., a world in which pain 
and suffering are but illusory appearances of the perfect 
Absolute--such a world was just as foreign to William James 
as the radically evil state of affairs posited by extremely 
pessimistic philosophers. A completely optimistic picture of 
reality simply did not square with William James's experience. 
L 
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He had lived through pain and suffering, both mental and physi-
cal; and he could not close his eyes to evil; he could not 
blink it away. But more than this, the seemingly cheerful 
picture of reality painted by Idealism was not cheerful at all 
--at least not from James's point of view; for it was totally 
alien, not only to James's experience, but more importantly to. 
his aspirations and to what he knew to be the aspirations of 
most men. James felt that most men shared with him the desire 
to be a match for the universe and to feel that their active 
powers were relevant to the world and its n~eds. 
Ye demand in it [the universe] a character for which 
our emotions and active propensities shall be a match. 
Small as we are, minute as is the point by which the 
cosmos impinges upon each one of us, each one desires 
to feel that his reaction at that point is congruous 
with the demands of the vast whole,--that he balances 
the latter, so to speak, and is able to do what it 
expects of him.12 
In James's opinion~ man has a natural instinct to do, to make, 
to ereate~in general to contribute to the growth, development, 
and perfection of the universe by his actions. However, if as 
monistic Idealism claimed, the world is completely finished 
and perfectly good and beautiful independently of all human 
activity, then indeed men's aspirations to act creatively and 
to contribute something lasting and worthwhile to the universe 
are pointless and vain. Paradoxically, when forced upon a 
man with such active propensities as those of William James, 
the extremely optimistic view of monistic Idealism could 
12James, "The Sentiment of Rationality," Essays on Faith 
and Morals, p. 84. 
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easily turn into pessimism and despair. 
Thus, James could be neither a radical pessimist nor an 
unmitigated optimist. He characterized his own view of real-
ity as melioristic. In James's opinion, the world indeed has 
its bad points, but it has its good ones too; and_ there is 
no reason why the proportions of good and evil must remain the 
same. The balance can certainly shift in either direction 
depending upon how men live their lives. Indeed it can become 
worse; but what James found heartening was the fact that the 
world is an open world, the fact that the world can improve 
and that the amount of good in it can increase and even out-
weigh the evil as the result of human activities. 
The world, in William James's melioristic view, is not 
totally alien to men as it is when seen pessimistically or 
optimistically. There is a.proportion between the world and 
man's active powers; in fact the world is in some degree plas-
tic in man's hands. Certainly it offers resistance, but this 
fact only increases the challenge and heightens the sense of 
adventure in the man who sets out to change things for the 
better. The resistance of brute facts notwithstanding, James 
felt that the world has shown itself susceptible to modifica-
tion by human activity. 
Thus James's world can be described not only as melior-
istic but also as humanistic; for it is a world which in large 
measure is what men have made it and which can become as good 
as they want it to be. In James's mind, human powers seem to 
be singularly adapted to changing the world. As we saw 
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above,13 man's receptive faculties present the sensible world 
to him, his theoretic faculty reflects upon the sensory pre-
sentations and then defines the way in which his active powers 
will react to them; finally by his active powers, man responds 
to the world and affects it for better or worse. James be-
lieved that the world was given to man to fashion and complete; 
and strangely enough, it is by fashioning his own life that 
man fashions the world. Indeed what man makes of himself 
determines what he makes of the universe. The good that he 
builds into his own existence not only becom~s part of the 
world's goodness but inspires other men to be good and to do 
good also. Man's happiness and success become the worl4's 
happiness and success. 
In Ja.mes's opinion, however, genuinely happy successful 
living is possible only to men of faith. In fact, the suc-
cess of the world as a whole depends upon human willingness 
to believe beyond the evidence when any situation calls for it. 
Fruitful human existence, for example, demands that men believe 
in themselves and in their own powers. The lack of evidence 
notwithstanding, they must believe in their ability to know 
truth. Furthermore, they must believe in their ability to act 
or not to act, as they choose; in other words, they must have 
raith in their own freedom. 
Furthermore, if they are to eliminate the causes of pain 
and suffering in the world to any extent and to produce the 
13see above, Chapter III, p. 103. 
r 
I 
265 
conditions conducive to human happiness and well-being, they 
must believe that their powers are relevant to the universe, 
that evil is exorable and that what happens in the universe 1s 
not rigidly determined independently of them. They must have 
faith in unrealized ideals--at least in the possibility of 
their actualization. However, no iess important than a man's 
faith in himself and in his ideals is his faith in other men. 
Any man's efrective contribution to the world demands that he 
believe in other men's good intentions and in their willing-
ness and ability to do their share of the.work in fashioning 
the universe. As William James pointed out, the world will be 
a success only if each person, trusting that every other man 
will do his best, does his own part with vigor and courage. 
James knew that it~ take courage to do one's best in 
the work of the world. For the results of one's efforts are 
not certified in advance. The changing character of experience, 
the fallibility of human knowledge, and the appearance of un-
foreseen consequences are such that it is not possible to know 
with.absolute certitude what the best course of action in a 
given case is or the exact results which a proposed plan of 
activity will effect. If a man waits for certitude in these 
matters, he will probably not act at all. Effective human 
action thus requires faith; and because faith involves risks--
the risk of error and the risk of failure, for example--faith 
demands courage and daring. In short, faith requires an 
adventurous spirit. 
However, it is difficult, if not impossible to act with 
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courage and daring if the goals that one seeks are, at most, 
only temporary goods that will eventually pass into nothing-
ness, if one's heroic efforts can produce no lasting results,· 
it all the goodness and beauty that one strives to realize are 
doomed to inevitable annihilation--as the materialists of 
William James's day were wont to suggest. The courageous and 
even heroic human action which the world's salvation demands, 
therefore, can best be exercised by men who see this world as 
~ than mere matter in motion. The men who are most capable 
of changing the world for the better are those who see it as 
14. but a "part of a more spiritual universe" in which superior 
powers, friendly to men, hold good and righteous things dear 
and guarantee the survival of the ideals which men cherish and 
for which they work. In other words, the men who can do the 
most good for the world are those who have faith not only in 
themselves and in other men but more importantly in God. 
William James believed that if a man is to do his best in 
the work of the world, he has need of religious faith. Purely 
moral effort may enable him to do what is necessary for sur-
vival in a grudging spirit of resignation. But religious faith 
is necessary to spark him to vigorous and enthusiastic moral 
action. Nothing can inspire a man to the heroic virtue of 
which he is capable quite so effectively as the knowledge that 
the ideals for which he fights are divinely esteemed and have 
everlasting value. Not only does religious faith bolster 
14James, The Varieties of Religious Elcperience, p. 367. 
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a man's ~ighting spirit,' but the knowledge that there is a 
God who helps and protects him, a God who will guarantee that 
all will be well no matter what happens, gives him the equanim-
ity and stability to fulfill his obligations in spite of all 
the adversity that might otherwise undermine his effectiveness. 
As James pointed out in "The Gospel of Relaxation," there is 
very little that inhibits us and destroys our effective power 
as much as worry; and "the sovereign cure for worry is reli-
gious .faith. 1115 Faith is indeed the great antidote to anxiety. 
As James said, 
to him who has a hold on vaster and more permanent 
realities the hourly vicissitudes of his personal des-
tiny seem relatively insignificant things. The really 
religious person is accordingly unshakable and full 
of equanimity, and calmly ready for any duty that the 
day may bring rorth.16 
Yilliam James did not mean to suggest that the religious man 
does not suffer, nor did he mean to suggest that the religious 
man faces the trials and tribulations of life without great 
feeling or emotion. The religious man may, in fact, suffer 
greatly; he may indeed be emotionally shaken by the great 
tragedies of life just as other men are. But the tragedies of 
his life do not shake his resolve to pursue that which is good 
and avoid that which is evil. They do not shake his belief in 
God's loving care of him or turn him aside from the fulfill-
ment of his duties. 
The importance of faith in God for the well-being of the 
l5James, "The Gospel of Relaxation," Essays on Faith and 
Morals, p. 255. 
16Ibid., PP• 255-56. 
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world is made still clearer by a further consideration no less 
practical than those that have gone before. If God does exist, 
James pointed out, and if the world's salvation depends upon 
God's help given at the prayerful request of men, then certainly 
the faith which prayer presupposes is indispensable. 
In James's mind, there was no doubt that the world would 
rare best if it were in the hands of men of faith--men who 
believed in themselves, in other men, and above all in God. 
Whether James realized it or not, he himself was such a man 
of faith--a man who believed in himself (al~hough not without 
effort), trusted other men, and believed that God actively 
shared his own concern for the triumph of that which is good 
and righteous. 
William James's belief in himself, however, was not a 
spontaneous belief; rather·it involved a deliberate act of 
his will. His belief in himself and in his powers to act 
responsibly and fruitfully was an attitude which, as a young 
man, he .forced himself to adopt in the face of physical and 
mental difficulties which might have made a weaker man accept 
permanent de.feat and resign himself to a life of passivity and 
uselessness. The inactivity which James's physical ailments 
seemed to force upon him in his youth and his numerous attacks 
of neurasthenia afflicted him with a kind of moral paralysis. 
Moreover, his early philosophical reflections, tending, as 
they sometimes did, toward materialistic determinism, suggested 
to him that a life of moral impotence and futility was his 
inescapable fate. Inspired by his reading of Renouvier, 
§ 
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however, Jam.es eventually came to see that determinism was no 
more a proven fact than freedom was and that whether one was 
a determinist or an indeterminist depended upon one's choice. 
And William James, himself, chose to believe in freedom, par-
ticularly in his own freedom and in his ability to affect the 
world for the better by the consequences of his free choices. 
As his diary reveals, James chose to believe in his. own indi-
vidual worth and creative power. 1? 
Determinism was not the only philosophical attitude which 
could stifle activity, however. The skepticism to which re-
flection upon man's fallibility often led could be just as 
paralyzing as philosophical determinism, for action presupposes 
conviction. But James would not allow either determinism or 
skepticism to relegate him to a life of moral or intellectual 
l?nr think that yesterday was a crisis in my life. I fin-
ished the rirst part of Renouvier's second ·~ssais' and see no 
reason why his definition of Free Will--'the sustaining of a 
thought because I choose to when I might have other thoughts' 
--need be the definition of an illusion. At any rate, I will 
assume for the present--until next year--that it is no illu-
sion. ~.tY first act of free will shall be to believe in free 
will. For the remainder of the year, I will abstain from the 
mere speculation and contemplative Grublei in which my nature 
takes most delight, and voluntarily cUltivate the feeling of 
moral freedom, by reading books favorable to it, as well as by 
acting •••• Hitherto, when I have felt like ~aking a free 1ni-
tiative, like daring to act originally, without carefully wait-
ing for contemplation of the external world to determine all 
for me, suicide seemed the most manly form to put my daring 
into; now, I will go a step further with my will, not only act 
wi~h it, but believe as well; believe in my individual reality 
and creative power. My belief, to be sure, can't be optimis-
tic--but I will posit 11fe (the r~al, the good) in the self-
governin~ resis~ance of the ego to the world. Life shall [be 
built inj doing and suffering and creating." ("Diary," The 
Writings of William James, pp. ?-8.) See above, Chapter-I, 
pp. 20-21. 
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stagnation. He assumed, without the· proo.f that rationalists 
demanded, that it is possible .for man to know truth. Realiz-
ing, however, that man cannot be sure that he has truth even 
when he does in fact possess it and that, except for the data 
of the present moment, doubt is always possible regarding 
matters of fact, James was willing to espouse a life o.f action 
based upon probabilities assumed as true--in short, a life of 
action based upon .faith.18 
This .faith which William James exercised, however, was not 
a blind faith; it was not arbitrary and irresponsible. \.Jhen 
evidence was available he heeded it; when evidence was lacking 
and the issues wer·e insigni.ficant, he was inclined to suspend 
judgment and to maintain a 'wise skepticism.• But when the 
issues were vital, when action was required, or when suspending 
judgment was equivalent to disbelief, then James, like the 
practical man that he was, believed what it was necessary to 
believe in order to act effectively and felicitously in spite 
of the lack of evidence. ~'Ven in this case, however, his 
belief was not arbitrary. The facts had to be such that what 
he chose to believe was at least a real possibility. 
I.f ever William James's .faith could be considered 
1811Skepticism, or unrest, in short, can always have the 
last word. After every definition o.f an object, reflection 
may arise, in.feet it with the cogito, and so discriminate it 
.from the object in se. This is possible ad infinitum. That 
we do not all do it is because at a certain point most of us 
get tired of the play, resolve to stop, and assuming something 
.for true, pass on to a li.fe o.f action based on that." (James, 
"Lewes's 'Problems o.f Life and Mind,'" Collected Essays and 
Reviews, p. 10.) 
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prodigal, it would have to be in regard to other people. In 
spite of the blindness from which James claimed all men suffer 
relative to the lives of others, he himself believed fervently 
in the individual worth of every human being, in the signifi-
cance of every human life. 
Wherever a process of life communicates an eager-
ness to him who lives it, there the life becomes genu-
inely significant •••• wherever it [eagerness] is 
found, there is the zest, the tingle, the excitement 
of reality; and there is 'importance' in the only real 
and positive sense in Wliich importance ever anywhere 
can be.19 
But, James said, we may easily miss this importance, this sig-
nificance, in the life of another; for we feel the importance 
of our own lives so intensely that we are easily blinded to 
the presence of this same feeling in others. Thus we often 
find it difficult, if not impossible, to judge accurately and 
properly to assess the value of other people's lives. 
James felt that if we could look at each person through 
the eyes of love, we would see that every human being's "life-
throbs ~ among the wonders of creation. "20 Indeed, .the 
shadows of intolerance, prejudice, and cruelty would soon dis-
appear in the brightness of such a vision. 
Every Jack sees in his own particular Jill charms 
and perfections to the enchantment of which we stolid 
onlookers are stone-cold. And which has the superior 
view of the absolute truth, he or we? Which has the 
more vital insight into the nature of Jill's existence, 
l9James, "On a Certain Blindness in Hu.man Beings," .r.:ssays 
on Faith and Morals, pp. 262-63. 
20James, "What Makes a Life Significant?," Essays on Faith 
and Morals, p. 28b. 
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as a fact? Is he in excess, being in this matter a 
maniac? or are we in defect, being victims of a patho-
logical anaesthesia as regards Jill's magical impor-
tance? Surely the latter; surely to Jack are the pro-
founder truths revealed; surely poor Jill's palpitating 
little life-throos ~ among the wonders of creation, 
are worthy of this sympathetic interest; and it is to 
our phame that the rest of us cannot feel like Jack. 
For Jack realizes Jill concretely, and we do not. He 
struggles toward a union with her inner life, divining 
her feelings, anticipating her desires, understanding 
her limits as manfully as he can, and yet inadequately, 
too; for he is also afflicted with some blindness, even 
here. Whilst we, dead clods that we are, do not even 
seek after these things, but are contented that that 
portion of eternal fact named Jill should be for us as 
if it were not. Jill, who knows her inner life, knows 
that Jack's way of taking it--so importantly--is the 
true and serious way; and she responds to the truth in 
him by taking him truly and seriously too. May the 
ancient blindness never wrap its clouds about either 
of them again! Where would any of us be, were there no 
one willing to know us as we really-are or ready to 
repay us for our insight by making recognizant return? 
We ought, all-of us, to realize each other in this in-
tense, pathetic, and important way.21 
William James knew that genuine knowledge involves sympathy and 
love. He knew that love enables one somehow to enter into the 
very interior of the reality to be known, and that the result 
is an intuition of that reality which the non-lover can never 
possess. As James indicated in "Is Life Worth Living?," the 
heart is "our deepest organ of communication with the nature 
of things. 1122 
For the most part, however, our blindness is such that we 
cannot view each and every human being with the same sympathe-
tic interest.with which a lover views his beloved. Because 
21Ibid., pp. 285-86. 
22James, "Is Life worth Living?," Essays on Faith and 
Morals, p. 31. 
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most of us do not love enough, we seldom penetrate into the 
inner lives of others and rarely do we discern even dimly the 
significance of their lives as they experience it. Neverthe-
less, the knowledge of our blindness, James said, ought make 
us beware of intolerance, indifference, and cruelty. 
James, himself, was a man of great tenderness and sympathy 
for others. Indeed, he may have vigorously opposed a philo-
sophical position with which he disagreed, but the person of 
the philosopher whose views he could not accept he held in 
reverent esteem. And he defended the man's right to believe 
whatever made his life more livable and happy, however diver-
gent his beliefs might have been from those of James himself. 
No doubt James did not realize that he was in fact describ-
ing himself when he spoke of certain individuals being blessed 
with an extraordinary talent for friendship. Such persons, 
he said, take a singular delight in the lives of others and 
"know more of truth than if their hearts were not so big. 1123 
That James himself was such a person is evident; his published 
correspondence reveals the multitude of his friends and the 
very tender reverence and affection with which he regarded them. 
He truly delighted in the lives of his fellow-men and seemed 
gifted with a singularly vivid realization of the beauty and 
significance of each one. James exhorted all men to be ever 
on the alert for the richness that surrounds them in the lives 
23 
James, "What Makes a Life Significant?," .l!;ssays on Faith 
and Morals, p. 286. 
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of other people • 
• • • no outward changes of condition in life can keep 
the nightingale of its eternal meaning rrom singing in 
all sorts of different men's hearts. That is the main 
fact to remember. If we could not only admit it with 
our lips, but really and truly believe it, how our con-
vulsive insistencies, how our antipathies and dreads 
of each other, would soften down! If the poor and the 
rich could look at each other in this way, sub s¥ecie 
aeternatis, how gentle would grow their disputes: what 
tolerance and good humor, what willi~gness to .live and 
let live, would come into the world!24 
Although William James did not subscribe to any particular 
creed and was not at all attracted toward institutionalized 
religion, he was unquestionably a man of religious raith •. He 
pro.fessed a belief in God, i.e., he believed in the reality or 
some kind of superhuman consciousness with which man is in con-
tact and .from whom man can receive help and support. James 
pointed out that it is literally true that men feel themselves 
to be in touch with a 'More' or the same quality from which 
help, strength, and consolation come as though rrom outside of 
themselves. As we saw in the last chapter, James felt that the 
'More' on its hither side is probably nothing other than the 
subconscious continuation or a man's conscious life. But what 
the 'More' is on its i:·arther side, James said, is a matter of 
individual over-·belief, i.e. , a matter of .f"ai th. 
According to Jaines's own private over-belief, the .further 
limits of man's being plunge into a dimension of existence 
totally other than the sensible and merely understandable world. 
James £elt that whether we call this region mystical or super-
24Ibid., p. 310. 
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natural, we belong to this region in a very intimate way, be-
cause our ideal impulses originate there. 25 They~ originate 
there, he said, because they possess us in a manner for which 
we cannot account. The fact that this mystical region pro-
duces real effects in the empirical world indicates that it is 
real itself and not merely idea1. 26 
When we commune with it, work is actually done upon 
our finite personality, for we are turned into new 
men, and consequences in the way of conduct follow 
in the natural world upon our regenerative change. 
But that which produces effects within another real-
ity must be termed a reality itself, so I feel as if 
we had no philosophic excuse for calling the unseen 
or mystical world unreal.27 . · 
James called this higher part of the universe 'God.' "God is 
the natural appellation, for us Christians at least, for the 
supreme reality, so I will call this higher part of the uni-
verse by the name of God. 1128 
Although James conceived God as the "higher part of the 
universe," indeed the highest part, he did not think of him 
as being totally unlike man. From James's point of view, both 
God and man are personal beings--personal beings who are exist-
25rt is not always clear what William James meant by the 
word 'ideal.' He used the word variously in different con-
texts. In general, the term seems to refer in one way or 
another to the conceptual order. However, in the term, 'ideal 
impulses,' 'ideal' seems to be roughly equivalent to 'noble.' 
An ideal impulse would seem to be an impulse to conduct one-
self according to the highest standards of excellence conceived 
by the mind. 
26Here the term 'ideal' means 'conceptual.' 
2?James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 389. 
28Ibid. 
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ing in time and working out a history. Thus, James did not 
conceive of God as eternal and immutable. Nor did he conceive 
God to be infinite. From James's point of view, to say that 
God is infinite, or without limit, suggests that there is no-
thing outside of him, that his being somehow includes all 
other beings as parts or aspects of himself. In James's mind, 
such an infinite, eterrlal, and immutable God would be identi-
cal with the Absolute posited by the Idealists, and James felt 
that the postulation of the Absolute was in no way warranted 
by experience. Furthermore, in James's opin~on, the Absolute 
was totally foreign to human life and could have no appeal 
for the common man. As awesome and admirable as an infi.ni te, 
eternal, and immutable Absolute might seem to be, James could 
not see how it could elicit sympathy, love or friendly cooper-
ation from ordinary people, for friendship implies some common 
ground, some similarity or likeness, however imperfect. 29 
Hence, the God of William James is a finite, temporal God, 
who, like man, is working for the salvation and perfection of 
the world. In James's view, man and God share at least some 
common ideals; they both· have their work to do; they both have 
their problems. Thus there is basis for sympathy and friendly 
cooperation; in fact, James was inclined to feel tbat God and 
man need each other. 
We and God have business with each other; and in opening 
ourselves to his influence our deepest destiny is ful-
filled. The universe, at those parts of it which our 
29see above, Chapter II, pp. 33-3?, for fuller treatment 
of James's objections to the Absolute. 
r 
personal being constitutes, takes a turn genuinely 
for the worse or for the better in proportion as each 
one of us fulfills or evades God's demands.30 
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Although James did not clearly delineate the features of 
his God, certain characteristics are easily discernible. As 
we have already noted, James conceived the divine part of the 
universe to be more than merely an impersonal force. He con-
ceived God to be a personal being capable of knowledge, love, 
and action: "He must be cognizant and responsive in some way."3l 
And, James wrote, "He must do."32 For James, God was the 
powerful ally of his own ideals. Writing· to Thomas Davidson 
in the early 1880's, James said: 
.. 
• • • I find myself less and less able to do without 
him [Godl. He need not be an all-including "subjec-
tive U..."li ty 3 3 of the uni verse. "7. . All I mean is that 
there must be some subjective unity in the universe 
which has purposes commensurable with my own, and which 
is at the same time large enough to be, among all the 
powers that may be there, the strongest •••• In saying 
"God exists" all I imply is that my purposes are cared 
for by a mind so powerful as on the whole to control 
the drift of the universe.34 · 
James believed in God not because he had any direct mys-
tical experience of the divine reality, but rather because he 
30James, The Varieties of Religious .l:!Xperience, p. 389. 
31James's reply to a questionnaire, The Letters of William 
James, II, 213. 
32Ibid. 
33The word 'subjective,' as it is used here, is not contra-
posed to the word 'objective.' It seems to suggest inwardness, 
and the term, 'subjective unity,' seems to refer to a personal 
consciousness of some kind. 
34Perry, The ThoE)ght and Character of William James, 
Briefer Version, p. 1 • 
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needed God. In reply to a question which asked if he believed 
because he experienced God's presence, James wrote: "No, but 
rather because I need it so that it 'must' be true."35 Accord-
ing to Ralph Barton Perry, James needed God and religion as 
"a reenf"orcement of the moral will."36 
While James disclaimed any mystical experience of God on 
his own part, he admitted that he was influenced in his belief 
by the testimony of the countless people who had been gifted 
with mystical intuition and by "the whole tradition of reli-
gious people, to which something in me makes admiring re-
sponse. "37 He felt that the .fact that he could respond so 
sympathetically to people who did claim to have experienced 
God's presence indicated that there was perhaps a germ of 
mysticism even in him. "The whole line of testimony on this 
point is so strong that I am unable to pooh-pooh it away. No 
doubt there is a germ in me of something similar that makes 
response. 11 38 
William James classed himself as a supernaturalist--not 
a refined supernaturalist but a crass one. In contrast with 
refined supernaturalism which bars ideal entities from inter-
fering causally in the course of phenomenal events, the crass 
35James's reply to a questionnaire, The Letters of William 
James, II, 213. 
36Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, II, 354. 
37James's reply to a questionnaire, The Letters of William 
James, II, 213. 
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supernaturalism to which James professed allegiance "admits 
miracles and providential leadings, and finds no intellectual 
difficulty in mixing the idea139 and the real worlds together 
by interpolating influences from the ideal region among the 
rorces that causally determine the real world's details. 1140 
In James's mind, the empirical world had to be somehow 
different in consequence of God's existence. It seemed incred-
ible to him that no concrete particular of experience should 
alter its complexion in consequence of God's being there. 
James felt that the world viewed religiously must be concretely 
different from a purely materialistic universe. Although he 
was not sure what all the concrete facts constituting the 
differences are, he was sure that the influx of energy which 
people experience in the raith-state and the prayer-state is 
one of them. He was certa~n that in such states, something 
ideal actually exerts an influence on man, raises the level of 
his personal energy, and produces regenerative erfects unat-
tainable in other ways. 
The whole drift of my education goes to persuade me that 
the .world or our present consciousness is only one out or 
many worlds of consciousness that exist, and those other 
worlds must contain experiences which have a meaning for 
our life also; and tha~ although in the main their ex-
periences and those of this world keep discrete, yet 
the two oecome continuous at certain points, and higher 
390nce _again, the meaning of the word 'ideal' is not imme-
diately evident. Apparently, however, an 'ideal world' in 
~his context does not mean one that is merely conceptual. ~he 
term seems to refer to that unseen world which is the object 
of our religious aspirations. 
40James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 392. 
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energies filter in. By being faithful in my poor 
measure to this over-belief, I seem to myself to keep 
more sane and true. I can, of course, put myself into 
the sectarian scientist-rs-attitude, and imagine vividly 
that the world of sensations and of scientific laws and 
objects may be all. But whenever I do this, I hear 
that inward monitor of which W. K. Clifford once wrote, 
whispering the word 'bosh!' Humbug is humbug, even 
though it bear the scientific name, and the total ex-
pression of human experience, as I view it objectively, 
invincibly urges me beyond the narrow 'scientific' 
bounds. Assuredly, the real world is of a different 
temperament,--more intricately built than physical 
science allows. So my objective and my subjective con-
science both hold me to the over-belief which I express. 
Who knows whether the faithfulness of individuals here 
below to their own poor over-beliefs may not actually 
help God in turn to be more effectively faithful to his 
own greater tasks?41 
The over-beliefs of most religious people, as James pointed 
out, include belief in some kind of life after death. In 
James's early manhood, however, his belief in immortality was 
never very strong. What was important to him was that his 
ideals would be cared for in eternity, not necessarily that 
he would be around to see to the matter himself. But as he 
grew older his faith in immortality grew stronger. In re-
sponse to the question, "Why?", he wrote, "Because I am just 
getting fit to live."42 
In 1904, James wrote the following to his friend Carl 
Stumpf: "I never felt the rational need of immortality ••• 
but as I grow older I confess that I feel the practical need 
of it much more than I ever did before; and that combines with 
41~., p. 391. 
42James's reply to a questionnaire, The Letters of William 
James, II, 214. 
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reasons ••• to give me a growing faith in its reality."43 
Indeed as James grew older he began to feel even a rational 
need for immortality, for death began to appear to him as a 
senseless waste, the inexplicable negation of goodness. Writ-
ing to his friend, Miss Frances R. Morse, in 1904 about the 
death of Sarah Whitman, James said: "Everything in this beauti-
ful world is good except old age and death if one supposes no 
'behind the veil' of any kind."44 
The religious faith of William James was truly the mature 
faith of a reflective man. It was not the blind belief with 
. 
' 
which a less speculative person might accept without question 
something handed down to him by others. On the contrary, 
William James examined the issues, assessed the evidence, con-
sidered the stakes and, in spite of the lack of proof, deli-
berately espoused the religious hypothesis. The man, who in 
his youth had felt the need to believe in God but whose scien-
tific bias had made accepting anything without proof extremely 
difficult, came to see that his very need to believe was in a 
matter this momentous sufficient warrant for doing so. He came 
to realize, too, that the very presence of the need for God 
could very well be an indication that the Divinity needed exists. 
In William James's opinion, the need for God and the need 
to believe in him are universal needs--exigencies of the whole 
human race. Religious faith, he said, is essential not only 
43Perry, The Thou~ht and Character of William James, 
Briefer Version, p. 26 • 
44Ibid., p. 269. 
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to the well-being of every individual but to the perfection of 
the world as a whole. For the perfection of the world requires 
that each man pursue that which is good in life with courage, 
enthusiasm, and heroic generosity. In the view of James, how-
ever, virtues of heroic proportions are possible only to men 
of religious faith. Hence, James asserted that religion is 
man's most important function in the world. And inspired by 
a desire to do ~ best for the world, as well as for the God 
with whom he shared a common concern for goodness, James under-
took, as his own distinctively religious task, that of making 
men realize that by being faith:f'ul to their religious beliefs, 
by living in the light of their religious faith, they could 
make their greatest contributions to the universe. In the 
following excerpt from a letter to Miss Frances R. Morse, 
William James explained the religious purpose which motivated 
him in writing The Varieties of Religious E;perience: 
••• the problem I have set myself is a hard one: 
first, to defend (against all the prejudices of my 
"class") "experience" against "philosophy" as being 
the real backbone of the world's religious life--I 
mean prayer, guidance, and all that sort of thing 
immediately and privately felt, as against high and 
noble general views of our destiny and the world's 
meaning; and second, to make the hearer or reader 
believe, what I myself invincibly do believe, that, 
although all the special manifestations of religion 
may have been absurd (I mean its creeds and theories), 
yet the life of it as a whole is mankind's most impor-
tant function. A task well-nigh impossible, I fear, 
and in which I shall fail; but to attempt it is ~ 
religious act.45 
45The t,./ri tings of William James, pp. 740-41. 
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